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esearchers in  the social sciences are at the forefront of  the urgent search for  k  etter ways of managing fisheries resources. The papers in the present volume 
contain a significant record of the search: they examine the concepts of community 
management and common property in coastal fisheries; and look at how community 
management operates in a range of past and present fisheries systems in Asia and 
the Pacific. 
All  over the world, people are seeking viable solutions to  the  critical challenges 
of the management of stressed and degrading natural resources. More than in any 
other region.  fisheries resources in  Asla and the Pacific are important sources of 
food, income, jobs and cultural heritage. Over the recent decades, many governments 
have adopted management approaches suited to expanding, commercial fisheries 
development -  relying on central control, monitoring and surveillance. Traditional 
management practices and codes  of small-scale fishers often have been overlooked. 
The new approaches have often been ineffective in conserving resources and ensuring 
equity and economic efficiency in their use. Fishers tend to flout the government 
management arrangements or Find ways around them; and governments lack resources 
for their full implementation. 
Achieving more effective management will be complex but there Is  a consensus 
that the way forward requires greater community involvement. A quick fix or an 
easy answer, however, does not exist. For  example, a greater level  of community 
management will  need considerable capacity building so that the community can 
cope with managing the present  stresses on the resources caused by  increasing 
population numbers, degraded present state of resources and coastal ecosystems. 
Many of the complexities are discussed in this volume whlch is  published as a 
contribution to the world's search for a way forward. 
Meryl J.  Wllllarns 
Director General 
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Is  volume reports the proceedings of an International scientific meeting to  document 
the concepts, methods and experlences in communlty-based  management and  T" 
common property management for coastal fisheries In Asia and the Pacific. A number 
of  general conclusions and recommendations about coastal fisheries community- 
based management can be made from the papers and discussion at the meeting. 
The conventional wisdom that fisheries resources which are held as  communal property 
are subject to eventual overexploitation and degradation and that a centralized 
management authority is needed to manage resources is  not equivocal. Traditional 
community-based management systems have an important role to  play in the management 
of coastal Fisheries. Recent investigatlon on  community-based fisheries management 
has shown that when left to their own devices, communities of fishers, under certain 
conditlons, may use fisheries resources sustainably. 
vli ROBERT  5. POMEROY 
Asian Fisheries Social Science Research Network 
In terna  tional Center for Living A qua  tic Resources Management 
MCPO Box 2631, 0718 Makati, Metro Manila 
Phili/pin  es 
Background 
I 
n many countries in  Asia and the Pa- 
cific, national governments have increased 
thelr role in  the management of coastal 
fisheries. The role of local level control, 
through traditional management and cus- 
tom, has correspondingly diminished. By 
appropriating  this control over coastal fish- 
eries management, the national govern- 
ment has often underestimated the ca- 
pacities of coastal communities, learned 
through often long and difficult experi- 
ence, to  manage local fisheries resource 
systems to meet their needs. In  many 
instances, the national government has 
overestimated its ability to  manage these 
same resources (see Ruddle, this vol.). 
The dissolution of  local  level control 
of  coastal fisheries management has been, 
in part, the result of institutional restructuring 
under colonial admlnistrations: the rise 
of the nation-state; technological mod- 
ernlzation: population growth; increas- 
ing efforts by private investors to gain 
"ICLARM  Contribution No. 1093. 
control over coastal and marine resources: 
and socioeconomic differentiation and  un- 
equal concentration of power within coastal 
cornmunitles. When community-level in- 
stitutional arrangements for coastal fisheries 
management are undermined, the usual 
common-property resource management 
regimes (in which group site and behavioral 
rules are specified), have been, in many 
instances, replaced by  open-access re- 
gimes, a free-for-all with uncontrolled entry 
for resource use and the economic in- 
centive for the user to extract as much 
of the resource as possible before oth- 
ers do. 
Fisheries management in the Asia-Pacific 
region has been heavily influenced by the 
Western concept of the need For  a centralized 
administrative authority. This approach 
Involves little effective consultation with 
the target beneficiaries and is  often not 
suited to  developing countries with limited 
financial means and expertise to manage 
fisheries resources in  widely dispersed 
fishing grounds. Western approaches to 
fisheries management have been dominated 
by the assumption of  free access to the resource and lack of  power of a single 
partlclpant in the fishery to  prevent others 
from exploiting the same  fishing grounds. 
A further dominant assumption is that any 
fishery must be characterized by intense 
competition whlch will inevitably lead to 
overexploitation and the  eventual dissipation 
of resource rents (profits), the so-called 
"tragedy of the commons". Recent research 
on small-de  coastal fisheries in developing 
countries in Asia and the Pacific has shown, 
however, that some  degree of regulated 
access, enforced at  the local level through 
community Institutions and social practices, 
appears to be the rule  rather than the 
exception  (Hviding  and  Jul-Larsen 
1993). 
Without denying that the traditional 
systems  of  fisheries management can often 
be inequltable and ineffectlve, state in- 
terventions that have chosen to ignore 
them have seldom fared better. National 
governments have, for the most part, failed 
to  develop an adequate  substitute for or 
complement to these traditional resource 
management systems. The promotion of 
nationalization or  privatization as  routine 
pollcy solutions has not solved the problem 
of resource degradation and overexploitation 
and,  in many  instances, has deprived large 
portions of the population of their Ilvell- 
hood (Bromley and Cernea 1989).  In this 
light, devolution of  major resource man- 
agement and allocation declslons to the 
local  level may thus be more effective 
than management efforts of distant, un- 





The growing realization of  the need for 
a stronger community role in  resource 
management can be seen in a wide range 
of programs and policles worldwide. Both 
Increased local participatlon and institu- 
tional  restructuring have given greater 
control of  resource management to  the 
community and resource users. 
The advantages of  community-based 
resource management (CBRM) systems 
have been well documented In  various 
parts of the world (Korten 1986: Berkes 
1989;  McCay  and  Acheson  1990; 
Poffenberger 1990: Bromley 1992).  The 
better known of these Initiatives have been 
In irrigation and social Forestry, but similar 
approaches are being applied in upland 
agriculture and wildlife. Communlty-based 
management efforts in  fisherles are pri- 
marily still in a developmental stage.  This 
Is  due in part to  the complexity of  coastal 
and marine resource systems; the social 
and cultural structure of fishing commu- 
nitles: and the independent nature of fishers. 
Examples of community-based manage- 
ment in  fisheries do exist, however, In 
the United States (Acheson 1975),  Japan 
(Ruddle 1985, 1989). the South Pacific 
(Ruddle and Johannes 1985)  and the Phil- 
ippines (White 1989). 
Community-based management strives 
for a more active people's participation 
In  the planning and implementation of 
fisheries management. CBRM starts from 
the premise that people have the Innate 
capacity to improve their quality of life. 
Often  what is  needed is  support to or- 
ganize and educate people to mobilize 
available resources to  meet their needs. 
The potential advantages of CBRM in- 
clude effectiveness and equity. CBRM can 
be more economical in terms of admin- 
lstration and enforcement than national. 
centralized systems. CBRM involves self- 
management where the community takes 
responsibility for monitorlng and enforce- 
ment. CBRM provldes a sense of ow ier- 
ship over the resource which makes the 
community far more responsible for long- 
term sustainability of  resources. This is 
accomplished by establishing a resource 
management regime and rules of  behavior for resource use.  By  making maximum 
use of indigenous knowledge and expertise, 
CBRM allows each communlty to  develop 
a management strategy whlch meets its 
own particular needs and conditions. CBRM 
permits a sufficient degree of flexibility 
and can easily be modifled. Involvement 
of  the  community in the formulation and 
implementation of management measures 
will  lead to a  higher degree of accept- 
ability and a stronger commitment to  comply 
with the marlagement strategy (Korten 
1986; Cernea 199  1 ). 
Community-based management is not. 
however,  a  panacea  for  resource 
management. It may not be suitable for 
wey fishing community. Many communities 
may not be willing to  or capable of taking 
on the responsibility of  CBRM.  Not  all 
elements  of fisheries management authority 
can, or should, be allocated to the local 
community.  For  many  communities, 
economlc, social and/or political incentlves 
to  engage in community management may 
not be present. The risks involved  in 
changlng fisheries management strategies 
may be too high for some communities 
and fishers. 
Despite the many advantages of CBRM, 
it is unllkely that local communities can 
successfully  implement  fisheries 
management on their own. A more dynamic 
partnership must evolve. using the  capacities 
and Interests of  the local community, 
complemented by the  ability of the national 
government to  provlde enabling legislation 
and other assistance. This partnership can 
be called  co-management, where the 
national government and the communlty 
share  authority.  Community-based 
management is a central element of co- 
management. The  amount of  authority that 
the national government  and the  community 
have will differ and depend upon the  country 
and site-specific condltlons (Pinkerton 1989: 
Berkes et  al.  199  1 ).  It  should be noted 
that  by  itself,  the  planning  and 
implementation of  fisheries  management 
can be a complex undertaking, which may 
not yield immediate results. in addition, 
many of the  solutions to  sustainable fisheries 
management may lie in  sectors outside 
fisheries. When combined with community/ 
economlc development and integrated 
coastal resource management activities, 
these concerns can often be addressed. 
Rlghts, Reglmes and 
Instltutlonal Arrangements 
An essential ingredient for success of 
any resource management system, whether 
communlty-based or centralized. is the 
system of  incentives and sanctions - rights 
and rules - for influencing individual behavior 
of resource users and dependents. Thus, 
at  the  core  of  community-based 
management are the issues of property 
rights, resource management regimes and 
institutional arrangements. Specifically of 
interest in  CBRM are common-property 
regimes. Common-property regimes arc 
forms of  management grounded in a set 
of accepted rights and rules by a group 
of resource users for the sustainable and 
interdependent use of collective goods. 
A collective good is defined as  a resource 
managed and controlled by a group of 
users (Pomeroy 1994). 
Common-property management issues 
have recently  received  much greater 
attentlon since they are  felt to  be critical 
to the practical  work on development 
projects, primarily agriculture. forestry and 
fisheries (Bromley 1892).  In  many parts 
of the  world, rights to  common property 
are all  that separate the poor  From 
destltution. It has been pointed out  that 
development planners must eventually 
deal, elther explicitly or implicitly, wlth 
the issue of  Institutional arrangements for 
property rights and rules over natural 
resources (Bromley and Cernea  1989). 
Renewed interest In the role of community- 
level Institutions and the Importance of indigenous knowledge and traditional values 
and institutions in  the management of 
common property is a result, in part, of 
past failures of development projects and 
the search for sustainable alternatives to 
existing systems of resource use. 
The transfer of management control from 
local communltles to the national gov- 
ernment has often resulted in the replace- 
ment of common-property regimes by open 
access. 
Depending upon the conditions of the 
area and the resource, it may be more 
appropriate to  restore common-property 
regimes than to  promote privatization or 
nationalization. This 1s  due  in part to  pre- 
vailing sociocultural values of resource 
users which often conflict with private 
property,  and past failures of  nationali- 
zation (Bromley and Cernea 1889).  Suc- 
cessful common-property management 
may be found through a combination of 
approaches. The application of commu- 
nity-based management and exclusive use 
rights, such as territorial use rights in fisheries 
(TURFS), presents one  viable approach. 
Fisheries management policies in de- 
veloping countries are shaped through 
a convergence of  institutional interests 
among  resource  users,  resource 
stakeholders, community, local govern- 
ment, national government and interna- 
tional agencies. Those concerned with 
reorienting fisheries management to  pro- 
mote  social and sustainable policies need 
to recognize this convergence of  insti- 
tutions and interests ifthey are to restructure 
them effectively. 
The Workshop 
It is within the context of the concep- 
tual  discussion above that an interna- 
tional workshop on community-based 
resource management and common prop- 
erty of coastal fisheries in  Asia and the 
Pacific was convened. In  recent years, 
throughout the region. an increasing number 
of community-based  coastal fisheries 
management projects have been under- 
taken. These projects are being imple- 
mented through a variety of strategies. 
This is good In  the sense that a number 
of approaches to  CBRM are being tried. 
It Is  bad in the sense that many of the 
project planners and staff are not fully 
aware of past experiences In community- 
based management or of the recent, vast 
literature on CBRM  and common-prop- 
erty resources. Some projects are being 
carried out from "scratch", going through 
the same. often unsuccessful  processes 
as  previous projects. There was a Felt need 
to bring together researchers and prac- 
titioners from around the region and the 
world who could consolidate the concepts, 
methods and experiences in community- 
based management and common-prop- 
erty resources in  coastal fisheries. This 
pool of information could then be made 
more readily available to their counter- 
parts in Asia and the Pacific for improv- 
ing project planning and implementation. 
In  june 1983, the International Asso- 
ciation for the Study of Common Prop- 
erty held its fourth annual conference In 
Manila, Philippines. Earlier that  year, the 
lnternational Center for Livlng Aquatic 
Resources Management (ICLARM) in the 
Philippines approached the lnternational 
Development Research Centre (IDRC) and 
Ford  Foundation  to cofund a post-con- 
ference workshop focusing upon commu- 
nity-baed management and  common prop- 
erty of coastal fisheries. The IDRC agreed 
to finance the workshop and suggested 
that a concurrent one  on upland resources 
would be valuable. 
The three-day workshop was held on 
21 -23 June 1993,  hosted by the International 
Institute for Rural Reconstruction in Sllang, 
Cavite. ICLARM organized the program 
for the coastal fisheries workshop and 
handled the local arrangements for the 
uplands workshop, which was set up in turn by IDRC. Over 70  people from around 
the  world attended both workshops. The 
proceedings of the uplands workshop have 
been published by lDRC (Thompson 1993). 
The general goal of the coastal Rsher- 
les workshop and Its proceedings was to 
document the concepts, methods and 
experiences in  community-based  man- 
agement  and common-property resources 
In Asia and the Pacific. These ideas would 
serve as  guidelines for wider dissemina- 
tion and utilization in the region. Four- 
teen experts from Asia, the Pacific and 
worldwide were invited to present pa- 
pers dealing with specific topics on the 
above theme. (See the Appendices For 
the  workshop program, paper titles, au- 
thors and participants). 
The workshop Itself was organized so 
that both the coastal fisheries and the 
uplands groups met  together on the  first 
day to listen to and discuss three con- 
cept papers on community-based  man- 
agement and common property. The two 
groups then split up on the second and 
third days to follow their own agenda. 
They came back together briefly at the 
end of  the thlrd day to present a sum- 
mary of the papers and group  discussions. 
The  Papers 
The contrlbutions at the  workshop are 
classlfled into three parts - concepts, meth- 
ods  and experiences. The three concept 
papers review recent analytical Frameworks 
and empirical evldence about common- 
property resources and CBRM. The eight 
method papers discuss a variety of  criti- 
cal issues and procedures For implementing 
CBRM. The three experience papers, all 
from the Philippines, discuss lessons learned 
from ongoing  and completed community- 
based  coastal  fisheries  management 
projects. 
Recent works by a number OF researchers 
and practitioners have questioned the 
conventional wisdom of Hardin's "Tragedy 
of the Commons" ( 1 W),  common property 
and the necessity For centralized government 
regulation OF Fisheries (Berkes 1 888:  Berkes 
and Feeny 1990;  Feeny et  al. 1990;  Ostrom 
1990; McKean  1992: Bardharn  1993; 
Seabright 1993). These challenges to 
established knowledge have been brought 
about by the accumulation of more empirical 
evidence on common-property resources 
and community-based management systems 
(NRC  1986; Bromley 1992).  This has resulted 
in a new conceptual focus of  inquiry based 
on the role of institutions and property 
rights in resource management, the  topic 
of the first three papers. 
David  Feehy  reviews a  number of 
frameworks, both conventional and more 
recent,  For  understandlng  resource 
management in the context of common 
property. Feeny emphasizes that recent 
literature in  economics has recognized 
a fourth category or  pillar oFvariables for 
describing economic  systems - institutions. 
Together with resource endowments, 
preferences and technology, institutions, 
the 'rules  OF  the game",  shape the 
possibilities  for  economic  activity. 
Institutional arrangements, in general, and 
property rights, in particular, form the nature 
of resource use and management OF the 
commons. 
Reviewing the works OF Hardin et al. 
on  the nature of common-property resource 
management, Feeny points out that more 
recent theoretical and empirical studies 
on the subject illustrate that while the 
Tragedy of the Commons  approach should 
not be ignored, the  conclusions it draws 
are  not  unequivocal.  Management 
mechanisms for common-property resources 
need to  acknowledge the importance of 
incentives for cooperation and individual 
self-interest, as  well as  balance the  claims 
of multiple uses and users. The more recent 
work argues that Institutions matter, as 
does the abillty to enforce collective 
agreements and innovate and accommodate 
evolving challenges. Feeny concludes that "the  frameworks imply a strong  and central 
role for local knowledge" In  developing 
a strategy for common-property resource 
management. 
Building on the general discussion of 
the different frameworks for understanding 
management of common-property  re- 
sources, Elinor Ostrom discusses results 
from the  study of  common-pool resources 
using a  specific framework of analysis. 
The Institutional Analysis and Develop- 
ment (IAD) Framework, developed by 
Ostrom and her colleagues at  the  Work- 
shop in Political Theory  and Policy Analysis 
at Indiana University, focuses on the Iden- 
tification of  contextual attributes that shape 
various action situations, i.e.,  resource 
management strategies. The IAD links the 
characteristics of the physical world with 
those of the general cultural setting of 
the resource users; the  specific rules-in- 
use that affect the incentives individuals 
face in a particular situation; the  patterns 
of interaction among  the resource users; 
and the likely outcomes. 
Recent research has applied this frame- 
work to  common-pool resource systems 
worldwide. A result of this research has 
been the identification of  'design  prin- 
ciples" which appear  to  characterize most 
of the robust common-pool resource in- 
stitutlons. While these design principles 
illustrate that community-governed com- 
mons can be sustainable, they are sus- 
ceptible to internal and external threats 
to this sustainability. Ostrorn discusses 
these threats, as  well as  coping rnecha- 
nisrns. The conclusion drawn from Ostrom's 
paper Is  that while threats do exist to 
effective and sustainable self-governed 
common-pool resources, evidence reveals 
that these resources and their institutions 
In  many countries can be long-lasting. 
Discussing the issues of property rights 
and in  particular, common-property re- 
sources. In  the context of coastal fisher- 
ies, Fikret Berkes argues about the need 
to  reassess the policy implications of  prop- 
erty rlghts and management of coastal 
fisheries worldwlde. This should include 
an abandonment of the conventional ideals 
of open access and centralized govern- 
ment regulatlon. Berkes contends  that many 
of  the problems in coastal fisheries world- 
wide are not due  mainly to  the resource 
users but to Western-trained  resource 
managers who still confuse common-prop- 
erty regimes with open access and are 
convinced of  the necessity of  a higher 
authority. 
Similar to Feeny, Berkes states  that recent 
work on common-property resources il- 
lustrates that left to  their own devices, 
communities of  fishers may use stocks 
sustainably under certain condltions.  If 
communlty-based  management of flsh- 
eries Is  to  succeed, the conditions con- 
ducive to  sustainable use of stocks by fishers 
must be produced. This means that the 
managers must create a management role 
for the community of flshers. Institutions 
must be built which enhance the capa- 
bility of fishers for resource management, 
including the reorganization of property 
rights. Berkes avers that co-management, 
involving more participatory decision- 
making, organized fishers' groups and 
incentives for cooperation, as  mentioned 
by both Feeny ark  Ostrom, is consistent 
with sustainable coastal fisheries devel- 
opment. 
The eight papers presented at  the second 
part of the workshop discuss the range 
of  issues and procedures In  the devel- 
opment and implementation of effective 
community-based coastal fisheries rnan- 
agement. 
Building on Berkes' artlcle. Ken Ruddle 
asserts that it is  becoming increasingly 
clear that CBRM  systems may have an 
important role in the co-management OF 
coastal fisherles. Reviewing various fisheries 
regulatory techniques In  the context of 
small-scale tropical fisheries, Ruddle ad- 
vocates the property rights alternative in 
which communities or groups of individual rlghts holders make and enforce thelr own 
regulatlons for a defined resource area. 
such as  the TUW  concept. However, to 
succeed. the property rlghts approach must 
be nested in a system of  traditional com- 
munity-based management. Ruddle points 
out  that traditional community-based marine 
resource management systems in the Asla- 
Paciflc reglon are or were managed by 
systems of property rights, defined user 
groups, defined resource terrltorles, and 
rights and rules which closely reflect so- 
cial organiations and local power structure. 
While recognizing that tradltlonal CBRM 
systems have difficulties, Ruddle states 
that they have a future In  a form of co- 
management with some higher level of 
government. To be effective, however, 
an explicit government policy will  be 
required regarding the scope and power 
of communlty management, flexible to 
the needs of  local communities. 
The inability of the state to  slow down 
or reverse environmental degradation has 
forced a rethinking of the problem and 
its solutions. Grassroots movements for 
people empowerment. developed through 
years of struggle, are now flndlng sup- 
port in environmental Initiatives world- 
wide. Mary  Racelis afflrms that people 
who  are organized, aware of their rights  1  and ready to  exercise them, and partners 
In  the planning and Implementation  of 
resource management systems, can bring 
about sustainable development. People- 
centered resource management can en- 
able an  effective collaboration among  flshers,  \ 
i  nongovernmental organizations (NCOs),  'I 
people's organizations, the government  \ 
and others.  /-+ 
Richard Pollnac, building on the argu- 
ments made by Racelis for  people's par- 
ticlpatlon in  fisheries co-management. 
specifies it further through fishers'  co- 
operative-type organizations. While various 
types of fishers' organizations such as NWs 
and stakeholder assoclatlons have been 
suggests that fishers' cooperatives may 
be the most appropriate form since It is 
probably the most widespread and well- 
known formal organization of  Fishers 
worldwide. While the literature Is  replete 
with reviews of failed fishers' coopera- 
tives, recent studies have systematically 
and quantitatively identified numerous 
factors influencing the relative success 
and failure of this type of  organization. 
Pollnac asserts that these factors, when 
used systematically, can provide a more 
rigorous understanding on  whether fishers' 
cooperatives can or should be used to 
facilitate people's  participation  in  the 
management process.  '\ 
\ohn  Kurlen points out that the "corn-,. 
munity" about which we  talk so  much in 
community-based  management  has 
changed slgnificantly with time as  It has 
been incorporated into larger national and 
international systems. Social, economic. 
cultural, technologlcal, resource and in- 
stitutional conditions of the community 
have altered and In many cases a variety 
of conflicts have arisen.  Before we can 
begin to develop or reinvigorate com- 
munity-based management systems. Kurien 
emphasizes the need to  redefine and re- 
discover the "community" in the  context 
of today's social, economic and political 
realities. Rebuilding community must be 
undertaken through the establishment of 
'communlty  property" over coastal wa- 
ters, sociocconomic development, inte- 
grated multlsectoral coastal management, 
and the forging of a new relationship with 
the global society and economy. Kurien 
concludes that the coastal community has 
changed and as  such, our approaches to 
community-based management must bal- 
ance the forces which have brought about 
this change. 
Hal McArthur describes ways to  enhance 
communicatlon between and  among fishers 
and fisher groups  and researchers, planners 
and development practitioners.  With 
suggested for people's participation, Pollnac  Increasing pressure on coastal resources from multlplc users, he suggests that 
dialogue can resolve conflicts  and produce 
a consensus about sustainable resource 
management strategies. The various 
methods and techniques developed to 
create dialogue with community-based 
clients can be grouped and evaluated in 
terms  of  the underlying  conceptual 
orientation, the  objectlves of  the actlvity, 
the research framework used and the desired 
type of  relatlonship with the  community. 
Of the three major conceptual orientations 
for creating community dlalogue - transfer 
of technology approach, agroecology and 
participatory action research - McArthur 
states that the latter two concepts are 
the most relevant to marine and coastal 
resources  management.  Due  to the 
complexity of coastal fisheries management. 
various aspects of these two conceptual 
orientations may need to be combined 
Into a research and intervention strategy 
to  generate information and communicntion 
for management. 
The management of small-scale coastal 
fisherles requires, among other activities, 
planning and the setting of objectlves. 
and this in turn needs  a good understanding 
of the fishers, their values and culture, 
the resource attributes, institutions and 
the  overall environment in which the fishers 
operate.  According  to Kuperan  and 
Mustapha, without prior knowledge of 
these attributes, any attempts to man- 
age will  often be met with serious re- 
sistance and noncompliance. The objec- 
tives of the managers and the  fishers can 
often be different and conflicting.  This 
requires, as  discussed by McArthur, the 
creation of dialogue to develop a con- 
sensus  to  ensure effective management. 
Co-management can provide a forum for 
fishers to  partlcipate in decislonmaking, 
as  well as  have the  authority to  make and 
implement regulatory decisions on their 
own. Kuperan and Mustapha conclude. 
however, that among  the  Southeast  Asian 
countries, only the Phillppines has a high 
prospect for adoption of co-management 
in the near future. 
Much has been written about the Inability 
of national governments to slow down 
or  reverse the overexploitation  and 
d-egradatlon  of coastal fisheries. In many 
countrles In Asia. the  role of  the  national 
government is  being replaced by NGOs 
which can facllltate development  through 
people's  participation and community 
organizing. What is the role of the  national 
government  and  NGOs  in  resource 
management7 Angel Alcala and Fred Vande 
Vusse see a need for the  government to 
recognize resource users as  the  real day- 
to-day  managers of  coastal resources. 
Discussing  the  Philippines,  but 
acknowledging  that  the  issues  and 
challenges It  faces are similar to those 
In  other Asian countrles, they advocate 
a  more developmental than regulatory 
approach  of  the  government  to 
management. The government should 
encourage and assist communitles and 
resource users in building their capacity 
to manage fisheries resources. Coastal 
communitles should be urged to move 
away from de Facto open access through 
the use of property rights to  limit entry, 
such as TURFS. 
In the Phlllpplne setting.  Grlito  Monuevo 
recommends a facilitative role for a service 
NGO, essential in helping build the  nec- 
essary social Infrastructure for implementing 
community-based  management. In  do- 
ing its work, the NGO can assist In com- 
munity organizing, training and educa- 
tion, livelihood development, advocacy 
and  financial  resource  mobilizatlon, 
Aiionuevo argues  that comrnunlty-based 
management, to  be effective and sustainable. 
must assign property rights to  the resource 
base to  Its direct stakeholders - the coastal 
communities and resource users. Moreover, 
community-based management must move 
beyond regulation and address the ba- 
sic factors which cause poverty among 
the coastal inhabitants. Practical experience in community-based 
coastal fisheries management in the  Asia- 
Pacific region is much more limited than 
in other resource systems  such as  irriga- 
tion and forestry. Yet looking around the 
region it is  possible to find an increas- 
ing number of  coastal fisheries develop- 
ment projects which implement CBRM strat- 
egies. This is especially true for the Phil- 
ippines, where since the  mid- 19805, several 
projects have begun to work with Fish- 
ers to develop community-based  man- 
agement systems for coastal resources. 
In the  third part of the  workshop, the  three 
papers  presented discuss experiences and 
lessons learned from three projects. 
The island-community of  Malalison in 
central Philippines was selected by the 
Aquaculture Department of the  Southeast 
Asian  Fisheries  Development Center 
(SEAFDEC) as  a project slte to  undertake 
a multidisciplinary, development-oriented 
research on  community fisheries resource 
management. The ongoing project has 
multiple objectives including the devel- 
opment of seafarming and searanching 
as alternative livelihood activities: com- 
munity organizing and institution build- 
ing; and regeneration of marine habitats. 
Rene Agbayani and Susan Siar of  SEAFDEC 
report that research and development  ac- 
tivities have been undertaken simultaneously 
at the project site. Research conducted 
by SEAFDEC scientists  are  complemented 
by community-organizing activities of an 
NGO.  Several problems have been en- 
countered in project Implementation, such 
as high expectations among project par- 
ticipants of  immediate project benefits; 
lack of  coordination and communication; 
and unstable community leadership. In 
dealing with these  problems and in overall 
project implementation, Agbayani and Siar 
stress the need For  open and continu- 
ous  dialogue and coordination among  re- 
searchers, development  practitioners and 
the community; clearly defined project 
plans and objectives; and strong leader- 
ship  at both the community and project 
management levels. 
The Central Visayas Regional  Project 
(CVRP) had the objective OF addressing 
both land-based and marine resource man- 
agement issues in four provinces in cen- 
tral Philippines. In  addition, the project 
was to reinforce the Philippine govern- 
ment's regionalization or  decentralization 
program and develop both governmen- 
tal and resource users' capability to  manage 
resources. 
Fisheries was only one component of 
the large, World  Bank-funded  regional 
project. Rafael Bojos recounts that  CVRP 
recognized From the  start  that the resource 
users were the real  managers and that 
the  project should be carried out  through 
a co-management approach. The CVRP 
staff and the government worked with 
fishers and the  community to  develop  in- 
stitutional arrangements  in resolving open- 
access problems identified as the main 
cause of resource overexploitation. Re- 
source management interventions and 
development activities were kept simple 
and appropriate to meet the identified 
needs of  the community. Community- 
organizing activities were focused on  the 
barangay or  village, the lowest govern- 
ment administrative level in the Philip- 
pines. Formal Memoranda of  Understanding 
were approved by the Philippine govern- 
ment to  allow for secure resource access 
and management by users. Bojos con- 
cludes  that project implementation must 
be  participative. A sense  of belonging and 
responsibility for  project success must be 
imparted to the participants to  encour- 
age  them to  join and sustain the project 
activities. 
Started  in  the  early  1980s,  the 
multisectoral  Palawan  Integrated Area 
Development Project  initially  aimed at 
improving agricultural production and 
natural resource management for the 
Province of Palawan in the  central western 
Philippines. The project activities were expanded in the late 1980s to address 
issues of environmentally sustainable 
development  through  the  Strategic 
Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan. One 
of the  strategies of SEP  was the promotion 
of CBRM through pilot-testing In dlfferent 
resource systems, including fisheries. Rlcardo 
Sandalo discusses the  experiences of one 
of these pilot-test  projects, the Honda 
Bay  Resource  Management  Program 
(HBRMP). 
In a slrnllar fashion to  the other projects 
described above. HBRMP  included the 
beneficiaries/cooperators as  co-implemen- 
tors and not mere recipients of  project 
activities. Fishers were organized and project 
activities reflected their priorities including 
alternative livelihood, resource enhancement 
and community development strategies. 
Sandalo concludes that two primary el- 
ements are critical for successful com- 
munity-based management: (1  ) the  com- 
munity that utilizes a given resource is 
organized, either formally or informally: 
and (2)  the  organized community actively 
participates in project activities. The ca- 
pability of the organized community to 
take on the responsibilities of resource 
management must be established by the 
project staff at  such a level that sustains 
project strategies and activities over 
time. 
A number of  general conclusions about 
community-based coastal fisheries and 
common-property resources management 
can be made from the papers and dis- 
cussions at the workshop. The conven- 
tional wisdom that fisheries resources held 
as communal property are subject to 
eventual overexploitation and degrada- 
tion and that a centralized management 
authority is  needed is  not unequivocal. 
Traditional community-based management 
systems have an important role to  play. 
Recent lnvestigatlons have shown that 
when left to  their own devices, commu- 
nities of fishers, under certain conditions. 
may use coastal resources sustainably. 
Fishers, the real day-to-day  resource 
managers, must be equal and active par- 
ticipants in resource management. An open 
dialogue must be maintained among all 
the stakeholders. Property rights to  the 
resource must be assigned directly to  its 
stakeholders - the coastal communities 
and resource users. The "community" must 
be relnvigorated through a multisectoral, 
Integrated approach to both resource man- 
agement and community development. 
The community must be provided assistance 
to organize and develop the capability 
to  take responsibility for resource man- 
agement. 
Flsherles resource management insti- 
tutions have not kept pace with our tech- 
nological ability to  exploit the resource. 
The result is  that the management sys- 
tem fails to address the growing prob- 
lems of fisheries overexploltatlon; dissi- 
pation and redlstrlbution of resource rents; 
and conflicts among different groups of 
resource users. The starting point in the 
search for more viable and sustainable 
institutions is to abandon the open-ac- 
cess ideals of the old freedom-of-the-seas 
principle and to  recognize the  failures of 
centralized management. A new manage- 
ment philosophy is  warranted in which 
the fisher can once again become a part 
of the resource management team, bal- 
ancing rights and responsibilities, and 
working in  a  cooperative (rather than 
antagonistic) mode  with the  government 
managers. Such joint management, or co- 
management, is  a  rational extension of 
evolutionary trends in fisheries management 
over the past decades. 
Commitment to CBRM should not be 
taken lightly by either the  community or 
the  government. The implementation of 
community-based management strategies 
Is  complex and takes time. Based on a new  understanding  of  common-property 
resource management, however,  CBRM 
provides a  range of possibilities for sus- 
tainable development of coastal  fisher- 
ies. 
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Background 
ilippine coastal resources are  vast and 
have great productive potential. There  P" 
are 18,000 km of  coastline around 7.100 
islands with a  total  land area of  about 
300,000 km2. The Philippines'  200-mi 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) encloses 
2,300,000  km of marine waters and the 
total annual fisheries production from this 
area is estimated at  2.2 milllon t. About 
75% of the total or 1.6 mlllion t are re- 
portedly taken from municipal waters (1  5 
km  from the shore) which comprise only 
11% (about 270,OM) km) of  the nation's 
marine waters. This is because coastal 
shallows are  much more productive than 
the open ocean and nearly one-thlrd  of 
municipal waters contain three of  the  most 
productive habitats - coral reefs, mangroves 
and seagrass meadows. A good quallty 
Phllippinr coral reef, for example, can  pro- 
vide up  to  30 t of fisheries harvest annu- 
ally f'rom every square kilometer or 60  times 
the average harvest from the same area 
of open sea (Alcala and Comez 1985). 
About one million families or six mll- 
llon individuals depend on  fisheries For  their 
livelihood and a Far  greater number sup- 
plement their diet with protein from the 
catch From part-time fishing or the glean- 
Ing of  shallows at  low  tide. Fisheries products 
are the major source of  dietary protein, 
especially in rural areas. Fisheries resources 
of  all  kinds contribute 5% to the gross 
national product each year. 
The Government's 
Legal  Mandate 
Natural resources in the Philippines are 
state  property. Article XI, Section 2 of  the 
1987 Constitution provides that "All  ... fisheries. forests or timber, wildlife, flora 
and fauna, and other natural resources are 
owned by the State."  This section goes 
on to  declare that "With the exception of 
agricultural lands, all other natural resources 
shall not be alienated"; "The ...  development 
and utilization  of natural resources shall 
be under the full control and supervision 
of the State" and "The State shall protect 
the  nation's marine wealth ... and reserve 
its use and enjoyment exclusively to  Filipino 
citlzens." Article XIII,  Section 7 adds a 
resource allocation provision which may 
be unique. "The State shall protect the rights 
of subsistence fishermen, especially of local 
communities, to  the preferential use of the 
communal marine and fishing resources, 
both inland and offshore." 
A  series of  laws  provides various 
government agencies with jurisdiction over 
coastal resources and a mandate to  protect 
and manage renewable  resources on a 
sustainable basis.  The national agencies 
primarily responsible are the Department 
of Agriculture, particularly the Bureau of 
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, and the 
Department of  Environment and Natural 
Resources (DENR), although more than 20 
separate national government agencies have 
a legal mandate that in some way impinges 
on coastal resource management. The Local 
Government Code of 199  1 transferred broad 
powers over coastal resources from the 
national  government  to  municipal 
governments. These powers are to be 
exercised within their respective municipal 
waters. 
Thus,  the management regime for  all 
Philippine natural resources is defined by 
law as  one  of state property (respublica). 
However, the constitutional provision that 
reserves the use of,marine wealth for a 
limited group. Filipino citizens, introduces 
the key element of a common property 
management reglme (res  communis).  Most 
countries of the world claim the natural 
resources within their boundaries and assign 
one or more government agencles to be 
responsible  for  their  protection  and 
management but few are as restrictive on 
marine resource use as  the Philippines. 
Exlstlng Sltuatlon 
The  Phillpplnes has an extensive and 
highly productive marine resource base that 
provides livelihood and sustenance for a 
significant portion of the population. A state 
property management regime is  clearly 
spelled out in  the law, but all is  not well. 
Overfishing is widespread and well docu- 
mented (Dalzell and Ganaden 1987;  Dalzell 
et al.  1987).  The productive potential of 
coastal waters has been further compro- 
mised by pollution and damage  to  the most 
productive  coastal habitats, coral  reefs, 
mangrove forests and seagrass meadows. 
Only about 30% of our coral reefs remain 
in good (25%)  or excellent (5%)  condition 
(Gomez  et  al. 198  1 :  Gomez 1990)  and over 
half of the mangrove forest area has been 
cleared to  make fishponds, many of which 
produce at levels well below their poten- 
tial (Camacho and Malig 1988). 
The concentration of fisheries wealth in 
coastal waters is oHen a source oFconflict 
among those who seek to  benefit from it. 
Fishpond  developers want to clear the 
mangroves while small-scale fishers and 
wood product harvesters prefer to  retain 
them. Industrial fishing vessels enter 
municipal waters to  compete  directly with 
artisanal fishers and contribute to  overfishing 
there. Some fishers resort to Illegal  and 
destructive fishing practices such as the 
use of  dynamite and cyanide in an attempt 
to  increase their catch: however, they make 
the situation worse for  themselves and 
everyone else by damaging the habitat that 
supports the fish  species they seek to 
harvest. Reduced harvests for each fisher 
translate into lower incomes and increasing 
poverty in rural areas. Fishers who watch 
their catch diminish each year know they 
have a  problem  but feel  helpless as individuals to  change  their situation. They 
often look to  the government for assistance. 
Philippine law mandates a state-property 
management regime. However, given the 
vast areas involved: the limited capacity 
of the government to effect control; and 
a lack of Functional communal management 
systems, open access prevails in most places 
most of  the time. This condition has been 
categorized as cfe facto open access. 
How did this situation come about7 Can 
any government with  limited means ef- 
fectively manage coastal resources under 
a state-property regime? In  attempting  to 
formulate an answer to  this question, three 
basic topics will be discussed: who actu- 
ally manages coastal resources; the role 
of tenure: and the need for equitable re- 
source allocation. 
Who Actually Manages 
Natural Resources? 
It is common For  personnel of the gov- 
ernment agency entrusted with the pro- 
tection and conservation of natural resources 
to assume that the agency does in  fact 
manage them. Laws are enacted and nu- 
merous rules and regulations are promul- 
gated by these agencies. To many, this is 
resource management. The government, 
however, does not have the capability. 
personnel and equipment needed to en- 
sure  that its policies, rules and regulations 
are enforced. The government must, in 
reality, depend upon the people who  daily 
use coastal  resources to make proper 
management decisions. 
Fishers decide each day if they will use 
dynamite, cyanide, fine-meshed nets or 
legal means of  fishing. The government 
can work to  influence these decisions but 
can only monitor relatively few fishers each 
day to enforce compliance with the law. 
Thus, effective resource management is 
really effective people management. This 
is  true everywhere in the world. 
Philippine government agencies have 
been relatively  ineffective  in  controlling 
dynamite Fishing for the  very reasons cited 
above. Yet it is  known that the vast ma- 
jority of fishers oppose the use of explo- 
sives and understand that it causes long- 
term damage to  the fisheries: but as indi- 
viduals they feel helpless to try control- 
ling this practice.  However, where indi- 
viduals such as these have been organ- 
ized and assisted by their local  govern- 
ment to take cooperative action against 
dynamite fishing, success has been uni- 
formly high. 
Recognizing that fishers are the real day- 
to-day managers of fisheries resources and 
organizing them at  the  village level to  take 
positive steps in resource management are 
important roles for the government. De- 
velopment nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) that can assign Full-time workers 
at the village level are usually more ef- 
fective than their government counterparts 
who can only make periodlc visits. 
Role of Tenure 
Providing an individual or a group with 
secure tenure over a part of the resource 
(either physical possession or the rlght to 
beneficial use) serves both to restrict ac- 
cess  and to encourage greater concern for 
Improved resource management, although 
the provision of tenure per se  does not 
guarantee better resource management. 
Providing tenure also carries with it the 
potential for abuse if control of the resource 
becomes concentrated in the hands of a 
few  "lords of the sea", as suggested by 
Christy (1982).  The history of mangrove 
utilization in the Philippines provides some 
interesting examples of the  various roles 
tenure can play. 
Prior to 1975,  mangrove areas could be 
alienated for fishpond development and 
titled. Since then, the  government has only 
leased areas up to 50 ha to individuals and 500 ha  to  corporations. About half of 
the Philippines' 450.000 ha of  mangrove 
forests  have  thus  been  cleared  for 
development of  an estimated 220,000 ha 
of  fishponds. Some 13  1,000 ha (59%) of 
mangrove-derived  fishponds are now 
privately held (Carnacho  and Malig 1988). 
The release of  mangrove areas for fish- 
pond development continued through 1988 
and sparked many protests by  communi- 
ties of small-scale  fishers and mangrove 
users who  wished to  retain the Forest. They 
seemed to  understand and appreciate the 
valuable contributions made by  mangroves 
to  coastal fisheries long  before the scien- 
tific community did. Ironically, it was im- 
possible then to  get a 25-year renewable 
lease agreement over a mangrove area 
unless one planned to destroy the forest 
to  create a fishpond. The government re- 
fused to  issue a similar lease to anyone 
who wished to conserve the forest under 
a sustainable use system. 
In 1981, under Presidential Proclama- 
tions 2 15  1 and 21  52, some 79,000 ha of 
the best remaining mangrove forests were 
unilaterally declared as mangrove  wilderness 
(4.500 ha) and forest reserve (74,500 ha) 
by  the government. Communities that had 
in  many cases used these forests sustainably 
for generations were ordered by the gov- 
ernment to  stop. This "do not  touch" policy 
could not be enforced and the de hcto 
open access  prevailed. Traditional use 
continued within the proclaimed  areas, as 
did illegal fishpond development. 
These policies led to situations where 
communities of  mangrove users were faced 
with  the imminent loss of  their mangrove 
forests to a wealthy fishpond developer 
from outside the community. As their pleas 
to  preserve the forest had been ignored 
by the government, they cleared the for- 
est to create their own fishponds in an 
attempt to  retain control over their tradi- 
tional mangrove areas using  the only means 
that the government would recognize wlth 
secure tenure. Few of these ponds ever 
produced as much  as the mangrove  areas 
that were destroyed. 
While the major destructive force  in 
mangroves has clearly been fishpond de- 
velopment and a significant proportion  of 
the existing fishponds on  government land 
has been developed illegally,  few cases 
have been successfully prosecuted by  the 
government. Conversely, there have been 
many successful prosecutions for small- 
scale mangrove firewood harvest, a prac- 
tice that represents sustainable use in  most 
instances. 
In 1990, the government altered its  policy 
and began to  grant traditional small-scale 
mangrove users secure tenure over existing 
mangrove forest areas,  provided they 
maintained the area as forest. The tenure 
instrument is the Mangrove Stewardship 
Agreement,  a 25-year  renewable lease. 
Where this approach has been implemented 
with community organization and training 
in  simple forest management techniques, 
overharvesting for fuelwood has  been 
eliminated, the forests are recovering  and 
their contribution to coastal fisheries  is 
increasing. 
Tenure can be a useful tool to restrict 
access and provide a sense of  ownership 
whlch can be a strong incentive for resource 
users to assume greater responsibility in 
management. Tenure, however. should not 
be awarded in isolation but rather in  the 
context  of  an  existing  community 
management system or one under active 
development. 
Equitable Allocatlon 
of Flsherles Resources 
The Philippines has a large number of 
artisanal fishers who depend on coastal 
resources for their livelihood  but  their role 
in the  economy  often  seems  little 
appreciated by the national government. 
The perception exists that artisanal fishers 
do  not  contribute significantly to  national (big city and/or export) markets, which 
are better served by industrial Fisheries 
and large-scale aquaculture. This viewpoint 
persists despite statistics showing that 
artisanal fishers routinely take 60-70% of 
capture fisheries harvest, including, for 
example, most of  the sashimi-grade tuna 
for export, and that aquaculture production 
on average  is well below international 
standards. This bias is expressed in  many 
ways:  several will be described briefly 
below. 
1. The  1975 fisheries law (Presidential 
Decree 704) granted municipal gov- 
ernments  jurisdiction over municipal 
waters (3 nm  or 5.6 km)  but few specific 
mechanisms to  exercise that jurisdic- 
tion.  The  same law authorized the 
national government to  issue indus- 
trial fishing licenses for use in  waters 
7 fathoms and deeper. A depth of 7 
Fathoms Invariably falls within municipal 
waters.  This overlapping authority 
diminished the role of  the local gov- 
ernment and served to  heighten the 
conflict between artisanal and industrial 
fishers. The Local Government Code 
(LGC) of 1991 now  allows municipal 
governments to  ban commercial fishing 
within their waters but effective en- 
forcement remains a problem. 
The national government has appar- 
ently been reluctant to limit indus- 
trial fishing,  possibly due to a con- 
cern that Fish supplies in  urban mar- 
kets mlght be adversely affected. Mum- 
ami, a fishing method proven to  de- 
stroy coral reek, was banned only after 
a lengthy fight; the use of  fish attracting 
devices (payao) that contribute to 
commercial overfishing (Floyd and 
Pauly 1984) remains uncontrolled; and 
drift nets that take porpoises, small 
whales and sea turtles in  addltion to 
tuna are being promoted locally al- 
though banned internationally. This 
is happening despite evidence of 
widespread overfishing and data in- 
dicating  that commercial fishing fleet 
horsepower should be reduced by 55% 
(Dalzell et al.  1987). 
3. Coastal  resources  management 
problems are Further exacerbated when 
the legal system fails to perform 
equitably due to pressures  From vested 
Interests usually those in high places 
with financial investments in  industrial 
fishing, aquaculture or illegal Fishing. 
Nothing is more discouraging to a 
community striving to protect its 
fisheries resources than to have clear- 
cut violations go  unprosecuted or 
strong cases  dismissed for lack of 
interest on the part of government 
personnel. 
Artisanal fishers deserve their fair share 
of  fisheries resources. A great number of 
lives are affected when government ac- 
tion (or inaction) denies this. Doubling  the 
2-kg average daily catch of an artisanal 
fisher with no corresponding increase in 
effort will more than double his net in- 
come. This can have a profound effect on 
Family life and can be achieved within months 
after illegal fishing is stopped and com- 
mercial fishing kept at least 5 krn okhore. 
Moreover, most of the artisanal  harvest 
already Finds its way into commercial 
marketing channels so big city fish sup- 
plies need not be adversely affected. 
The constitutional mandate that gives 
preference to  subsistence fishers has sev- 
eral possible implications. It can serve as 
an effective check on the concentration 
of  resource access control in  the hands of 
a few.  However, it could also result in 
perpetual poverty For  fishers who would 
presumably lose their preferential rlghts 
to access as soon as their incomes rose 
above the subsistence level. Without pref- 
erential access, their income could be ex- 
pected to  fall again. IAN  R.  ShA!T!-I  MFMCF16L  I !3?APY  & 
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the licensing of artificial reef  clusters to 
restrict access and prevent ovefishing have 
not received a favorable response. 
Enactment of the LGC  provides the po- 
tential to solve many of  these problems 
as  It transfers control of most fisheries re- 
sources up to 15 km  from the coastline 
From  the national  government to local 
governments. This is  in part a legislative 
response to the perceived failure of the 
nationally run state-property management 
regime to  protect the interests of artisanal 
fishers. While the management regime under 
the LGC  is  still technically  one of  state 
property, the  decislonmaking process has 
been  brought nearly to the level  of  the 
resource user. This bodes well for the es- 
tablishment of what are effectively com- 
mon-property and private-property man- 
agement regimes under the local govern- 
ment. Under a municipal ordinance, local 
governments may now, for example, es- 
tablish municipal marine sanctuaries or  Ii- 
cense artificial reefs. 
Role of the  Natlonal 
Government 
If  resource users rather than the gov- 
ernment are the real day-to-day manag- 
ers of  coastal resources, then it is  incum- 
bent upon the government agencies en- 
trusted with resource protection and  man- 
agement to be more developmental than 
regulatory in their approach. They should 
encourage and assist communities to  build 
their capability to  effectively manage their 
resources. This is true of industrial as  well 
as artisanal fishers. Difficult decisions on 
access limits must be made and are best 
done by organlzed and informed groups 
of resource users. The major challenge to 
the government then is  to support local 
communities and other fishing groups to 
move away from de  hcto open access to 
whatever combination of sustalnable man- 
agement regimes is suited to  the particu- 
lar community and the resources available 
to  them. 
Some  specific national government ac- 
tions would include the following: 
1.  Accept that there are Ilmits to natu- 
ral  production and a corresponding 
need to harvest within  sustalnable 
limits. 
2. Gather and analyze adequate data to 
regularly assess the status of the re- 
sources and provide direction for 
management policies and activities. 
3. Reduce the number of  commercial 
fishing vessels licensed by the national 
government and make their licenses 
area- and gear-specific. 
4. Make the legal system work. It is not 
enough to have laws and organized 
communltles to  apprehend offenders. 
The process must follow through to 
conviction and penalty when neces- 
sary. 
5. Assist municipal fishers to organize 
and assume control over their fisher- 
ies resources. Development NGOs are 
well suited to  help with this task. Assist 
every municipality to develop a mu- 
nicipal  fisheries ordinance that pro- 
vides for effective and equitable fish- 
eries management. 
6. Support implementation of the LGC 
because it complements community 
resource management. 
7. Control water pollution to maintain 
coastal productivity. This can be ef- 
fected through the application of an 
environmental impact assessment 
system. 
8. Develop good working relationships 
with coastal communities and encour- 
age them to assist the government 
in the protection of endangered spe- 
cies, such as  sea  turtles and dugong. 
9. Carefully monitor resource manage- 
ment projects and practices and learn 
From the observed successes  and fail- 
ures. Two recent Philippine examples that seek 
to implement this approach are the en- 
actment by Congress of  the National In- 
tegrated Protected Area System (NIPAS) 
In  1992 and the establishment of DENR's 
Coastal Environment Program (CEP) in 1993. 
The NlPAS law accepts that people live in 
and around declared protected areas; rec- 
ognizes their tenure; and seeks  to  involve 
them in  protection and management. It 
calls for the establishment of a Protected 
Area Management Board for each area and 
ensures that local  representation will be 
prominent. The NlPAS law also provides 
a sound legal basis for the establishment 
of community and private-property man- 
agement regimes as a part of the park 
management plan to protect core areas. 
The CEP consolidates all of DENR's coastal 
related activities. It stresses the manage-  - 
ment of coastal habitats by coastal com- ,+,I 
munities under NlPAS or municipal-level 
projects. Major objectives are to  bring most 
of the remaining mangrove forests under ,,,s 
cornrnunlty management as well as  to  assist 
coastal residents to pr~tect  and manage 
major coral  reef,  seagrass and soft-bot- 
tom environments using the philosophy  + 
and approaches discussed above. 
In  summary, the government can play 
an effective role in coastal resources man- 
agement at the national and local levels 
by supporting the development of effec- 
tive management regimes by resource users. 
Three key  factors must guide this proc- 
ess: (1)  the recognition  OF limits on natu- 
ral production; (2)  the  need to  restrict access 
to  sustain productlon; and (3)  the provi- 
sion of  equitable access conslstent wlth 
the socioeconomic situation in the coun- 
try. 
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Common-Property Resource 
B 
erkes et al. (1989) defined common- 
property resources as 'a  class of  re- 
sources for which exclusion is  difficult and 
joint use involves subtractability" (see  also 
Oakerson 1986;  Ostrom 1986;  Feeny et  al. 
1990. E.  Ostrom instead used the term 
common-pool resource; see Ostrom 1990, 
Ostrom et al..  in press). Most marine re- 
sources fit  this definition. For  migratory 
species, the problems of defining bounda- 
rles or excluding potential users (harvest- 
ers) of the resource are obvious. Exclusion 
is also problematic for more sedentary re- 
sources such as lobster. In  addltion, as Is 
well known in  the fisheries literature, the 
effort of one fisher may affect the current 
productlvity of another as well  as the fu- 
ture productivity of all  fishers through its 
effects on the stock of fish. Subtractablllty 
(or rivalry) Is  thus a salient characteristic of 
most marine resources. 
Similarly, upland resources suit the defi- 
nition. The  physical nature of forests is such 
that exclusion is costly. In addition, at  least 
some uses are competitive. Clearing 
swidden cultivation and logging may pro- 
mote soil erosion and a deterioration in water 
quality downstream. 
The definition of  a  common-property 
resource implies two  major classes of man- 
agement issues. First, mechanisms to  regu- 
late access to the resource to handle the 
exclusion problem, are needed. Second, the 
level of exploitation among  authorized us- 
ers must be regulated  to deal with the 
subtractability or rivalry problem. Thus, any 
successful management regime will  have 
to  address these two fundamental problems. The Four Plllars 
Common-property resources are man- 
aged within the context of a larger economy. 
Until recently the literature in economics 
presumed that such a  system could  be 
adequately described by specifying three 
major categories of variables:  resource 
endowments, preferences and technology. 
Now that It  has come to be understood 
that the complex nature of  institutional 
arrangements in general and property rights, 
in particular, need to  be described, a fourth 
pillar, Institutions, should be specified (Feeny 
1988b; V.  Ostrom et al.  1988; North 
1  990). 
Resource endowments refer to  the land, 
labor and capital (both human and physi- 
cal) available for use in economic production. 
Resource endowments include the nature 
of the  climate, topography and other im- 
portant elements of tRe ecosystem. 
Preferences refer to the goals of  the 
exploiters of the resource. What are the 
resource users trying to  achieve? How do 
they rank desired outcomes? What are their 
tradeoh  among  competing and sometlmes 
confllcting goals? 
The third basic component of any eco- 
nomic situation is technology. It describes 
the  array of  production possibilities. Tech- 
nology includes information on how to 
combine Inputs to  produce outputs. Tech- 
nology reflects knowledge accumulated over 
time, including both the formal scientific 
and experiential types. Changes in tech- 
nology, such as the introduction of chain 
saws or trawlers, clearly have the poten- 
tial to affect resource management. 
The first three pillars, resource endow- 
ments, preferences and technology, are 
important in shaplng the possibilities for 
economic activity. However, to  understand 
the operation of  the economy, it is  im- 
portant to  describe the overall Institutional 
structure of  the society and economy. 
Although the outcomes depend on  the 
amount and  nature of the resources available, 
they are also contingent on the "rules of 
the game" -  institutlons. 
There are three basic categories of  in- 
stitutions: constitutional order, institutional 
arrangements and normative behavioral 
codes (Feeny 1988b). The constitutional 
order refers to  the fundamental rules about 
how society is  organized -  the rules for 
making rules. institutional arrangements 
are created wlthin the rules specified by 
the constitutional order. These arrange- 
ments include laws, regulations, associa- 
tions, contracts and property rights, a key 
topic of this paper, Normative behavioral 
codes refer to the cultural values which 
legitimize the arrangements and constrain 
behavior. Normative behavioral codes also 
include the conventional wlsdorns of so- 
ciety about how things work. The consti- 
tutional order and normative behavioral 
codes  evolve slowly; institutional arrange- 
ments may be more readily modifled. 
Together, the  four pillars affect the  pos- 
sibilities for the evolution of  technology 
and instltutions. Nevertheless, the normative 
behavioral codes  and existing institutional 
arrangements may be the facilitators or 
inhibitors of the creation of new institu- 
tional arrangements to  improve resource 
management on the commons (Feeny 
1988b: Buck 1989; Ostrom 1990). 
Property Rlghts and 
Property-Rights Reglmes 
A key set of  institutional arrangements 
is  a system of  property rights.  Property 
rights are a key element in  the descrip- 
tion of any situation involving common- 
property resources. Property rights assign 
benefit (and cost!) streams derived from 
the utilization of a resource. 
In  general. "property as a social insti- 
tution implies a  system of relations be- 
tween individuals ....  it involves rights, duties, 
powers, privileges.  forbearance, etc., of 
certain kinds" (Hallowell 1943). Property rights are then a bundle of characteristics: 
exclusivity, transferability. inheritabillty. 
alienability and enforcement mechanisms 
(Hallowell 1943;  Alchian and Demsetz 1973; 
Barzel 1989;  Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
Property rights define the uses which are 
legitimately viewed as being exclusive and 
who has these  exclusive rights. Rights also 
have a temporal dimension comprising the 
present and future. The Institutional arrange- 
ments Include mechanisms for defining and 
enforcing rights, consisting of not only formal 
procedures but also social custom and the 
legitimacy  and  recognition  of  rights 
(Hallowell 1943;  Taylor 1988).  Enforcement 
depends on a constellation of supporting 
arrangements and mechanisms including 
courts, police, Financial institutians, the legal 
profession, land surveys, resource man- 
agement authorities, record-keeping system 
and titling agencies in addition to  the so- 
cial legitimacy of property rights. 
There are Four basic categories of property 
rights For  common-property resources: none 
(or open access), communal, private and 
state (or  crown) (Berkes et  al. 1989;  Feeny 
et  al.  1 'WO).'  Under open access, rlghts 
are left unassigned. The lack of  any ex- 
clusivity implies the absence of an incen- 
tive to conserve, and therefore often re- 
sults in degradation of  scarce resources. 
Until recently, most marine resources outside 
of 3-, 12-, or 200-mile coastal zones were 
effectively held in open access. Forest re- 
sources have often been treated similarly. 
Under communal property, exclusive 
rights are assigned to  a group of individuals 
'The term "common property" sometimes refers to 
that classified as communal in the system used here. 
but also applies to open-access situatlons. More gen- 
erally. common-property refers to situatlons wherein 
excluslon Is dlFRcult and use Involves rivalry. To avoid 
confusion, group ownership Is therefore labelled as 
communal, rather than common-property rights. For 
more on these distlnctlons. see Berkes et al. (1989) 
and Feeny et al. (1990). E. Ostrom (1990)  preferred 
common-pool resource instead of common-property 
resource. and common property, rather than com- 
munal property. 
(Bromley and Chapagain 1984: NRC  1986). 
The group excludes others From harvest- 
ing the resource and manages its use among 
members of the group. This type of prop- 
erty-rights  regime was common among 
traditional artisanal fishing communities 
and is found in  a number of  contempo- 
rary coastal fisheries throughout the  world, 
including Atlantic Canada, Japan  and Mlcro- 
nesia. Many village woodlots have also 
been held as  communal property. 
Under state property, resource rnanage- 
ment is  under the authority of the public 
sector who regulates both access and uti- 
Ilzation. The regulation  of  flshing in  na- 
tional waters and tree cutting in state for- 
ests are examples. 
In  private property, an individual  (or 
household) Is  assigned the rights. In  the 
context of fisheries, aquaculture is  often 
conducted under private-property rights. 
Similarly, in the context of the uplands, 
crop lands are often held as  private prop- 
erty. 
All or  some  ofthese categories of property 
rights may exist in a single society for dif- 
ferent tracts of land or resources. Further- 
more, there are circumstances where the 
same resource can be categorized under 
more than one regime. For instance, ex- 
clusive rights to crop production may be 
assigned to  Individuals while grazing rights 
are  communally held by members of a vil- 
lage. Likewise, Fishing rights may be held 
communally while navigation rights over 
the same body of water are characterized 
by open access. Thus, property rights For 
upland  and marine resources are often 
layered in space and in many cases stag- 
gered in  time. Although in  practice,  re- 
sources are often held in overlapping cat- 
egories of property rights, it is  nonethe- 
less important to  distinguish the resource 
from the property-rights regime in which 
It is held and also to  describe the nature 
of  the property-rights regime accurately. 
Moreover, it is essential to distinguish 
de  jure property rights from cle hcto.  Many common-property resources are classified 
as state property, their de  jure designa- 
tion. In  practice. however, access is often 
left unregulated and de facto the resource 
is held in open access. In  other cases,  re- 
sources held as state property are in fact 
available for expropriation by privileged 
friends of those in power while the coer- 
cive power of  the state is used to  exclude 
ordinary citizens. 
Framework for the Analysls 
of Common-Property Resource 
Management 
Oakerson (1  986.  1992) specified a simple 
framework around which one can organ- 
ize information about any management 
regime for common-property resources. 
The original Framework was comprised of 
four elements: the technical and physical 
nature of  the resource; the decisionmaking 
arrangements; patterns of interactlon; and 
outcomes. More recently, a fifth element 
(In part based on the work of James T. 
Thomson),  the nature of the social  and 
economic context,  has been added to 
complement the information in the first 
category, the technical and physical na- 
ture of the resource. The framework closely 
parallels the four pillars described earlier. 
Each category will be described in  turn. 
Physical attributes of the resource 
and nature of technology 
This category describes the resource 
endowment and technology. It  glves in- 
formation on  the capaclty of the resource 
system; its boundaries; the nature of the 
technologies available for its exploitation; 
the natural rate of reproduction or renewal 
of the resource; and the physical ease or 
difficulty of regulating access to  the re- 
source. 
Nature of  sociai and 
economic context 
This category includes information on 
preferences and institutions that pertain 
to the resource, as  well as  social norms 
and cultural endowments. Is the nature of 
the society such that it is easy or difficult 
to organize  resource users? What is the 
nature of  markets For the produce derived 
from exploiting the resource? Do fishers 
sell their output for local consumption or 
to  an export market7 Clearly, the size of 
the market may affect the incentives for 
harvesting the resource. 
Decisionmaking arrangements 
This category describes the institutional 
arrangements that govern access to and 
the  utilization  of the  resource.  The 
decisionrnaklng arrangements Include 
mechanisms for  dispute settlement and 
enforcement. The arrangements may in- 
volve multiple levels of  authority consist- 
ing  of local. provincial and national. 
Patterns of  interaction 
Given the information on the physical 
nature of the resource; the nature of the 
social and economic context (including  the 
size and nature  of  the market  for the products 
derived from exploiting the resource); and 
the decisionmaking arrangements that 
influence lndlvidual behavior -  what strat- 
egies do individuals adopt? Do they co- 
operate to manage the resource on  a sus- 
tainable basis? Or do  they free ride on  the 
restraint of others and violate communal 
agreements governing resource use7 
Outcomes: efficiency, equfw 
and sustahbility 
A number of useful (and for the most 
part not mutually exclusive) criteria can be used to evaluate outcomes. Among them 
are economic efficiency,  equity and 
sustalnability. (Of course each of these has 
a variety of definitions). 
The framework proposed by Oakerson 
(1  986. 1992) can be used to describe a 
resource management situation at a point 
in time. It can also be a diagnostic tool to 
identify the elements in  a situation that 
might be associated with unfavorable out- 
comes. In  this context, it  can be "back 
solved" from outcomes to  underlying char- 
acteristics (examples of this type  of analysis 
are provided in Ostrom 1990). Finally, the 
framework can be used iteratively over time 
to help understand the evolution of  re- 
source management systems (Thomson et 
al. 1892). 
Proposltlons from "the Tragedy 
of the Commons" 
Our understanding and analyses of com- 
mon-property resources, in the natural and 
social sciences and in the formulation of 
public policy,  have been profoundly in- 
fluenced by a set of germinal papers in- 
cluding those by  Gordon (1954), Scott 
(1955)  and Hardin (1968). 
In the conventional wisdom derived from 
Hardin, Gordon and Scott, it Is  argued that 
all  resources held in  common will Inevi- 
tably suffer overexploitation and degra- 
dation. This prediction was based in part 
from a confusion of open access and com- 
munal property. The concluslon was also 
inferred from an appreciation of  the Im- 
plications of subtractability. Users of  the 
resource would collectively be better off 
if they all  exercised restraint; any given 
individual, however, could do better for 
himself by cheating on  the collective agree- 
ment. 
In Hardin's tragedy ofthe commons VOC) 
version of the conventional wisdom, there 
are two basic solutlons to the problem: 
the transfer of the resources either to pri- 
vate property or to government control 
(Hardln 1978; Bajema 199  1). 
Emerglng Themes 
A  number of  recent works,  however, 
question the predictions of Hardin's TOC 
approach concernlng  the fate of common- 
property resources, e-g..  NRC (1  986);  Berkes 
and Feeny (1  990); Feeny et  al. ( 1990):  and 
Bromley (1992). The empirical  record Is 
far  from  unequivocal.  Although 
overexploitation  and degradation have 
occurred, their incidence Is  not excluslve 
to  situations of communal property or  open 
access as implied by the TOC argument; 
degradation has also happened under pri- 
vate- and state-property  regimes. Siml- 
larly, successful resource management is 
found under communal, private- and state- 
property rights regimes. Apparently the 
TOC argument Is  oversimplified. Evidences 
from a volumlnous case study literature, 
recent experimental studies and theoretical 
developments all serve to  qualify and en- 
rich the simple propositions embodled in 
the TOC  approach. 
This body of evidence  will be discussed 
briefly in an effort to examine important 
and sometimes  overlapping categories of 
assumptions that underlie the TOC  and 
Gordon-Scott  (G-S) approaches about in- 
dividual  motivations:  characteristics  of 
individuals; nature of existing institutional 
arrangements; interactions among users 
of the resource; the ability of users to  create 
new institutional  arrangements; and the 
behavior of regulatory authorities. 
It is  important to describe the explicit 
and implicit assumptions made In  both the 
germinal work of Gordon and Scott, and 
Hardin.  In  the TOC/G-S  model, resource 
users are assumed to act as  if they were 
profit-maximizing  firms.  In  their model, 
resource users (or firms) are essentially 
identical -  firms are homogenous and lack 
distinguishing characteristics. The classic TOC/G-S model also assumes  open access 
to  the resource for all. Property rights are 
not allotted and property  rights to har- 
vest of the resource stock are assigned only 
by "law of capture". Furthermore, individuals 
(firms)  are assumed to  have no  direct contact 
or interaction with each other and to be 
powerless to  alter the institutional arrange- 
ments to  affect the outcome. In  this set- 
ting, as the incisive analysis of Gordon, 
Scott and Hardin demonstrates, each re- 
source user will take into account only his 
own marginal costs and revenues and ig- 
nore the fact that increases in  his harvest 
affect the efforts of other resource users 
(as well  as perhaps the health of  future 
stocks of the resource). 
One way to characterize the TOC/G-S 
argument is that individuals are assumed 
to  be myopic, oriented only to  short-term 
gains. This conclusion  results from the 
assumption of profit mnximizatlon, open 
access and law of capture which implies 
that it is individually rational to  ignore the 
effects on others or the future. In  such an 
environment, people act as if  their rnoti- 
vatlon was short-term gain even if that is 
not an accurate description. Thus, the ar- 
gument In the  TOC/C-S approach that re- 
source users behave myopically  springs 
from assumptions concerning the institu- 
tional environment as well as  the under- 
lying motivations of the users themselves. 
It is, however, clear that even when indi- 
viduals are operating in environments such 
as the one presumed by TOC/G-S,  they 
are aware of the effects of  their current 
actions on others and the intertemporal 
nature of resource rhanagement. 
Furthermore, their motivations are not 
accurately described as  profit maxlmizntion. 
The standard economic theory of the Arm 
is overly restrictive (Charles 1988).  As was 
discovered decades ago  in the labor eco- 
nomics literature and even more forcefully 
in the development economics literature, 
utility rather than profit maximization of- 
ten provides more powerful insights and 
analysis in situations in which there is no 
clear separation between the household 
and the firm (Singh et al. 1986; De Alessi 
1990).  Thus. resource users have prefer- 
ences for leisure that affects labor supply. 
The concept of the household-firm in which 
production and consumption decisions are 
interdependent is  applicable. 
Resource users also have nonpecuniary 
goals and preferences including an appre- 
ciation of  the aesthetics of the envlron- 
ment (Karpoff 1985: Charles 1988).  Such 
preferences have important implications; 
e.g.. a willingness to  sacrifice some  mon- 
etary gains for nonpecuniary rewards (De 
Alessl 1980; Becker  1993). Thus, higher 
incomes are traded off for the enjoyment 
of the livelihood and the lifestyle. 
Finally, altruistic motives are also rel- 
evant. Cdtural norms, ideology and value 
systems  appear to  affect the degree of  free 
riding (e.g.. Andreoni 1888; Buck  1989; 
Feeny 1992).  Evidence for altruism (in the 
context of the social sciences defined as 
failing to  act in one's own narrow self-in- 
terest) must be interpreted carefully and 
in a balanced fashion. Complete free rid- 
ing appears to be uncommon: but so is 
its complete absence. Social norms mat- 
ter but may be insufficient to eliminate or 
control free riding when an enforcement 
mechanism is  lacking. Nonetheless, self- 
interest does not appear to account for 
all behavior. 
Characteristics of  indlviduais 
In the  TOC/G5 approach, individuals are 
assumed to  be identical; firms are homog- 
enous and therefore interchangeable. This 
assumption greatly simplifies the analy- 
sis and was  an important part of the original 
demonstration by Gordon and Scott of the incentives for economic overexploltatlon 
in situations involving open access and 
therefore free entry. As a description of 
the nature of  individuals and firms Involved 
in  the exploitation of the resource, how- 
ever, the assumption of homogeneity ls 
often inaccurate and sometlmes mislead- 
ing. There are often considerable dlffer- 
ences among individuals and firms in terms 
of the size and scope of their operations; 
their abilities, education and experience; 
the degree of their lifetime commitment 
to the industry; their preferences over 
nonpecuniary aspects of their employment; 
their cultural values; and the technologies 
they employ. This heterogeneity has im- 
portant implications for political economic 
analysis and the effects of regulation 
(Johnson  and Llbecap 1982; Karpoff 1987: 
Hackett 1992). 
Nature of existimg institutfonal 
arrangements 
The germinal analyses of  Gordon, Scott 
and Hardin assumed an open-access, free- 
entry and free-exit regime. The assump- 
tion of the lack OF property rights, formal 
or informal, was crucial for obtaining strong 
unambiguous predictions concerning out- 
come -  the eventual degradation of the 
resource. Much of the subsequent litera- 
ture derived from the G-S model and TOC 
approach assumed either open access or 
state property. The standard literature has 
typically Focused on only two property 
regimes and thus has limited relevance in 
a variety of  other commonly found insti- 
tutional environments (e.g.,  Barzel 1989; 
Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
Yet before the modern era of powerful 
governments, many fisheries were subject 
both to formal and informal property-rights 
systems and regulatlons. Typically, tradi- 
tional hunting and gathering groups de- 
Rned and enforced exclusive harvesting 
zones. In  addition, customs served to  regu- 
late intragroup use and when coupled with 
ethical norms that stressed sharing and 
cooperation, limited exploitation to sus- 
tainable levels. A similar story can be told 
for many upland resources. 
In  modern times, however, virtually all 
resources are de  jure subject to state regu- 
lation. Thus,  the descriptive accuracy of 
the assumption of open access is sharply 
limited. Furthermore. the analytical impli- 
cations of the assumption are potentially 
misleading. 
In addition, de  facto there are often 
systems of informal communal property 
rights. The informal and formal commu- 
nal property rights systems as  well as 
prlvate and state property serve to  llmlt 
entry into the exploitation of  the resource. 
Free entry is not an accurate description. 
Neither is Free exit.  In many cases,  re- 
source users  have invested heavily in 
industry-specific human and physlcal 
capital which are not readily transferred 
to  other industries. 
The TOCIG-S approach argues that the 
free rider problem is so severe that users 
will be unable to organize effectively to 
coordinate strategies or provide enforce- 
ment mechanisms. It is assumed that agents 
Ignore the actions of others in formulat- 
ing  their own strategles. There are, how- 
ever, many counterexamples. Fishers are 
able to  communicate with each other and 
devise cooperative strategles.  Slmilarly, 
a number OF  Informal and formal enforce- 
ment mechanisms have been observed. In 
the Maine lobster fisheries, vlolatlons of 
InFormal prlvate  property rights  to  harvesting 
sites are met  with gear destruction  (Acheson 
1989). More severe social sanctions and 
violence follow when milder sanctions are 




The metaphor used by many to  summarize 
the  TOC/G-S argument is the single-period prisoner's dilemma (PD) game.z In the PD 
game, defection Is  the dominant strategy 
and thus overexploitation of  common 
resources is the prediction, even though 
both agents would  be  better off  by 
cooperating. Hardin directly appealed to 
this argument in developing his prediction. 
The relevance of the slngle-period PD  is, 
however,  limited.  First,  resource 
management  problems  are  usually 
multiperiod ones. Thus, the game is played 
more than once, allowing scope  for viable 
cooperathe  strategies to  avoid the "tragedy" 
(e.g.. Godwin and Shepard  1979; Kreps 
et  al.  1982: Berkes and Kencc 1987). In 
theoretical and simulation studies, tit-for- 
tat has proven to  be  a robust strategy which 
resists challenge from others. (In a tit-for- 
tat strategy, a  player cooperates unless 
another defects. In the event of  defection, 
the player defects on the next round of 
play to punish the original defector, and 
then  resumes  cooperative  play.) 
Furthermore,  Hirshleifer and Rasmusen 
(1  989) demonstrated that in a finite-perlod 
game, just a little morality, enforced for 
instance by social ostracism, is enough to 
make cooperation a dominant strategy. Thus. 
the multiple-period  context of many 
common-property resource management 
situations provides scope for learnlng and 
the evolution of  rules and new institutional 
arrangements that convert  the stark 
Zln  the basic PD game, each of the two players can 
cooperate or defect. In the orlginal formuiatlon, the 
prosecuting  attorney has suffldent  evldence to convict 
two prlsoners of a petty crime but lacks sufficient 
evldence wlthout a confession to obtain a convic- 
tlon for  a more serious crime that he Is sure they 
committed. The attorney interrogates  the suspects 
separately, offerlng a I  -year sentence each If both 
do not confess: 3 months for  the person who con- 
fesses and  10  years for  the other who does not; 
and 8 years each If both confess. In the context of 
flsherles. IF  both players cooperate, for  Instance to 
restrict their catch, they would both receive a pay- 
oFfof 5. 2 iF they both defect (refuse to restrict thelr 
catch): and if one defects while the other cooper- 
ates. 8 for the defector.  1 for the cooperator (Luce 
and Ralffa 1957). 
defection-dominates-prediction  of  the 
single-period PD game into one  in which 
cooperation is  a viable approach. 
Abl/lty to create new InstItutiona/ 
arrangements 
In the  TOC/G-S  approach, resource us- 
ers are powerless to  create new arrange- 
ments to prevent the demise of  the re- 
source. The costs of creating and operat- 
ing new institutions are indeed important 
(Johnson  and Libecap 1982; Rose 1991). 
The creation and operation of these new 
lnstitutlons is indeed a form of collective 
action and subject to  free-rider problems. 
Nonetheless, agents are sometimes able 
to  alter the  set  of institutional arrangements 
to create new forms that better address 
their resource management problems. In- 
shore fishers are  capable of innovating new 
arrangements (Berkes 1985; Pinkerton 
1989). An  important factor that affects 
institutional innovation by resource users 
is the nature of the political system. Japa- 
nese fisheries law legitimizes communal 
ownershlp of inshore fisheries by village- 
based cooperatives. Turkish fishers are  able 
to  exploit the laws on cooperatives to  obtain 
exclusive and enforceable rights to  lagoon 
fisheries. In contrast, long-standing com- 
munal property rights without formal rac- 
ognitlon have often been insufficient  to 
prevent incursions as in  the case of the 
displacement of artisanal fishers by trawlers 
in  Northeast Brazil  (Cordell and McKean 
1992)  and the demise of informal ethnic 
management of  the California fisheries 
(McEvoy 1988). 
Behavlor of regdatoty authorities 
There ls  no  expllclt model of regulatory 
behavior in  the G-S  model. The norma- 
tive criterion used In the C-S approach to 
evaluate the effects of policy is  one of 
maximizing net social benefits. There is, 
however, an implicit  model of  behavior for regulatory authorities in Hardin's TOC 
approach. The implicit assumption is that 
regulators will act in the social interest - 
that state  property will be managed in the 
public interest. 
A large number of  case studies, how- 
ever, provide  evidence to the contrary. 
Efficiency or social justice does not ap- 
pear to have been the objective of many 
regulatory  initiatives.  In fact, the use of 
state power to convert de  hcto comrnu- 
nal property into de  jure  state property, 
but cle facto open access, has contributed 
to  the decline of  fisheries and upland re- 
sources in many jurisdictions. Similarly, the 
damages imposed by the unregulated use 
of air, land and water resources in the in- 
terests of  industrial and urban users have 
often jeopardized  rural  communal man- 
agement regimes. 
A useful analysis of the behavior of regu- 
latory authorities thus requires a detailed 
description of the legal, political and in- 
stitutional setting as  well as  an understand- 
ing of  cultural attitudes, value systems and 
conventional wisdom. In addition, the time 
horizon of officials in regulatory agencies 
does  not, in general, correspond with that 
of resource users with a life-long commit- 
ment to  the industry or  to  the interests of 
society as  a whole. Negative consequences 
of actions taken by an official today that 
will become apparent only after he expects 
to have already left office are unlikely to 
be given much weight in decisionmaking. 
Those consequences are, however, often 
very important both to  resource users and 
the general public. 
An important assumption which underlies 
many regulatory approaches is that resource 
users themselves, the participants in the 
industry, are largely ignorant of  the ecol- 
ogy of  the natural  systems which they 
exploit. It  Is  often assumed that profes- 
sional managers with training in the natural 
sciences are needed to formulate policy. 
Yet by providing little or no incentive for 
participants In the industry to reveal their 
ecological  knowledge, a  great deal of 
potentially valuable information, obtained 
through years of  experience and obser- 
vation, is lost. A number of studies high- 
light the depth and usefulness of  these 
knowledge bases (e.g.. Ruddle and johannes 
1985; Berkes 1989).  Although this knowl- 
edge is seldom articulated in the language 
of the scientist or manager, it can irnpor- 
tantly complement and sometimes even 
substitute for scientific studies. 
Similarly, the wse  for professional rnan- 
agement and regulatory approaches of- 
ten places too much faith in the accuracy 
of the formal scientific knowledge of the 
resource. In  fact, the degree of uncertainty 
about ecological relationships and popu- 
lation dynamics has sometimes  been pro- 
found. For  instance, precise information 
on the determinants of  fish populations 
and therefore the effects of human pre- 
dation is often lacking (Munro and Scott 
1985).  Regulatory mechanisms which rely 
on careful fine tuning of the resource stock 
may therefore be unrealistic. 
Predictions and policy impIicatlons 
of  the TOC/G-S approach 
The TOC/G-S  approach predicts the 
overexploitation of common-property re- 
sources. The policy prescription generally 
Inferred from the standard approach is the 
transfer of the resource to  private- or state- 
property regimes. The conventional wis- 
dom relies on market/government success. 
In contrast, the case-study evldence is 
more agnostic. It  recognizes the poten- 
tial viability of communal. private and state 
propedy, as  well as  the potential for over- 
lapping systems of property rights and co- 
management. The evidence indicates that 
private property does not guarantee suc- 
cess and that In  addition to government 
success  there is  government failure  (De 
Alessi 1990; Feeny et  d.  1990; Copes 1992). 
For instance, a state-property rights regime in Thai forest lands has not promoted the 
socially optimal exploitation of  the resource 
(Feeny 1988a). Likewise, private property 
in the absence of unitization in oil fields 
has contributed to  dramatically inefficient 
outcomes (Libecap and Wiggins 1985). 
Just  as  evidence from recent case studies 
casts doubts on the simplistic arguments 
of  the TOC/G-S  approach, evldence from 
controlled laboratory experiments in social 
psychology, political science and related 
disciplines  questions  the  approach. 
Laboratory experimental methods play an 
increasingly important role in the social 
sciences. Although case studies can be 
illuminating and are likely to remain the 
mainstay of studies on common-property 
resource management, they do have 
limitations. The management of common- 
property resources involves complex 
interactions  among  human  agents. 
Modelling such behavior is  difficult.  In 
addition, because of the size, complexity 
and interactive nature oFcommon-property 
systems, natural experiments are difficult 
to  interpret and hence provide only crude 
tests. In  the naturally occurring settlngs 
of case studies. frequently many things 
change at once, making it difficult to  derive 
unambiguous interpretations concerning 
underlying causation. 
In contrast, laboratory experiments permit 
more definitive tests of analytical propo- 
sitions  and inductive generaliutions (Feeny 
1992).  Furthermore, experiments may also 
be used as a simple screening device for 
the assessment of proposed new institu- 
tional arrangements. The argument is that 
ifa new proposal does  not work in an ideal 
controlled environment, it is  unlikely to 
function in practice. (Asymmetrically, the 
fact that a new institutional arrangement 
works In  a laboratory setting necessarily 
implies that it will do  well under natural 
Field conditions). 
Generalizations relevant to common- 
property  resource  management have 
emerged from recent experimental stud- 
ies, which include: (1) rules and institu- 
tions matter; (2) sanctions and enforce- 
ment matter; (3)  free riding is  Important 
but less than complete; (4)  norms and Ide- 
010s  matter; (5)  communication matters; 
and (6)  inforrnatlon matters. 
One very strong result emerges from 
the laboratory experimental literature. The 
rules of the game, institutions, do  matter 
(Smith 1987; Roth  1988).  Outcomes dif- 
fer systematically among experiments in 
which  different  rules are deployed.  For 
instance, Ostrom et  al. (1  392)  demonstrated 
different outcomes in experiments  with and 
without sanctions permitted and with and 
without communication. Outcomes in set- 
tings involving both communication and 
sanctions are more efFicient than those with 
neither or only one of the two character- 
istics. 
A  number of  experiments have been 
designed to  test major propositions in game 
theory and public-goods theory. For ex- 
ample, Isaac et al.  (1  985) Found  that al- 
though Initial voluntary contributions for 
the provision of a public good were sub- 
stantial (but below the optimal level), in 
successive periods,  free-riding  behavior 
became more evident. After five periods. 
the level of voluntary contributions was 
low, but still greater than zero -  free rid- 
ing was less than complete. Similarly, Kim 
and Walker (1984) discovered that indl- 
viduals with high personal pay-offs from 
the provision of the public good contrib- 
uted more than those with low pay-offs. 
Moreover, Isaac et dl. (1  985) learned that 
allowing for communication among  experi- 
mental subjects -  thus more closely imi- 
tating the natural environment in  which 
most common-property  resources are 
managed -  did increase moderately the 
level of contributi~ns,  although the optl- 
ma1 level was still not achieved. 
Evidence on the importance of norms 
and ideology comes from an impressive 
array of  experimental studies in  social 
psychology, sociology, political science and economics. These studies indicate that free 
riding  is typically less than complete, even 
in  situations involving repeated play and 
experienced subjects who have had the 
opportunity to assess the costs and ben- 
efits of  free riding.3 Mestelman and Feeny 
(1988) provided results suggesting that 
ideology ameliorates free riding  but does 
not overcome it. 
Again in an experimental context, Cass 
and Edney (1978) demonstrated that the 
provision  of  up-to-date information on  the 
condition of  the resource and granting of 
private territorial usufruct both move the 
rate of  exploitation closer to the optimal 
level. A number of  studies corroborate the 
importance of  comm~nication.~ 
It is possible to synthesize the results 
of  recent analytical, experimental and case 
study work into prescriptions for policy. 
A prominent example of  such an effort is 
the derivation by  E.  Ostrorn (1  892)  of  eight 
design principles for crafting institutions 
(or rules) for self-governing resource-man- 
aging organizations,  namely: ( 1  )  clearly 
defined boundaries; (2) congruence between 
appropriation and provision rules and lo- 
cal conditions; (3)  collective-choice arrange- 
ments; (4)  monitoring: (5)  graduated sanc- 
tions: (6)  conflict-resolutlon mechanisms; 
(7) minimal recognition of  rights to  organize; 
and (8) nested enterprises.  Because the 
reasoning behind the propositions is dis- 
cussed elsewhere, these ideas will  not  be 
dealt with in  detail here. 
The assumptions of the TOC/G-S  con- 
ventional wlsdom approach with respect 
to  indlvldual motivations; characteristics 
3See for example. Cass and Edney (1978):  Marwell 
and Arnes (1  979, 1980, 1981  ); Alfano and Marwell 
(1980); lsaac et al. (1984); Klm and Walker (1984); 
Andreoni (1988): and Feeny  (1992). 
%ee  for  example, Dawes et al.  (1977): Liebrand 
( 1984); lsaac and Walker (1  988). 
of individuals: nature of existing institu- 
tional arrangements: interactions among 
resource users; the ability of  users to  cre- 
ate new institutional arrangements: and 
behavior of regulatory authorities often 
appear to lack both descriptive accuracy 
and predictive power. Important lessons 
from the TOC/G-S  approach should not. 
however, be Ignored. In the absence of 
the ability to exclude others and in the 
presence of  rivalry, the outcome is unlikely 
to  be optimal. Individual self-interest is a 
powerful force and must be taken into 
account in devising viable arrangements 
for the management of  common-property 
resources. Mechanisms need  to  be incen- 
tive-compatible. 
Another important theme that emerges 
from the literature is that the important 
resource management issue is often not 
the regulation of  utilization of  a particular 
resource but instead balancing the inter- 
ests of  multiple  uses and users (Scott 1979; 
Munro  and Scott 1985; Copes 1992).  For 
instance, many fisheries have both com- 
mercial and recreational users. In  addition, 
many fisheries  share habitats with other 
uses and users,  including hydroelectric 
power, forestry, irrigation, tourism, navi- 
gation and shipping, landfill and harbors. 
Upland resources are used for agriculture, 
forestry,  habitat preservation, water re- 
sources management and others. The con- 
text in which resources are managed is 
substantially more complicated than the 
simple one pictured in the TOC/G-5  ap- 
proach. 
Five key messages  emerge from a review 
of recent theoretical and empirical studies. 
First, success and failure are not  uniquely 
determined by  the system of  property rlghts. 
Both  success and failure have been observed 
under communal,  private- and state- 
property rights regimes. Second, Institutions 
maRer. Third, a key  component of successful 
lnstitutlonal arrangements is the provision 
of  incentives for cooperatlon. Fourth, another 
key element of successFul arrangements Is  the  ablllty  to  enforce  collective 
agreements. Flnally, a third characteristic 
associated with success is  the authority 
and  ability  to innovate  instltutlonal 
arrangements to accommodate evolving 
challenges. 
These messages have Important policy 
implications. Among these is  the impor- 
tance of  local  biological, ecological and 
institutional knowledge. Although general 
principles  and frameworks have  broad 
applicability,  the fiarneworks outlined above 
also imply a strong and central role For 
local knowledge concerning the physical 
nature of the resource; normative behavioral 
codes; decisionmaking arrangements;  and 
soclal and economic setting. The support 
of  the human capltal capability and social 
and natural science Infrastructure for  the 
accumulation of such local speclflc knowl- 
edge then becomes a key component of 
any development assistance strategy for 
common-property resource management. 
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Instltutlonal Analysls and 
Development Framework 
T" 
e Institutional Analysis and Develop- 
ment (IAD) framework is  an evolving 
method for identifying and analyzing in- 
teractions between the physical environ- 
ment and sociocultural and Institutional 
realms (Klser and E. Ostrorn 1982;  E. Ostrom 
1986;  V.  Ostrom 1991  ; Oakerson 1992; 
Thomson  1992; V.  Ostrom et al.  1993). 
The framework links the  characteristics of 
a physical world (such as forests) with those 
of the  general cultural setting (the  villages 
and harvesters that use forests); the spe- 
ciflc rules that affect the incentives indi- 
viduals face in particular situations (how 
forest products can be harvested, utilized 
and maintained); the outcomes of  these 
Interactions (regeneration or deforestation): 
and the evaluative criteria applied to  these 
patterns and outcomes (efficiency, equity, 
sustainability). Common-pool  resources 
(CPRs) share two  characterlstlcs of  a physical 
world: (1) it is costly to develop institu- 
tions to  exclude potentlal kneficlaries from 
them: and (2)  the  resource units harvested 
by one  individual are not available to  others. 
Recent research projects have applied this 
Framework to  develop a database on CPRs 
(particularly irrigation systems and inshore 
fisheries) located in different regions of the 
world (Schlager 1890: Tang 199 1. 1992; 
E.  Ostrom et al.  1992; Schlager and E. 
Ostrom 1992). After more than a year's 
developmental work, we have now de- 
signed a new database to  record information 
about forest resources and institutions in many different countries (E. Ostrom et al. 
1983). 
Analysis of human actions and conse- 
quences frequently starts with  a focal arena 
as shown in Fig.  1. Examples include situ- 
ations where individuals decide when and 
how much to harvest of forest products 
from different  locations,  whether to es- 
tablish a forest users'  association,  or to 
fence off a particular part of a forest to 
prevent  animals from foraging  within. What 
arena is analyzed depends on the qucs- 
tions of interest to the analyst. The ana- 
lyst wanting to examine recurrent struc- 
tures of  situations must, however, find ways 
of separating one situation from another 
for the purpose of  analysis. Further, indi- 
viduals who  participate in  many situations 
must also know  the difference among  them. 
The actions that can be taken in harvest- 
ing  timber are different from those in  har- 
vesting thatch or in selling either timber 
or thatch. An individual  who is repeatedly 
mixed up  about what situation he or she 
is in, is not normally considered compe- 
tent to  take independent actions. 
What is distinctive about the IAD  frame- 
work, when contrasted to  frameworks that 
are closely tied to  a single scientific disci- 
pline, is that all situations are viewed as 
being composed of the same set of ele- 
ments. Thus, while harvesting or market- 
ing  timber or thatch differ in  many important 
ways, these diverse situations can all be 
described by  identifying  and analyzing how 
particular elements constituting the situ- 
ations under analysis lead to  the patterns 
observed. These elements include identi- 
fying: 
the participants; 
the positions they hold; 
the actions they can take; 
the information they possess; 
the possible outcomes: 
how  actions and outcomes are linked; 
and 
the benefits and costs assigned to 
actions and outcomes. 
These elements are themselves relatively 
complex. Many different action situations 
can be constructed from them. At  the same 
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Flg.  1. A framework for lnstltutlonal analysis. universality  of working parts, it enables 
analysts to examine  unique combinations 
of these parts. The array of potential out- 
comes that can be analyzed and evalua- 
tive criteria, such as equity, efficiency, 
sustainabllity and adaptability, is also  very 
broad. Moreover, these elements  are  them- 
selves constituted by a  deeper layer of 
attributes about a physical and material 
setting: the community within which a 
situation occurs; and the specific rules-ln- 
use that affect  the structure of the situa- 
tion. 
Action situations are perceived to be 
nested within at least three relevant tiers 
of action.  Operational level actions are 
decisions which occur whenever individuals 
directly affect variables in  the world  by 
doing such things as  harvesting products, 
worshipping at a  forest shrine, planting 
seeds, building fences, patrolling the  borders 
of a forest or feeding leaves to  their ani- 
mals. Collective choice actions constitute 
a group's decisions about operational ac- 
tivities, e.g., the actions taken at an an- 
nual  meeting of  a  forest users'  associa- 
tion to keep a  forest closed for the har- 
vest of a  particular product except for a 
specified time. Constitutional choice ac- 
tions are decisions about how collective 
choice actions will be made. An example 
is  the resolution of  a  forest users' asso- 
ciation to  create an executive committee 
that will meet  once  a month to  determine 
joint activities to be undertaken. Consti- 
tutional choices are frequently made  without 
recognition that they are indeed creating 
a future structure to  make rules about an 
operational action. 
Design Principles of Sustainable 
Community-Governed Commons 
The IAD framework has been an under- 
lying foundation for all  of our empirical 
studies of common-pool  resources and 
common-property  regimes. One line of 
inquiry that we  have pursued over  time is 
the  study of long-lasting resource systems 
that are user-governed. Many of these 
systems have been studied in  depth by 
perceptive scholars such as Robert Net- 
ting, Daniel Bromley, Margaret McKean, 
Fikret Berkes, David Feeny and others. The 
resources involved vary from irrigation 
systems to mountain grazing lands and 
inshore fisheries. The most notable simi- 
larlty among them is  the sheer persever- 
ance of  these resource systems  and insti- 
tutions. The  institutions can be  considered 
robust in that the rules have been devised 
and modified over time  according to  a set 
of  collective-choice  and constitutlonal- 
choice rules (Shepsle 1989).  In other words, 
these systems have been sustainable over 
very long periods of time. Most of  the 
environments  studied are  complex, uncer- 
tain and interdependent where individu- 
als continuously face substantial incentives 
to behave opportunistically. The puzzle 
addressed in  Governing the commons is 
how the individuals using these systems 
have sustained them over extended peri- 
ods  of time. 
The specific rules-in-use differ markedly 
from one  case  to  the  next. Given this great 
variation, the  sustainability of  these resources 
and their institutions cannot be explained 
by the presence or absence of  particular 
rules.  Part of  the explanation for the 
sustainability of these systems is based on 
the fact that the particular rules do  differ, 
taking into account specific attributes of 
the related physical systems: cultural world 
views; and the economic and political re- 
lationships that exist in the  setti-ng.  With- 
out  different rules, appropriators could not 
take advantage of the positive Features of 
a local CPR or avoid potential pitfalls that 
could occur in  one milieu but not in oth- 
ers. 
A set of seven design principles appears 
to characterize most of  the robust CPR 
institutions. An eighth principle marks the 
larger, more complex cases. A  "design principle" is defined as  a concept used either 
consciously or unconsciously  by those 
constituting and reconstituting a continuing 
association of individuals about a general 
organizing principle.  Let us discuss each 
of these design principles. 
Cf early deflned boundarles 
Individuals or households with rights 
to  withdraw resource units from the 
CPR and the boundaries of the CPR 
itself are clearly defined.' 
Defining the  boundarles of the CPR  and 
of  those authorized to  use  It can be thought 
of as  a  'first  step" In  organizing for col- 
lective action. So long as  the boundaries 
of the  resource and/or the  individuals who 
can use it remain uncertain, no  one  knows 
what they are managing or for whom. 
Without defining the boundarles of  the  CPR 
and closir~g  it to 'outsiders",  local appro- 
priators Face the risk that any benefits they 
produce by their efforts will be reaped by 
noncontributing users. At the least, those 
who invest in the CPR  may not receive as 
high a return as  they expected. At the worst. 
the actions of  others could destroy the 
resource itself. Thus, for appropriators to 
have a  mlnlmal  interest in  coordinating 
patterns of  appropriation and provlsion, 
they should be able  to  exclude others from 
access and appropriation rlghts.  If there 
are substantial numbers of potential ap- 
propriators and  the  demand for the resource 
units is  high, the destructive potential of 
all  users freely  withdrawing from a CPR 
could push the  discount rate toward 100%. 
The higher the discount rate, the closer 
the situation is  to  that of  a one-shot dl- 
lemma  where the  dominant strategy of all 
partlclpants is to  overuse the CPR 
'~hls  sectlon draws In part on  E. Ostrom (1990). 
Congruence between appropr/atlon 
and provision rules and /oca/ 
condkions 
Appropriation rules restricting time, 
place, technology and/or quantity of 
resource units are related to local 
conditions and provision rules requiring 
labor, materials and/or money. 
Unless the number of  individuals author- 
ized  to use a  CPR is  so small  that their 
harvesting patterns do  not adversely af- 
fect one another, at least some rules re- 
lated to how much, when and how differ- 
ent  products can be harvested are usually 
designed by the resource users. Well-tai- 
lored approprlatlon and provision rules help 
account for the perseverance of the CPRs 
themselves. Uniform rules established for 
an entire nation or a large region of it rarely. 
can take into account the specific resource 
attributes considered in designing rules- 
in-use in a particular location. 
In  long-surviving irrigation systems, for 
example, subtly different rules are used 
in  each system for assessing water fees 
to  pay for water guards and maintenance 
activities, but in all instances those who 
receive the highest proportion of the  wa- 
ter also pay approximately the  correspond- 
ing share of the fees. No single set  of rules 
defined for all irrigation systems In  a re- 
gion would satisfy the  particular problems 
in  managlng each of these broadly simi- 
lar, but distinctly different, systems. 
Coffectlve choice arrangements 
Most individuals affected by  opera- 
tional rules can participate In  modi- 
fying them. 
lhe CPR instltutions that use this principle 
are able to tailor better rules to local 
circumstances since the individuals who 
dlrectly interact with one  another and with the physical  world can modify the rules 
over time so  as  to better fit them to the 
specific characteristics of  their setting. 
Appropriators who designed CPRinstitutions 
characterized by the first three principle* 
clearly defined  boundaries: good-fitting 
rules:  and appropriator participation in 
collective choice--should  be able to  devise 
a good set of rules if  they keep the costs 
of changing rules relatively low. 
The presence of good rules, however, 
does not account for appropriators following 
them. Nor is  the fact that the appropria- 
tors themselves designed and initially 
concurred with the operational rules an 
adequate  explanation For  centuries of com- 
pliance by individuals who were not origi- 
nally involved in the initial agreement. It 
does  not even suficiently explain the con- 
tinued commitment ofthose  who  were part 
of the initial agreement. Consenting to  follow 
rules ex ante is an easy "commitment" to 
make. Actually obeying rules expost,  when 
strong temptations are present, is the sig- 
nificant accomplishment. 
The problem of gaining compliance to 
rules-no  matter what their origin-is  fre- 
quently assumed away by analysts posit- 
ing all-knowing and all-powerful external 
authorities  that enforce agreements. In many 
long-enduring CPRs, no external author- 
ity has sufFicient presence to  play any role 
in the day-to-day enforcement of the rules- 
in-use.  Thus, external enforcement can- 
not be used to  explain high levels of com- 
pliance. In  all of the long-prevailing cases, 
active investments in monitoring and sanc- 
tioning activities are very apparent. These 
lead us to  consider the fourth and fifth design 
principles: 
Monltors who actively audit CPR con- 
ditions and  appropriator behavior are ac- 
countable to  the appropriators  and/or are 
the appropriators themselves. 
Graduated sanctions 
Appropriators who violate operational 
rules are likely to receive graduated sanc- 
tions (depending on the seriousness and 
context of the offense) from other appro- 
priators, from officials accountable to these 
appropriators, or from both. 
In  long-enduring institutions, monitor- 
ing and sanctioning are undertaken  pri- 
marily by the participants themselves. The 
initial sanctions used in these systems are 
also surprisingly low.  Even  though it is 
frequently presumed that participants will 
not spend the time and effort to monitor 
and sanction each other's performance, 
substantial evidence has been presented 
that they do  both in these settings. 
To explain the investment in monitoring 
and sanctioning activities in these robust, 
self-governing CPR  institutions, the term 
"quasi-voluntary compliance" (Levl 1988) 
is very useful. She  uses the  term to  describe 
taxpayer behavior in regimes where almost 
everyone pays taxes. Paying taxes is 
vduntaly in  the sense that individuals 
chooseto  comply in many situations  where 
they are not being directly coerced. On 
the other hand, it is  "quasi-voluntary because 
the noncompliant are subject to  coercion- 
if they are aught"  (Levi 1988).  Levi stressed 
the contingent nature of  a commitment 
to  follow rules that is possible in a repeated 
setting. Strategic actors are willing to  heed 
with a set of  rules, she argued, when they 
perceive that: (1  ) the collective objective 
is achieved and (2)  others also comply. In 
Levi's  theory, enforcement is  normally 
provided by an external ruler although it 
does not preclude other enforcers. 
To explain commitment in many of the 
cases of sustainable community-governed 
CPRs,  external enforcement is  largely 
irrelevant. External enforcers may not travel 
to  a remote village other than in extremely 
unusual  circumstances.  The  CPR 
appropriators create their own internal 
enforcement to: (1)  deter those who are tempted to  break rules and thereby (2)  assure 
quasi-voluntary compllers that others also 
obey. The Chisasibi Cree, for example, have 
devised a complex set of  entry and authority 
rules related to  the coastal and estuarine 
fish stocks of  James  Bay as well as the beaver 
stock located In  their defined huntlng 
territory. Berkes (1  987)  described why these 
resource systems and the rules used to 
regulate them have survived and prospered 
for so long: 
Effective  social mechanisms ensure 
adherence to  rules which exist by virtue 
of mutual consent within the com- 
munity. People who  violate these rules 
suffer not only a loss of favour from 
the animals (important in  the Cree 
ideology of  hunting) but also social 
disgrace. 
The costs of monitoring are kept relatively 
low in many long-survivlng CPRs as a result 
of the rules-in-use.  Rotation rules used 
in Irrigation systems and in some  inshore 
fisheries place the two actors  most 
concerned with cheating In direct contact 
with one  another. The irrigator who nears 
the end of  a rotation turn would like to 
extend the  time of his turn (and thus, the 
amount of  water obtained).  The next Irrigator 
In  the rotation system waits nearby for 
him to  finish, and would even like to  start 
early. The presence of the flrst Irrigator 
deters the second  from an early start, and 
the  presence of the second irrigator prevents 
the first from a late endlng. Monltorlng 
Is  a  by-product  of  thelr own strong 
motivations to use their water rotation 
turn to the  fullest extent.  The fishing slte 
rotation system used In  Alanya. Turkey. 
(krkes  1992)  has the  same  characterlstlc: 
cheaters are  observed at low cost by those 
who  most want to deter another cheater 
at that  particular time  and location. Many 
of the  ways that work-teams are organized 
In  the Swiss and lapanese mountain 
commons also have  the result  that 
monitoring is a natural by-product of using 
the commons. 
The costs and benefits of monitoring 
a set ot  rules are not independent of the 
particular set of  rules adopted. Nor are 
they uniform  In  all CPR settings. When 
appropriators deslgn at least some  of their 
own rules, they can learn from experience 
to  craR enforceable rather than unenforceable 
ones. This means paying attention to the 
costs of  monitoring and enforcing as  well 
as the benefits that those who monitor 
and enforce the rules obtain. 
A  frequently unrecognized "prlvate" 
benefit of monitoring In  settings where 
information is costly is obtaining the data 
necessary to  adopt  a contingent strategy. 
If an approprlator who monitors finds 
someone who has violated a rule, the 
benefits of this discovery are shared by 
all using the  CPR, as  well as  provides the 
discoverer a signal about compliance rates. 
If the monitor does  notfind a violator, it 
had previously been presumed that private 
costs are involved without any benefit 
to  the individual or the  group. If  information 
Is  not freely available about compliance 
rates, then an Individual gathers  valuable 
data from monltoring. 
By  monitoring the behavlor of others, 
the  appropriator-monitor learns about the 
level of quasi-voluntary compliance in the 
CPR If  no one  is discovered breaking rules, 
the  appropriator-monitor learns that others 
comply and no one is  being taken for a 
sucker. It Is  then safe for the  approprlator- 
monitor to  continue to follow a strategy 
of quasi-voluntary  compliance. If  the 
appropriator-monitor  discovers  rule 
infractions, it Is  possible to learn about 
the  particular clrcumstances surrounding 
the  vlolation; to partlclpate In determining 
the  appropriate level of sanctlonlng; and 
then to  decide  about continued cornpllance 
or not. If  an appropriator-monitor  flnds 
an offender who  normally obeys rules but 
happens to face a severe problem, the 
experience confirms what everyone already knows. There will  always be times and 
places where those who are basically 
committed to following a  set of rules 
succumb to  strong temptations to break 
them. 
A real threat to  the  continuance of quasl- 
voluntary compliance can occur, however, 
if  an appropriator-monitor  discovers 
individuals who break the rules repeatedly. 
If this happens, one would  expect the 
appropriator-monitor to escalate the 
sanctions imposed in an effort to  halt future 
rule-breaking by such offenders and any 
others who might start to  follow suit. In 
any case, the appropriator-monitor  has 
up-to-date information about compllance 
and sanctioning behavior on which to make 
future decisions about personal compliance. 
Let us also look at  the situation through 
the  eyes  of someone who breaks the rules 
and is discovered by  a local guard (who 
will eventually tell everyone) or another 
appropriator (who  also is likely to  tell eve- 
ryone). Being apprehended by  a  local 
monitor when the  temptation to  break the 
rules becomes too  great has three results: 
(1)  it stops  the infraction from continuing 
and may return contraband harvest to others: 
(2)  it conveys information to  the  offender 
that someone else in a similar situation is 
likely to  be caught, thus increasing confi- 
dence in the level of quasi-voluntary com- 
pliance; and (3)  a punishment in the form 
of a  fine plus loss of  reputation for  rell- 
ability is  imposed. 
The fourth and fifth design principles- 
monitoring and graduated sanctions-thus 
take their place as part of the configura- 
tion  of  principles that work together to 
enable appropriators to constitute and 
reconstitute robust CPR  institutions.  Let 
me  summarize my argument to  this point. 
When CPR appropriators design their own 
operational  rules (Design Principle 3) to 
be enforced by individuals who are local 
appropriators or accountable to  them (Dc- 
sign Principle 4) using graduated sanctions 
(Design Principle 5) that define who has 
rights to  withdraw from the CPR (Design 
Principle  1) and that effectively restrict 
appropriation activities given local con- 
ditions (Design Principle 2), the commlt- 
ment and monitoring problem are solved 
In an interrelated manner. lndlvlduals who 
think a set of rules will be effective in pro- 
ducing higher joint benefits and that moni- 
toring (including their own) will  protect 
them from being gullible, are willing to 
make a contingent self-commitment of the 
following type: I commit myself to follow 
the set of rules we have devised in all in- 
stances, except during dire emergencies. 
if the rest of those affected make a similar 
commitment and act accordingly.  Once 
appropriators have made  contingent self- 
commitments, they are then motivated to 
monitor other people's behavior, at  least 
occasionally,  to assure themselves that 
others are obeying the rules most of the 
time. Contingent self-commitments and 
mutual monitoring reinforce one another 
especially in CPRs where rules tend to  re- 
duce monitoring costs. 
Conflict  resolution mechanisms 
Appropriators and their officlals have 
rapid access to low-cost, local  are- 
nas to  resolve conflicts among  appro- 
priators or between appropriators and 
officials. 
In  field settings, applying rules always 
involves discretion and can frequently lead 
to  conflict. Even such a simple rule as  "Each 
irrigator must send one individual for one 
day to help clean the irrigation canals before 
the rainy season begins" can be interpreted 
quite differently by various individuals. Who 
is  or is  not an "individual" according to 
this rule? Does sending a child below 10 
or an adult above 70 to  do  heavy physical 
work meet this rule? Is  working For  4 or 6 
hours a "day" of  work? Does  cleaning the 
canal immediately next to  one's own farm 
qualify for this community obligation? For indlviduals seeking ways to slide past or 
subvert rules.  there are always ways to 
"Interpret" the rule so  that they can argue 
they meet it while thwarting the intent. 
Even individuals who intend to  follow the 
spirit of  a  rule can make errors. What 
happens if  someone forgets about labor 
day and does not show up, or If the only 
able-bodied worker is sick, or unavoidably 
in another location? 
If indivlduals are going to follow rules 
for a prolonged period, a mechanism for 
discussing and resolving what Is  or Is  not 
a rule infraction is  quite necessary to  the 
continuance of rule conformance itself. If 
some individuals are allowed to free ride 
by sendlng less valuable workers on a 
required labor day. others will  consider 
themselves suckers If they send their 
strongest workers who could otherwise 
produce  private  goods  rather  than 
communal benefits. Over time, only children 
and old people will  be sent to do  work 
that requlres strong  adults and the system 
will break down. If  lndlviduals who make 
an honest mistake or  face personal problems 
that prevent them From  following a rule 
cannot find mechanisms to make up for 
their lack of  performance In an acceptable 
way, rules can be viewed as unfalr and 
compliance rates decline. 
While the presence of conflict-resolu- 
tlon mechanisms does  not guarantee that 
appropriators are able to maintain endur- 
Ing instltutlons, It Is  difficult to imagine 
how any complex system of  rules could 
be retained over  time without such mecha- 
nisms. In the cases  described above, these 
mechanlsms are  sometimes quite informal 
and those selected as leaders are also the 
basic resolvers of conflict. 
Minimal ~cognkion  of 
rights to organize 
The  rights of  appropriators to devise 
their own institutions are not chal- 
lenged by  external governmental 
authorities. 
Appropriators Frequently devise their own 
rules without having created formal, gov- 
ernmental jurisdlctlons for this purpose. 
In many inshore fisheries. for example, local 
fishers form extensive rules defining who 
can use a fishing ground and what kind of 
equlpment can be used. So long as exter- 
nal  governmental omclals at least mlni- 
mally recognize to  the legitimacy of  such 
rules, the fishers themselves may be able 
to  enforce them. But if external govern- 
mental offlclals presume that only they can 
make authority rules, then It Is  dlMcult for 
local appropriators to  sustain a rule-gov- 
erned CPR  over the long run. At any point 
when someone wishes to  break the rules 
created by the fishers, they can go to the 
external government and get local rules 
overturned. 
Nested enterprises 
Appropriation, provision, monitor- 
ing, enforcement, confllct resolution 
and governance activities are organized 
in  multiple layers of nested enter- 
prlses. 
In  larger systems. It  Is  qulte dlmcult to 
devise rules well-matched to all aspects 
of  the provlslon and approprlatlon of that 
system at one level of organization. The 
rules appropriate for allocating water among 
three major branches of  an irrlgatlon sys- 
tem, for example, may not be suitable for 
farmers along a single distributory chan- 
nel. Consequently, among long-enduring 
self-governed CPRs, smaller-scale organi- 
zatlons tend to be nested in  ever larger 
organizations.  It  is  not at all  unusual to 
find a larger.  farmer-governed irrigation 
system, for example, with five layers of 
organization, each with its own distinct 
set of  rules. Threats to Sustainable 
Cornmunlty-Governed 
Commons 
The study  of community-governed and 
managed commons provides evidence of 
an  immense  diversity of physical settings 
and institutional  rules relatively well- 
matched to the local envlronment.  It  is 
important to  recognize, however, that not 
all community-governed CPRs  cope effec- 
tively with the  array of problems they face 
over  time. Some  efforts at  self-governance 
fail before resource users even get  organized. 
Others break down within a few years. 
Others survive for long periods of time 
but are destroyed as a result of a variety 
of conditions. One source of failure is in- 
stitutions  that are  not characterized by many 
of the  design principles. Earlier studies have 
shown that small-scale CPRs with only a 
small number of these design princlples 
are  more likely to  fail than those that possess 
a larger number of them. 
However, even institutions character- 
ized by the  design principles flounder. Thus, 
we  need to  speculate  about  other threats 
to  community governance  that arise from 
Field observations, theoretical conjectures 
and empirical findings of  scholars study- 
ing small-scale CPRs or  related situations. 
The reader is cautioned that the next two 
sections are far more speculative in  na- 
ture than the First  two. It  is  important, 
however, to share speculations so that 
further research and analysis can be di- 
rected toward improving the knowledge 
claims OF some  conjectures and reducing 
our confidence in others. Here are eight 
threats to  sustainable  community govern- 
ance  of small-scale CPRs that  I  have come 
across in different contexts: 
1. blueprint thinking: 
2. overreliance on simple voting rules 
as the primary decision mechanism 
for making all collective choices: 
3. rapid changes  in technology, human, 
animal or plant populations;  factor 
availability; substitution of  relative 
importance  of monetary transactions: 
heterogeneity of participants: 
4. transmission failures from one gen- 
eration to  the  next of the operational 
principles on  which community gov- 
ernance is  based: 
5. turning to external sources of  help 
too frequently; 
6.  international aid that does not take 
account of indigenous knowledge and 
institutions; 
7. corruption and other forms of  oppor- 
tunistic behavior; and 
8. lack of: large-scale institutional arrange- 
ments related to  reliable information 
collection, aggregation and dissemi- 
nation: fair and low-cost conflict reso- 
lution mechanisms; educational and 
extension facilities; and facilities For 
helping when  natural disasters or  other 
major problems occur at a  local 
level. 
Blueprint thlnklng 
Blueprint thinking occurs whenever 
policymakers, donors, citizens or schol- 
ars propose uniform  solutions to  a wide 
variety of  problems that are  clustered un- 
der a single name based on one or more 
successful exemplars. Korten ( 1980)  called 
this the "blueprint approach" and made a 
devastating critique of  its prevalence in 
development work at  the  end of the 1970s. 
As he  described it: 
Researchers are  supposed to  provide 
data from pilot projects and other 
studies  which will allow the  planners 
to  choose the most effective project 
design  for  achieving  a  given 
development outcome  and to reduce 
it to  a blueprint For  implementation. 
Administrators of the implementing 
organization are  supposed to  execute 
the project plan Faithfully, much as a contractor would follow construction 
blueprints,  s'pecifications,  and 
schedules. An evaluation researcher 
is supposed to  measure  actual changes 
in the target population and report 
actual versus planned changes to  the 
planner at  the end of  the project cycle 
so  that  the  blueprints  can  be 
revised. 
Korten's critique is just as relevant in  the 
1990s as it was more than a decade ago. 
Even advocates of  community govern- 
ance Fall into the trap of blueprint think- 
ing. Whenever  a policy is adopted that 
calls for the creation of  large numbers of 
farmer organizations in  a short period of 
time, there is a potential threat of blue- 
print thlnklng.  Sengupta (1991), for ex- 
ample, descrlbed the efforts of the Sone 
Command Area Development Agency in 
India  to  defend itself  against questions raised 
in 1978 by policymakers as to why one 
part of its objectives was not being met 
-  "that pertaining to  the formation of  ir- 
rigation assoclatlons".  The  agency then 
turned to  'the  Cooperative Department to 
frame  model bylaws for the irrigation-specific 
cooperatives  called  Chak  Societies" 
(Sengupta 199 1  ). The model bylaws con- 
tained 42 major and several minor clauses, 
but failed to address how irrigation co- 
operatives might be similar to or differ- 
ent from those established for other pur- 
poses.  In  the next year,  22 Chak Socie- 
ties were initiated in  the Sone Command 
area.  But few of them performed in the 
way that policymakers thought they should, 
and the whole idea of registering irriga- 
tion associations using the model bylaws 
was dropped. The only way to  get a large 
number of  organizations set up  In  a hurry 
is to have an organizational charter and 
constitution written for all units. Then one 
can simply call meetings and have peo- 
ple sign up. Such efforts result in large 
numbers of  paper organizations and little 
else. 
Overreliance on simple voting rules 
Closely related to blueprint thinking is 
the presumption that certain voting rules- 
either simple majority or unanimity-are 
the only rules that should be used in making 
collective decisions. The problem that users 
face is gaining general understanding of 
and agreement to  a set of  rules-not  simply 
having a short discussion and a pro  forma 
vote. The extensive theoretical and em- 
pirical studies growing  out of  social choice 
theory have demonstrated repeatedly that 
if the community members are strongly 
divided on an issue, it is extremely unu- 
sual to find any rule that enables them to 
achieve a final decision that is stable and 
reflects the preferences of  those affected. 
Substituting a simple majority vote for a 
series of long discussions and extensive 
efforts to come close to  a consensus be- 
fore making  declslons that commit a self- 
governing  community, may bring  leaders 
to  simply arrange agenda so that they win 
in  the short run. As soon as  rules are seen 
as imposed by a majority vote rather than 
generally agreed upon, the costs of  moni- 
toring  and enforcement Increase. The group 
has lost quasi-voluntary compliance and 
must invest more  heavily in  enforcement 
to  gain conformity. 
Similarly, reliance on  unanimity prior to 
major changes may also challenge the long- 
term viability of  a selfdgoverning society. 
Once formal unanimity is adopted,  only 
one person needs to hold out to delay 
decisions or impose high  costs on  almost 
everyone else. The adaptability of a self- 
governed system may be too rapid if  only 
simple majority votes are relied upon  and 
too slow if  only unanimity is used. 
Rapid exogenous changes 
All rapid  changes in  technoloa, human, 
animal or plant papulations; factor avail- 
ability: substitution of  relative importance of monetary transactions; or the hetero- 
geneity of participants are a threat to  the 
continuance of any self-organized system 
whether it is a Firm  in a competitive mar- 
ket or a community-governed CPR.  Indl- 
viduals who have adapted an effective way 
of coping with a particular technological, 
economic or social environment may be 
able to adjust to slow changes in  one or 
several variables if substantial feedback is 
provided about the consequences of these 
changes for the long-term  sustainability 
of the resource and/or the set of institu- 
tions used For governing that resource. They 
may even be able to  adjust to  changes in 
these variables that occur at a moderate 
rate. The faster key variables change and 
the more  variables that change at the same 
time, the more demanding the problem 
of adaptation to  new circumstances. These 
kinds of threats are difficult for all organi- 
zatlons. Those that rely to a greater ex- 
tent on quasi voluntary compliance are. 
however, more threatened than those who 
are able to  coerce contributions (Bromley 
and Champagain  1984; Goodland et al. 
1 886). 
Transmission faiiures 
Rapid change of population or culture 
may lead to  a circumstance in which the 
general design principles of effective com- 
munity-governed  institutions are not trans- 
mitted from one generation to  another. 
When individuals substitute rote reliance 
on formal rules for an understanding OF 
why these rules are used, they can ar- 
gue  on how to interpret the formal rules 
that undercur the  viability of community 
organization. Relating this back to vot- 
ing rules,  for  example, the charter or 
constitution of a community organization 
may specify that simple majority rule will 
be used  in  making decisions about fu- 
ture projects and how  the costs and beneFits 
will  be divided. If the founders of such 
an organization recognize the importance 
of gaining general agreement, they will 
rarely push forward on a large project that 
is supported by only a minimal winning 
coalition. In  such an instance, there are 
almost as many community members in 
opposition as  those who support the project. 
But, if  over time, the principle of gain- 
ing general agreement to  furure projects 
prior to  implementation is not conveyed 
and accepted by those who later take on 
leadership responsibilities, then decisions 
receiving only minimal support may be 
pushed forward. Leaders of communities 
who rely on minimal winning coalitions 
for too many decisions, may resort to 
patronage, coercion or corruption to  stay 
in power rather than depend on a foun- 
dation of  general agreement. 
Similarly, if those who are required to 
contribute particular resources or refrain 
from particular actions see these "rules" 
as  obstacles to  be overcome, rather than 
as the written representation of general 
underlying principles of organization, they 
may push for interpretations of rules that 
lead to their general weakening. If each 
household tries to Find  every legal way 
to  minimize the amount of labor contributed 
to  the maintenance of a Farmer-governed 
irrigation system, for example, eventu- 
ally the cumulative effect is  an insuffi- 
cient maintenance effort and the unraveling 
of the contingent contributions of all. If 
one family tries to make a favorable in- 
terpretation of how much labor they should 
contribute, given the land they own, others 
soon discover it and those who would 
be favored by such an interpretation, begin 
to use it as well. The total quantity of 
labor contributed declines. Unless there 
is a community discussion about the un- 
derlying principles that can  be used in 
interpreting rules, practices may evolve 
that cannot be sustained over time. Then, 
the danger exists that the unraveling con- 
tinues unabated until the community or- 
ganization Falls apart. PumIng to external sources of 
help too frequently 
A threat to long-term sustainability can 
be the availability of funds from external 
authorities or donors  that appear to be "easy 
money." These can undercut the  capabili- 
ties of a local  Institution to sustain itself 
over  time. Thls Is particularly dent  In  regard 
to farmer-governed  irrigatlon  system^.^ 
Monetary resources for constructing, op- 
erating  and maintaining irrigation systems 
are frequently contrlbuted by the taxpay- 
ers of the natlon In  whlch the lrrlgatlon 
system Is  located or  the taxpayers of those 
nations providing economic assistance. 
When these funds are used, the financial 
connection between supply and use is 
nonexistent. Whether the resources so 
mobilized are directly invested In  the con- 
struction and operation of irrigation sys- 
tems or are diverted for individual use by 
politicians or contractors depends  on the 
professionalism of those involved and on 
active efforts to  monitor and sanction di- 
versions of resources. When the farmers 
themselves are involved In  the construc- 
tion and operation of irrigation systems, 
they provide low-cost monitoring of  how 
resources for these activities are used. This 
is lost when the users are not involved in 
construction or operation. Expensive au- 
diting systems are then needed, but rarely 
supplied. Consequently, a  considerable 
portion of the mobilized resources is  di- 
verted to purposes other than those for 
which they were intended. 
Further, the design of  projects is  ori- 
ented more toward gaining the approval 
of those who release funds than toward 
providing systems that solve the problems 
facing present and future users. To con- 
vince politicians that large chunks of  a 
national budget should be devoted to  the 
Thls and the next two sectlons draw on E. Ostrom 
(1  992). 
construction of irrigation projects, plan- 
ners attempt to deslgn projects that are 
"polltlcally attractlve."  Thls means that 
politicians who  support such expenditures 
can claim that the  voters' funds are being 
Invested in projects that wlll produce more 
food and the cost of Ilvlng. 
lnternatlonal ald that Ignores 
IndIgcnous knowledge and 
Instltu  flons 
To convince external funding agencies 
that major irrigation  projects should be 
funded through loans or  grants, the  evalu- 
ative selection crlteria by these agencies 
have to play a prominent role In  project 
design. Projects designed by engineers who 
lack experience as farmers or training as 
institutional analysts, are frequently ori- 
ented toward winning polltical support or 
lnternatlonal funding. This orientation does 
not lead to the construction of  projects 
that serve most users (i.e., small-scale farm- 
ers) effectively or encourage the invest- 
ment of users in their long-term sustenance. 
Inefficiencies occur at  almost every stage. 
At the  same  time, this inept process leads 
to the construction of projects that gen- 
erate  substantial profits for large landholders 
and strong political support for a govern- 
ment. 
Processes that encourage looking to 
external sources of funding make it difficult 
to  build upon indigenous knowledge and 
institutions. A central part of the  message 
asking for external funds is that what has 
been accomplished locally has failed and 
massive external technical knowledge and 
funds are needed to  achieve "development". 
In  some  cases,  prior  institutional 
arrangements are not recognized at  all. 
Thls has three adverse consequences: ( 1  ) 
property rights that resource users had 
slowly achieved under earlier regimes are 
swept away and the  poor lose substantial 
assets: (2) those who have lost prior investments are less willing to  venture; 
and (3)  the status of indigenous lcnowledge 
and institutions is generally downgraded. 
Corruption and other forms of 
opportunistic behavior 
All types of opportunistic behavior are 
encouraged, rather than discouraged, by: 
( 1 )  the availability of  massive funds to 
subsidize the  construction and operation 
OF  large-scale irrigation projects and (2) 
the willingness (or even eagerness) of 
national leaders to subsidize water as a 
major input into agricultural production. 
Corrupt exchanges between officials and 
private contractors are a notorious and 
prevalent form of  opportunism; corrupt 
payments by farmers to  irrigation officials 
are less well-known, but probably no less 
widespread. Free riding on the part of 
those receiving benefits and the lack of 
trust between Farmers and officials, as  well 
as  among  farmers, are also endemic. Moreo- 
ver, the potential rents that can be de- 
rived from free irrigation water by large-scale 
landowners  stimulate efforts to  influence 
public decisionmalting as to  where projects 
should be located and how they should 
be financed. Politicians, for their part, win 
political support by  strategic decisions 
concerning who  will receive or continue 
to receive artificially  created economic 
rents. 
Bates (1987) explained many of  the 
characteristics of  African agricultural policies 
by arguing  that major "inefficiencies persist 
because they are politically useful: eco- 
nomic inefficiencies afFord governments 
means  of retaining political power". Part 
of Bates'  argument relates to the artifi- 
cial  price control for agricultural  prod- 
ucts. The other part of his argument concerns 
the artificial lowering of  input prices. 
When they  lower the price of  inputs, 
private sources furnish lesser quan- 
tities, users demand greater quan- 
tities, and the result is  excess de- 
mand. One  consequence is that the 
inputs acquire new value; the  admin- 
istratively created shortage creates 
an economic premium for those who 
acquire them. Another is that, at  the 
mandated price, the market cannot 
allocate the inputs; they are in short 
supply. Rather than being allocated 
through a pricing system, they must 
be rationed. Those in charge of the 
regulated market thereby acquire the 
capacity to exercise discretion and 
to  confer the resources upon those 
whose favor they desire. ... 
Public programs which distribute farm 
credit, tractor-hire  services, seeds, 
and fertilizers, and which bestow access 
to government managed irrigation 
schemes and public land, thus be- 
come  instruments of political organi- 
zation in the countryside of Africa. 
Thus, there is  an added dimension to 
rent seeking in  many developing coun- 
tries. The losses that the general consumer 
and taxpayer accrue from  rent-seeking 
activities are one  dimension. The second 
aspect of rent seeking in  highly central- 
ized economies is the acquisition of re- 
sources needed to accumulate and re- 
tain political power. All forms of oppor- 
tunistic behavior, therefore, are exacer- 
bated in an  environment  where an abun- 
dance of funds is  available for the con- 
struction of new  and Frequently large-scale 
irrigation projects that provide subsidized 
water. This is  exactly the political  and 
financial milieux that irrigation suppliers 
have faced during the past 40 years in 
most developing countries. Developed 
countries have made  vast amounts  of money 
available to  developing  countries through 
bilateral  and multilateral  loans and aid 
agreements. Lack of  large-scale supportive 
instItutIons 
While smaller-scale,  community-gov- 
erned resource institutions may be  far more 
effective In  achieving many aspects of 
sustainable development  than centralized 
government. the absence of supportive. 
large-scale institutional arrangements may 
be just as  much a threat to  long-term sus- 
tenance as the presence of  preemptive large- 
scale government agencies. Obtaining 
reliable Information  about the effects of 
different uses of  resource systems and 
resource conditions is  an activity essen- 
tial to  long-term sustainability. If all local 
communities have to develop all of their 
own scientific InFormatlon about their physi- 
cal settings, few would have the resources 
to  accomplish this. 
Let me use the example of  the impor- 
tant role of the United States Geologic Survey 
in the  development of more effective, lo- 
cal groundwater institutions in some  parts 
of the country. It  is  important to stress 
that the Geologic Survey does not con- 
struct engineering works or do  anythlng 
other than obtain and dissemlnate accu- 
rate information about hydrologic and 
geologic structures  within the country. Some 
water users could contract the Geologic 
Survey to  conduct an intensive study of a 
local groundwater basin and the cost would 
be shared by  water producers and the 
Geologic Survey. It then becomes public 
information available to  all interested parties. 
The Geologic Survey employs a  highly 
professional staff who relies on the most 
recent scientific techniques.  Local water 
producers obtain the very best available 
information From an agency that is not trying 
to  push any particular future project in which 
it may be interested. Many countries, such 
as India, that do  have large and sometimes 
dominating state organizations lack agencies 
that provide public access to high-qual- 
ity information about resource conditions 
and consequences. Recent efforts to  open 
up  groundwater exploration in India may 
lead  to  the  massive  destruction  of 
groundwater basins rather than a firm ba- 
sis for long-term growth. 
Similarly, the lack of a low-cost,  fair 
method for resolving those conflicts that 
spill out beyond the bounds of a local 
community is  also a  threat to long-run 
sustalnability. All groups face internal or 
intergroup conflicts that can destroy the 
Fundamental trust and reciprocity on which 
so much effective governance is based. If 
the only kind of  conflict resolution mecha- 
nism available is either so costly that most 
self-governed CPRs cannot make use of 
It, or so blased, then these conflicts can 
themselves destroy even very robust in- 
stitutional arrangements. 
Methods for Coping with 
Threats to Sustainabillty 
There are no sure-fire mechanisms for 
addressing all of  the above threats. Three 
methods  are not frequently mentioned as 
important in increasing the effectiveness 
of self-governed institutions: ( 1 ) the creation 
of associations of community- governed 
entities; (2)  comparative Institutional re- 
search that provldes a more effective knowl- 
edge base about design and operating 
principles; and (3)  developing more ef- 
fective high school and college courses 
on local governance. 
Creating assoclatlons of  community- 
governed entities 
Those who think local participation  is 
important in  the process of  developing 
sustainable resources and their more 
effective governance are often committed 
to dolng a good deal of  'community 
organization." All too frequently! this type 
of organiution is conceptualized as fostering 
a large number of community groups at the same level. IF  community organization 
is  fostered  by  nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) which then provide 
staff assistance and some external resources, 
the entities may flourish as  long as  the 
NGOs remain interested, but  wither on  the 
vine when the NGOs turn to other types 
of  projects. A technique that draws on  our 
lcnowledge of  how  self-governed institutions 
operate is helping to create associations 
of  community organizations. As discussed 
above,  most large-scale  user-governed 
resource institutions  are composed of  several 
layers of nested organizations. 
Community organizations brought  to- 
gether in federations can provide one an- 
other some ofthe back-up that NGOs offer 
to  single-layer community organizations. 
While no single community-governed 
organization may be able to fund infor- 
mation collection that is unbiased and of 
real value to it, a federation of such or- 
ganizations may be able to  amass the funds 
to  do  so. Simply having  a newsletter that 
shares information about what has worked 
and why in some settings helps people 
learn from each others' trial-and-error 
methods. Having  an annual meeting  that 
brings people together to discuss their 
common problems and ways of  tackling 
them greatly expands that repertoire of 
techniques for coping with threats that 
any one group can muster on its own. 
Such organizations can also encourage 
farmer-to-farmer training efforts that have 
proved  to  be highly successful in  enhancing 
farmer-governed  irrigation systems in 
Nepal  .3 
3See Pradhan and Yoder (1  989): WECS/IIMI (1  990): 
Yoder  (1991) For  descriptions of a highly innova- 
tive and successful program of assisting farmers design 
their own institutional rules rather than imposing a 
set of model bylaws on them. 
Rigorous cornparat/ve 
Institutional research 
In  addition to the type of information 
exchange that those involved in  self-gov- 
erning entities can undertake on their own, 
it is important to find ways of conduct- 
Ing  rigorous, over-time comparative re- 
search that controls for the many con- 
Founding  variables that simultaneously affect 
performance. For instance, folk medicine 
had frequently been based on unl<nown 
foundations that turned out to be rela- 
tively sound. But some folk medicine con- 
tinued for centuries doing  patients more 
harm than good. The commons governed 
by  users and the institutions they use are 
complex and sometimes difficult to un- 
derstand. It is important to  blend Itnowledge 
and information  obtained in  many different 
ways as we try to build a more effective 
database about what works and why. 
Developing better curricula on local 
governance 
Western textbooks on  the subject used 
to  focus as much  on  local as national gov- 
ernance arrangements. During  the past half- 
century, introductory textbooks on  American 
government have moved from a 50-50 split 
between  national and local administration 
to  a 95 to 5 ratio. The textbooks used in 
the West have strongly influenced those 
in  developing countries. Consequently, 
many public  officials learn nothing  in  high 
school and college about how  local com- 
munities can govern themselves effectively 
or about the threats to  local self-govern- 
ance. Instead, it Is presumed that governance 
is done in  national capitals and what goes 
on  in  villages is outmoded If  not  completely 
useless. Thus, it is recommended that more 
paterials on  self-governing communities 
be integrated into the curricula offered in 
high school, professional schools and col- 
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Summary 
F 
isheries resources, subject to indi- 
vidual use but not to  individual pos- 
session, provide the classical example 
of  common property. By  definition, all 
common-property (or common pool) re- 
sources share two characteristics:  (1  ) 
it is  costly to exclude potential users 
From gaining  access  to  the resource (the 
problem of  exclusion); and (2)  each per- 
son's use of the resource subtracts from 
the welfare OF  others (the problem of 
subtractability). These two  characteristics 
provide the starting point for any dis- 
cussion of property rights in coastal fish- 
eries. 
In the case OF  marine resources, the 
exclusion problem is closely related to 
the "Freedom of  the  seas" principle, the 
idea that seas should be open access 
or freely available to  all. Exclusion may 
be approached through traditional man- 
agement  methods, such as  territorial use- 
rights, and cooperative-based or com- 
munity-based  exclusive fishing areas. 
It can also be addressed through some 
of  the current scientific management 
techniques which accomplish much the 
same purpose through license limita- 
tion and the  allocation of  individual trans- 
ferable quotas (ITQs). 
The problem of  subtractability may be 
approached by  making and enforcing 
rules to  limit short-term individual interest 
and to protect long-term, collective 
interest. Rule-malting and enforcement 
by government  agencies everywhere have 
been both difficult and costly. Thus, there 
is renewed interest in many parts of the 
world to  involve fishers in management. 
But no community of fishers carries out 
its business in isolation: purely communal fisheries exist hardly anywhere in the 
world. Thus,  practical solutions to the 
subtractabllity problem revolve around 
some appropriate mix of  communal and 
state  management regimes (or co- 
management) for coastal fisheries. 
Reliance purely on the government 
has blinded Fisheries resource manag- 
ers to  the broad range of possibilities 
offered by  systems that involve  various 
degrees of user self-management. But 
integrating  communities of  fishers into 
the management process requires,  in 
the first place,  the creation of incen- 
tive structures for users to fish sustainably. 
The  exclusion problem almost always 
requires government management to  help 
enforce rights. The subtractability problem 
needs the building  of  institutional ca- 
pability for self-management. In sumL 
policy implications of a  reassessment 
of property rights in  coastal  fisheries 
of  the world Include the abandonment 
of open-access  ideals and the notion 
that government regulation is  sufficient. 
It also calls for institution-building In 
fishing communities to establish co- 
management regimes towards the sus- 
tainable use of resources.  .  . 
L-- 
Introduction and Context 
It is ultimately desirable to develop 
integrated resource management sys- 
tems which include the human dimen- 
sion. More  and  more  managers emphasize 
that fisheries can only be managed with 
due regard to  communities of fishers. 
A  major dllemma has,  nevertheless, 
persisted. On  the one  hand, many agree 
that fishers have to  be integrated Into 
management systems. But on  the other 
hand, many managers hold  the view  that 
users cannot be  trusted wlth  the resource. 
An article in The  Econornlst(l0  December 
1988)  encapsulates the conventional wis- 
dom: 
...  it is possible to manage fisher- 
ies successfully, provided three facts 
are kept in mind. (I),Left to  their 
own devices, fishermen will over- 
exploit stocks. (2)  Those stocks are 
extremely unpredictable. (3) To avoid 
disaster, managers must have ef- 
fective hegemony over them. 
Note  that two  of  the three "facts" are 
germane to  community management (no 
one is questioning the unpredictability 
of  stocks). Those two  "facts" compel us, 
as does the consequence of "freedom 
in the commons (which) brlngs ruin to 
all" (Hardin t968), to do  something to 
control those Fishers. 
For many managers, this means a better 
and tighter kind of government man- 
agement. Even in cases in which the re- 
sources are privatized by  the allocation 
of  ITQs,  the allowable catch still has to 
be calculated and total fishing effort con- 
trolled.  a very major job for any one 
entity. A large amount of  literature testifies 
to  the difficulties of regulating fishing 
effort (e-g..  Larkln 1988).  Stock assessment 
costs and administrative costs of  regulating 
and policing have been escalating. For 
example, Macdonald ( 1980)  calculated 
for Prince Edward Island fisheries in  Canada 
that: 
..  . with  administrative costs and sub- 
sidies of $13 million, It cost more 
than $41 million to produce $28 
million worth of fishery  products 
... However, If  a more kindly  view 
of  the PEI fisheries performance Is 
taken (i.e.-assuming the opportu- 
nity costs of  labour to  be zero) then 
it costs as  low as  $25 million to 
produce $28 million. If  this view 
Is taken.  then it cost $13 million in  government fundlng to  produce 
something less than $16 million In 
income to fishermen and process- 
Ing  workers. 
The concentration  of management pow- 
ers and responsiblllties wlth government 
agencies is not  only costly; it  is admin- 
istratively inefficient. Other branches of 
management science have discovered 
over the years that complicated regu- 
lations are counterproductive. Such find- 
ings have compelled the wiser manag- 
ers to take into account the self-regu- 
latory abilities of  workers. In  many fields 
of management, managers are turning 
to the view that the person who does 
the job knows It best. 
The  irony in the field of marine re- 
sources is that fisheries managers had 
been heading. until recently, in  the di- 
rection of  tlghter government controls, 
whereas those In other fields of man- 
agemmt (and who have already "been 
there") are moving  towards devolution, 
deregulation. decentralization and co- 
operative management. The popularity 
of  the Japanese model of business man- 
agement may be seen In  this Ilght. The 
current interest in  community-based fish- 
eries may also be viewed from this per- 
spective. 
To summarize, the conventional wisdom 
In marine resources management has 
favored strong, well-informed, centrallzed 
controls (Hanna, in  press). But there is 
ample evidence over the years that 
centralized controls have not worked 
(MacKay 1993).  As part of the process 
of  rethinking coastal resources manage- 
ment. It Is informative to reflect on the 
history of management philosophy that 
separated the resource user from the 
manager; perceived the need for a "higher 
authorlty": and made a managerial axlom 
out of the "freedom of the seas" prin- 
clple. 
Hlstorlcal Background: Hobbes, 
Rousseau and Grotlus 
The current 'crisis  In  the world's fish- 
eries" (McGoodwln 1990) has historl- 
cal roots wlth respect to managers' as- 
sumptions and management philosophies. 
The  conventional wisdom In fisheries 
circles ("left to their own devices, fish- 
ermen will overexploit stocks; manag- 
ers must have effective hegemony over 
them") reflects the thinking of an era 
that glorified technologlcal elitlsm, and 
created a bureaucratic elite to manage 
the affairs of the state.  The  develop- 
ment of technocratic-bureaucratic controls 
was identified and analyzed by the German 
sociologist Max Weber In  the early twen- 
tieth century. The separation of  the user 
from the manager and the governed from 
the governor is usually explained in  terms 
of the rise of the modern state whose 
affairs had become too compllcated for 
ordinary citizens to handle. The debate 
over self-governance has In fact much 
deeper roots. 
In  the 1600s In  Britain. Thomas Hobbes 
argued In Leviathan ( 165  1  ) for the ne- 
cessity of a higher authorlty.  He was 
convinced that soclety needed the ab- 
solute dominance of a sovereign ruler 
as  the source of law.  People were ln- 
capable of  collective action towards thelr 
common good, Hobbes argued, and the 
rule of law had to be exogenously im- 
posed. By contrast, Jean-lacques  Rousseau 
in  France (On the social contract. 1  762) 
developed the antithesis of Hobbes' 
solution. The  rule of law was  endog- 
enous to  soclety rather than externally 
supplied by a Leviathan. A hlgher au- 
thority was not necessarily needed: It 
was possible. for Rousseau, to  have egali- 
tarian agrarian comrnunltles In which peas- 
ants regulated thelr affalrs  'under  an 
oak  tree." Hard-nosed fisheries managers have 
been Hobbesians; they have always con- 
sidered Rousseau's kind of thinking as 
Usoft"  and "romantic". The managers of 
enormously successful  Japanese busi- 
nesses would probably disagree. Now 
combine with Hobbesian attitudes a 
second cherished Western notion, the 
"freedom of  the seas."  Hugo  Grotius wrote 
The freedom of  the seas ( 1608) to  jus- 
tify the Dutch trade in the East Indies. 
The sea,  he argued, was limitless and 
could not become the possession  OF 
anyone but  was, by nature, suitable to 
the use of  all. The limitless sea of  Grotius 
is said to be the basis of  the fundamental 
assumption of "freedom of the seas." 
a notion which persisted more or less 
until the 1982 Law of  the Sea. 
The point  to  emphasize is that "free- 
dom of  the seas"  and an open-access 
approach to marine resources in gen- 
eral were deliberate and essential to 
colonial trade. Grotius did distinguish 
among res nu//ius (no one's  property 
but  could be acquired), res communes 
(collective property) and res  publica (public 
property). But Grotius' legacy has been 
that the sea,  while res communes.  is 
also free, limitless and cannot be owned. 
This assumption makes marine resources, 
In  effect, res nu///us. 
Among Western-trained fisheries man- 
agers, however, the confusion between 
res communes and res nu//ius persists 
despite notable efforts by scholars such 
as Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop ( 1975) 
and a series of  recent major works (McCay 
and Acheson 1987; Berkes 1989; Ostrom 
1990; Bromley 1992). To set the record 
straight, many continue to confuse com- 
mon  property with open access (Pomeroy 
19934.  The basic differences between 
the two regimes are shown in Fig. I. 
Note that in the absence of common- 
property institutions to receive and 
evaluate feedback from the resource and 
a common-property regime to  regulate 
the behavior of  users, one ends up  with 
a runaway positive feedback loop that 
will lead to  a "tragedy of  the commons" 
(Hardin 1968). 
In  some non-Western cultures. marine 
resources are not  regarded as open access, 
and coastal marine areas have property 
status comparable to  that of  communal 
land.  Such  resources are held as  res 
communes by communities of  users under 
well-defined resource-use rules, although 
not under outright ownership in the 
Western sense. Contemporary examples 
of such communal property marine 
resources may be found in  Fiji and Solomon 
Islands (Baines 1989) and in  coastal Japan 
Table 1. A sampllng of tradltlonal flshery and lntegraed resource-management systems. 
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Ruddle ( 1989) 
Lasserre and Ruddle ( 1983) 
Ternpler ( 1985) 
Lasserre and Ruddle ( 1983) 
Lasserre and Ruddle (1  983) 
Moorehead ( 1989) 
Costa-Pierce ( 1987) 
Ruddle et dl. (1992) 
Ruddle et al. ( 1992) 
Smlth (1991) Resource users 
property regime 
Resource  u 
A. Feedback in potentially sustainable 
common-property systems 
B. Feedback in unsustainable 
open-access systems 
Fig.  1. A system vlcw of the differences between common-property and open-access systems. 
(Ruddle 1989). A sampling of  traditional 
flsherles systems from diverse reglons 
of the world is given in  Table 1. These 
set  the stage  for the discussion of 
community management of flsherles. 
There is  a great wealth of  information 
from the Aslan-Pacific region about the 
traditional marine resource management 
systems. Country-by-country  surveys 
show, however. the great variation In 
the persistence and health of  these systems 
(Ruddle, In press).  Functional systems 
exist only in areas where traditional marine 
tenure has been legally recognized and 
protected by the government (Ruddle, 
in  press). In  other areas. such as Hawaii, 
well-documented ancient management 
systems have completely dlsappeared 
(Costa-Plerce  1987). In  yet other areas 
(Philippines, Indonesla), tradltlonal coastal 
marine management systems have been 
poorly documented or dlfflcult to  flnd. 
It should be noted, however, that the 
existence of  traditional systems is helpful 
but not essential for the development 
of  common-property  instltutions. 
Community-based management systems 
can arlse. If  conditions are appropriate. 
in  areas which lack tradltlonal systems 
(Berkes 1986.  1987). Common-Property Framework 
The approach outlined here starts with 
Grotius' concepts, modified to  distin- 
guish res communes from res no///us 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975). It 
addresses, in effect, the central debate 
between Hobbes and Rousseau. It has 
become an approach used by a grow- 
ing  number of  workers, not  only in  Fisheries 
but  also in  wildlife, forestry, grazing lands, 
mountain ecosystems,  irrigation and 
groundwater resources. 
Common-property resource rnanage- 
ment has become a truly interdiscipli- 
nary area, with contributions from econo- 
mists, anthropologists, ecologists, so- 
ciologists, geographers, political scientists 
and planners (Feeny et al.  1990). As 
reviewed by  Feeny (this  vol.), common- 
property resources, as a class, have two 
characteristics which distinguish them 
from other kinds of resources:  (1) the 
difficulty of exclusion, that is, control 
of access  to the  resource:  and (2) 
subtractability, that is, the capability of 
each user of  subtractlng from the wel- 
fare of  others. To these,  one may add 
boundary problems as a characteristic 
especially pertinent to regional Fisher- 
ies in which the geographic range of 
the resource does not match adminis- 
trative or communal boundaries. As shown 
by Ostrom (this vol.), this issue poses 
a serious obstacle to  management success, 
as the requirement for clearly defined 
boundaries is at the top of the list of 
design principles for long-term stabil- 
ity of  common-property Institutions. 
Almost all living  resources of  the sea 
are common-property (or common-pool) 
resources by the above definition, ex- 
cept for some of  those under aquaculture. 
But a given resource may be held un- 
der a variety of management regimes 
(Ostrom 1988: Bromley 1992). There is 
nothing inherent in  the resource itself 
that predetermines the kind of regime 
it may be held under. As explained in 
more detail by Feeny (this vol.). there 
are four basic kinds of such regimes: 
1. open access (res ndlius) which is 
actually no  management regime  at 
all: property rights are absent and 
access is free and open to all: 
2.  private property in  which the claim 
rests with the individual or the cor- 
poration; 
3. state property (respubfica) in which 
claim and sole jurisdiction lie  with 
the government; and 
4.  communal or common property (res 
communes) In  which the resource 
is controlled by  an identifiable com- 
munity of  users. 
These four categories are ideal ana- 
lytical types. Nevertheless, examples are 
available that fit each category reasonably 
well (Table 2). Many other resources. 
however, are held under regimes which 
combine the characteristics  of two or 
more  of  these types. In  fact, this is true 
to some extent for the cases in  Table 
2.  For example, the use of lTQs  in  Ca- 
nadian Lake Erie effectively privatized 
harvesting  rights, while the stock tech- 
nically  remained state property. The 
particular system only worked because 
of  effective self-poiicing of  quotas among 
fishers and processors. The example there- 
fore combines private. state and com- 
munal property regimes (Berkes and 
Pocock 1987). 
Likewise, both  of  the examples of  state 
property in  Table 2 contain some elements 
of  communal property. User-groups are 
involved in  fisheries management under 
the (US Federal) Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (FCMA) (Young 
198  1  ) but perhaps not  very effectively. 
In the United States northeast coast 
groundfish fisherles, there are cases of 
effective community-based management 
(McCay 1980). Despite ingenious ways 
in  which some groups of fishers restrict 
the access of other potential users to Table 2. Property rlghts reglrnes as applled to marlne resources. 
Regime  Example  Reference 
open-access  Oceanla flsherles  Johannes  ( 1978) 
during colonlzation 
Gulf of Thalland  Tlews (1  975) 
fisheries 
prlvate  exclusive or monopoly  Scott ( 1955) 
Propew  flshlng rlghts 
lndlvldual transferable  Berkes and Pocock ( 1987) 
quotas 
state  US northeast coast  Young ( 198 1 ) 
Property  Rsherles under FCMA 
Paclfic salmon fisheries,  Marchak et al. ( 1987) 
Canada 
communal  Japanese  coastal fisheries  Ruddle (1  989) 
ProPertY  cooperatives 
reef and lagoon tenure  Ruddle and Johannes  ( 1985) 
In the Paciflc 
the resource (McCay 1980),  there is no 
official limitation of these fisheries so 
that  actual  management,  in effect, 
combines state property, communal 
property and open-access reglrnes. The 
Canadian example, by contrast, is under 
limited entry; there is no open-access 
element here, but neither is there much 
communal property (Marchak et al. 1987). 
Matchlng the Resource 
and the Reglme 
Resources differ in  the difficulty with 
which property rights may be established. 
For example, enclosed aquaculture ar- 
eas may be owned outright by their users, 
as with agricultural land. They may also 
be owned by the state and leased to 
individuals and cooperatives. Aquaculture 
may be considered to  be at one end of 
a contlnuurn which extends through la- 
goons and semi-enclosed areas, to  in- 
shore fisheries within bays and estuar- 
ies, to coastal fisherles carried out by 
small-scale fishers, to  those undertaken 
by intermedlate-scale fisherles,  to off- 
shore flsheries requiring extended trlps. 
and finally to  open-ocean fisheries un- 
der international regimes. There are natural 
differences among these rnarlne envl- 
ronments In terms of pulsing and cy- 
cling behavior (Fig. 2). Thus, the nature 
of the fisheries is also different in  these 
environments (Hammer et  al. 1993). and 
so are the appropriate management re- 
gimes. 
The basic idea of  matching the resource 
and the regime is  not new and has been 
suggested before, for example. In  a study 
of  Turkish coastal fisheries. Local-level 
management provides a feasible arrange- 
ment for managlng 'small-scale  fisheries 
In which the community of users is rela- 
tively homogeneous and the group size 
relatively small". In  contrast, for "larger- 
scale, more mobile fishing fleets, com- 
munity-level management is less likely 
to  work" and the assignment of  fishing 
rights, such as transferable quotas may 
be more appropriate (Berkes 1986). In 
another example, a comparative inves- 
tigation was carried out on the man- 
agement of  Barbados and Jarnalcan fish- 
eries. Communal property regime made 
sense for Jarnalcan fisheries, predoml- 
nantly inshore and reef-based,  with 
communal trapfishing terrltorles in  some 
areas.  By contrast.  Barbados fisheries Flg. 2.  The archipelago, coastal,  offshore and open-ocean ecological systems arc Integrated. How- 
ever,  they are qulte dlfferent In  terms of pulslng and cycllng behavlor. the frequent pulses In  the 
nearshore system and the ablllty to recycle matter. continuously recelved from the offshore areas. 
glve rlse to a more dlverse and reslllent system. Coastal flsherles, dependent on the resources In  a 
testrlcted coastal area.  have co-evolved wlth the dynamlcs of the ecosystem. The offshore flsherles 
have taken advantage of  the much hlgher magnltudes In  pulslng fish specles. These dlfferences em- 
phaslze the cross-scale  nature of flsherles managmnent and the need for coordlnatlon for future 
sustainable management. 
Source:  Hammer ct  al. (1993). 
were relatively large-scale and offshore, 
and license and quota management (state 
property with privatization  of harvest 
rights) made more sense (Berkes 1987). 
Thus, it is possible to  sort out  different 
kinds  of  fisheries  wlth  respect  to 
management regimes which are more 
likely to be appropriate. In  so doing, 
one  could at least rule out some  of the 
combinatlons that make relatively little 
sense. Private property, wlth allocated 
quotas, may  be reasonable for offshore 
fisheries in which fishing units are relatively 
few, large in size and amenable to  policing. 
In Inshore and coastal fisheries, by contrast, 
ehforcement of  privatized rights is likely 
to  be troublesome, and privatlzation of 
harvest rights may probably create equity 
problems with the traditional users of 
these resources. The range of problems 
encountered with  lTQs indicates that 
privatlzation is  not likely to  be a universal 
solution (Copes 1986; Berkes and Pocock 
1987). 
State property regimes make more and 
more sense as the scale of  fishing op- 
erations, and hence the ability of  fish- 
ers  to  deplete  the stock, increase. How- 
ever, beyond the 200-mile Ilmit, state 
governance is effective only in combl- 
nation with International agreements; 
otherwise, an international "tragedy of 
the commons" is obtained. Near the shore. 
state property regimes are senslble in 
combination with communlty manage- 
ment, that Is, in co-management arrange- 
ments (Pinkerton 1989). 
Finally, communal property regimes 
are more sound at  the small-scale end 
of  the cpntinuum, and less and less so towards the other end. However, even 
in these coastal, small-scale fisheries. 
government regulation still has a place. 
Examples for the enabling role of gov- 
ernment include the exclusion of out- 
siders from a resource which is under 
communal management, as in  the case 
of  Japanese  coastal fisheries (Ruddle 1989), 
and the enforcement of conservation regu- 
lations so that all users can benefit from 
increased production (Delos Angeles and 
Pelayo 1993). 
The Hobbesian approach favored by 
many Western resource managers, ex- 
emplifled by the quotation regarding 
the necessity of manager's hegemony 
over fishers,  is based on the dominant 
culture and values of resource manage- 
ment science. The recent accumulation 
of  a great deal of evidence on the po- 
tentlal sustainability of  community-based 
flsherles management systems indicates 
that we  may do  well to review some of 
our assumptions about the behavlor of 
fishers.  These  findings challenge.  for 
example,  the 'fact"  that "left to thelr 
own  devices, fishermen wlll (necessar- 
ily) over-exploit stocks". Instead. we need 
to  look for the system-stabilizing feedbacks 
such as those in Fig.  1. 
Our best evidence is that, left to  their 
own  devices, communities of fishers may 
use stocks sustainably under certain con- 
ditions. The investigation of these con- 
dltlons is consistent with research agenda 
being developed at the International 
Center for Living Aquatic Resources Man- 
agement (Pomeroy 1993b), the Beijer 
International lnstitute for  Ecological 
Economics, the Caribbean Natural Re- 
sources lnstitute and elsewhere. The flrst 
general condition pertains to the ex- 
clusion of other potential users. Thus. 
the first research question is: Is there 
an  Identlflable cornmunlty of  fishers 
whlch can control  access to  the re- 
source? 
A second general condition pertalns 
to circumstances within a community 
of  users that permit the evolution of  ef- 
fective communal property lnstltutions 
(Ostrom 1990); that is, can the com- 
munity of  users  make  and  enforce its 
resource-use rules? Hardin's  ( 1968) 
"tragedy of  the commons" would corn- 
pletely reject this possibility, in keep- 
ing  with Hobbes. But we know now  that 
the "tragedy" is a very limited and in- 
complete view of reality. Many groups 
of resource users can and do  create ap- 
propriate Institutions for resource use 
(Ostrom 1990; many cases in the pre- 
viously cited volumes). 
One central task is to examine and. 
where possible, to  create the conditions 
conducive to  the sustainable use of  stocks 
by communities of fishers. FImt, we need 
case-speclfic information to  characterize 
user-groups and the scale of  the flsheries. 
Generalizations are risky; many fisheries 
around the world do  not  clearly fall into 
categories of  small- or large-scale (Berkes 
and Kislalioglu 1989). Second, data on 
group size and homogeneity of  fishers 
are essential (e.g., Berkes 1986). Third. 
knowledge on the existence of any 
common property Institutions in  a given 
fishery  or among a group of users is 
helpful. Perhaps as a fourth task,  we 
should  examine  the  management 
objectives that underlie a given case study. 
Charles (1  988) observed that 'normative 
single-objective analyses tend to find 
favour pr,marily in  'industrial' fisheries", 
whereas  "multiple-obj xtive socio- 
economic analysls has been preferred 
in  developing or 'inshore' flsheries."  In 
any  given case,  we need to know 
managers' explicit or implicit  objectlves. 
In some situations.  the behavior of 
managers  may be as  crucial  to the management outcome as the behavior 
of fishers1 
The emphasis on managers becomes 
particularly relevant if we accept the 
proposition that a mix-and-match of re- 
sources and regimes is necessary. Man- 
agers need to be willing and flexible 
to  seek the regime appropriate for the 
fisheries at hand. Fishers are not always 
alone to blame for the failure of a fish- 
ery.  As Marchak et al.  (1987) put It, 
"instead of talking about the 'tragedy 
of the commons',  we should be con- 
cerned with  the tragedy of  mismanaged 
state property" In fisheries. 
Community-based management of Ash- 
eries is never entirely free of its con- 
text of government resource manage- 
ment policies, whether explicit or im- 
plicit. Communal fisheries are viable even 
in countries such as the Philippines where 
there is little evidence  of communal 
property regimes for marine resources. 
For example, McManus (1  988) argued 
that traditional community rights over 
coastal resources in the Lingayen Gulf 
can be rejuvenated. This would involve 
"the organizing of fishermen into legally 
and traditionally recognized groups that 
would have the clout to be stewards 
of their resources." 
Deregulation and decentralization of 
management, and devolution of  authority 
in flsherles,  as in other fields of man- 
agement, can be accomplished only if 
both government managers and users 
are willing  and have the capability. Cre- 
ating a role for fishlng communities in 
resource management is not  easy, if there 
is no cultural background of self-regu- 
lation and no stewardship ethic.  Even 
with such a background,  community- 
based management will likely Fail if  there 
are major problems with exclusion, 
subtractability and boundaries. Institution- 
building to enhance the capability of 
fishing communities for resource rnan- 
agement will probably be a major com- 
ponent of  any effort to  reorganize property 
rights in fisheries. 
As  Hanna (1990) observed.  marine 
resource management lnstitutlons have 
not kept pace with our technological 
ability to  exploit these resources, First, 
the starting point in  the search for more 
vlable and sustainable institutions is the 
abandonment of open-access Ideals of 
the old principle of "freedom of the seas." 
Second, the failure of  centralized man- 
agement compels us to abandon pure 
Hobbesian approaches, or rather to  bal- 
ance Hobbes with Rousseau in  the new 
management philosophy. The fisher can 
once more become a part of  the resource 
management team, balancing rights  and 
responsibilities,  and working in a co- 
operative (rather than antagonistic) mode 
with the manager. Such joint rnanage- 
ment, or co-management, is a rational 
extension of evolutionary trends in  Rsh- 
erles management over the past dec- 
ades (Rettig et al.  1989). Co-rnanage- 
ment that: ( 1 ) involves more participatory 
decisionmaking; (2) creates conserva- 
tion incentlves by empowering fishers 
to reap the benefits of  their own  restraint; 
(3) enables cost-cutting in  research and 
enforcement: and (4)  sets policy objectives 
more in tune with fishers'  social and 
economic needs, is consistent with sus- 
tainable development planning for coastal 
fisheries. 
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lntroductlon 
C 
ontemporary fisheries management, 
based on famlllar bioeconomic mod- 
els, has generally not been able to either 
foresee or overcome the now equally fa- 
miliar and intractable problems in coastal 
fisheries  worldwide. It is common knowl- 
edge  that most problems and errors have 
occurred in the fisheries of  temperate-zone 
developed  countries.  Yet,  the same 
bioeconomic models that have been less 
than successful are still those generally rec- 
ommended for fisheries development and 
management In Third World contexts. This 
is ironical, "... first because in many Thlrd 
World societies there already exist sophis- 
ticated fisheries management systems well- 
adapted for local  use; second, because 
similar systems  also exist (although often 
extra-legally) in  many parts of  the First 
World; and third, because many such Third 
World systems might be readily adaptable 
for managing Fisheries in the First World" 
(Ruddle et al. 1992). 
Traditional systems of fishing rights and 
tenurial relationships of small-scale  fish- 
ers to resources and resource areas have 
been documented throughout the world, 
particularly in the Asia-Pacific  region. In 
many parts ofthat region, traditional man- 
agement systems are often common-prop- 
erty regimes where access to  a particular 
territory is  limited to  a defined user group; 
operational rules are specified; and con- 
trol resides in traditional local authorities. 
Many systems were either deliberately or 
inadvertently weakened or destroyed by 
colonial administrations, and replaced by 
centralized fisheries institutions nominally 
responsible for all  aspects of  fisheries 
management, from policy  formulation 
through enforcement (Ruddle 1994a. b). 
Where that occurred, community-based 
systems of marine resource management 
were not usually replaced by more effec- 
tive central or regional  management in- 
stitutions. Neither has nationalization nor 
privatization  policies usually resulted in 
more effective resource management. Rather, the cumulative effect  of this re- 
structuring of fisheries management has 
been the impoverishment of  fishery re- 
sources and fishing communities. Compared 
to  the scope of the problems facing gov- 
ernment agencies attempting to  manage 
Inshore Fisheries, their administrative and 
technical abilities are generally relatively 
weak. As a result, devolution of resource 
management and allocation decisions to 
local communities, within the framework 
of co-management, Is  increasingly seen 
as an alternative to ineffective manage- 
ment undertaken by distant, understaffed 
and underfunded government agencies. 
This paper examines varlous shortcomings 
of conventional fisherles management. The 
characteristics of traditional community- 
based systems of management are then 
summarized, based on the Asia-Pacific 
region.  Policy alternatives regarding the 
future adaptation of  such systems to a 
modern management role are then exam- 
ined. 
The Context of  Flsherles 
Management 
In  any fisheries, there exist four actual 
or potential focl of problems that require 
management (Table 1  ). Conventional fish- 
eries management focuses on fish stocks 
and stock externalities and assumes  an  open- 
access resource regime. Thus. it has con- 
centrated on modelling the biological and 
physical flow of fish resources and through 
fishing grounds, and in  implementation, 
on  attempting to  manage the resultant stock 
externalitles. In other  words, it focuses on 
trylng to manage what is  unknown (and 
perhaps Inherently unknowable), and thus 
wnmanageable. It is also predlcnted on the 
generally false assumption of  'open  ac- 
cess" and implemented by  regulatory 
measures which are often complex: far from 
having been wholly successful; and un- 
suited to  Third World conditions. 
The erroneous assumption 
of  open  access 
The "tragedy-of-the-commons model" 
(Hardin 1968)  Is  the prlnclpnl.  Western theory 
held to account for problems In  certain 
fisheries, according to  the dynamics elabo- 
rated by Gordon (1  954)  and subsequently 
refined by other economists. But this model 
is gounded in the erroneous notion that 
the misuse of fisheries resources stems  from 
the institution of common property, which 
was, and unfortunately often still Is, mis- 
takenly assumed to be synonymous wlth 
"open access". Thus, fisheries must be 
managed to mitigate the selfish and my- 
opic  behavior of  fishers, consequent upon 
fisheries being a classic example of a 'com- 
mon property" (meaning "open access") 
resource. This has been widely viewed as 
the predominant pattern of  individuals. The 
proposition  asserts that inherent in  the 
exploitation of common property resources 
are the tendency to physical wastage of 
the  resource:  an  incentive  to 
overexploitation by users, leading inexo- 
rably to the now famlllar tragedy of  the 
commons;  and an inclination toward eco- 
nomlc wastage vla overcapitalization  of 
Table  1. Actual or pottntlal focl of flsherles management problems. 
Focus  Definition 
1.  Flow of the resource  Contlnued, regular avallabllity OF  harvested fish 
2.  Stock externalities  Econornlc. and therefore soclal, Impacts of harvesting 
lnteractlons among fishers 
3.  Technological (gear) externalitles  Mutual Incompatlbility of various gear on a Rshlng ground 
4.  Asslgnrnent problems  Competition for access to a resource(s) distributed 
unevenly in space and time the industry, and eventual impoverishment 
of  flshlng communities and immobility of 
labor. 
To  counteract these inherent tendencies, 
so the conventional theary runs. manage- 
ment by authorities external to fishlng 
communities is required. It is generally 
accepted that the replacement  of  common- 
property (meaning 'open access") regimes 
by systems of  controlled access could ei- 
ther eliminate or alleviate excess effort. 
Although there is no unanimous opinion 
concerning the optimal design of such 
systems,  they have been widely imple- 
mented, together with catch quotas, gear 
and/or seasonal limitations, Ilcensing, or 
a combination of these and other elements. 
All share the common characteristic of 
assigning fish harvesting rights to  selected 
indivlduals, who then receive all or part 
of the economic rent created by the rc- 
duction in  effort (Keen 1983). 
Generally, such schemes have been less 
than successful, because they are both of- 
ten costly to implement and administer, 
and have not eliminated the excess effort 
problem since they induce increased in- 
vestment by Fewer lndivlduals seeklng to 
improve  their share of  the catch. So it can- 
not be assumed that limited access sys- 
tems alone are either capable of reducing 
or eliminating the dissipatlon of resource 
rents, or that they are cost effective for gov- 
ernment (Wllson 1987). Nevertheless, lim- 
ited  access has been advocated principally 
for its supposed economic efficiency; po- 
litical acceptability and resultant ease of 
implementation; as well as  a means of  raising 
incomes in  fishing wmmunities (Keen 1983). 
Techniques for regulating flsherles 
In  terms of  changing the focus of coastal 
fisheries management, the important  char- 
acteristic of regulatory technlques  is whether 
or not they restrict access to the fisher- 
ies. Most  techniques of conventional man- 
agement do not. 
Techniques that Do Not 
Restrict Access 
Catch lim/tat/on or  quota. Total allow- 
able catch (TAC) Is now  the standard tech- 
nique used in  the developed world to  regu- 
late fishing effort. However, it is severely 
limited because it  can solve only problems 
of resource conservation.  Without the 
concurrent introduction of some form of 
allocation, overcapitalization will remain. 
Further, this regulatory technique is com- 
plex to apply and expensive to both op- 
erate  and  enforce  (Derham  1984: 
Schowengerdt 1984). Calculation of  TACs 
poses problems. The accurate and current 
data (needed to indicate the percentage 
of the TAC that has been taken, and so 
when fishing Is to stop) demanded by this 
"information-hungry"  (Caddy 1984) tech- 
nique are expensive to  obtain, and the task 
requires specialized personnel  and daborate 
networks of  committees and working  groups 
(Hoydal 1984).  Although cheap, estimates 
are oHen extremely inaccurate, because 
adoption of  TAC is often accompanied by 
a deterioration of data quality and under- 
reporting, since this regulatory technique 
puts a premlum on cheating,  which en- 
forcement fails to  halt. Thus, expense and 
lack OF locally available personnel put the 
TAC technique beyond the means of most 
Third  World  countries.  In  troplcal 
multispecies fisheries, all such problems 
are exacerbated by the complexity of  the 
fisheries, and by the problems of  by-catches 
and associated discards (so as not to  ex- 
ceed the TAC and to  concentrate the quota 
on only the most economically valuable 
species). 
Enforcement  of TACs  is extremely 
expensive,  both in terms of data and 
management. For the most part, high seas 
enforcement  Is either impossible or too 
costly. Point-of-first-sale  monitoring and 
quota enforcement are hardly more feasible, 
given the characteristics of  tropical small- 
scale fisheries (vide  /nha).  Thus, using  TAC as  a regulatory measure is not suitable for 
adoption by developing countries. 
Gear restrictions. Regulation of size and 
spacing of  net meshes, hooks and trap 
openings has been one of  the main methods 
used to control fisheries, by  allowlng 
immature fish to escape being caught when 
small, and grow to  an economically more 
valuable slze before harvesting. One of 
the major problems is the initial decline 
in catch rates following their introduction. 
Thus, fishers are required to sacrifice in 
the short term to  reap long-term benefits. 
Further, owing to  random fluctuations in 
recruitment,  for example, theoretically 
predicted improvements are hard to  detect 
in practice, thus making the fishers sceptical. 
This may not be economically feasible, 
depending on whether the target is a fast- 
or slow-growing species, resulting  in 
circumvention of the regulation, and a 
correspondlng increase in  enforcement 
costs. 
This regulatory mechanism suffers from 
allocation problems.  For  example,  if 
minimum mesh size regulations reduce the 
catch of  Fisheries aiming at young Flsh 
migrating inshore, then the resource will 
be reallocated to offshore fisheries which 
target them at a later growth stage. The 
total economic yield would improve, but 
the livelihood of  the small-scale fishers 
would be immediately jeopardized. In fact, 
in economic  terms there would be no lasting 
benefit, since the increased income in the 
offshore  industrial fisheries would attract 
additional entrants to the point of rent 
dissipation, and the cost of regulation would 
cause an overall  economic loss to the 
fisheries. 
Prohibition of certain fishing methods; 
types of gear, such as  trawls; and fishing 
aids, like acoustic Ash-finders, has severe 
allocational repercussions. The ban on cheap 
but effective although extremely destructive 
methods of  fishing, such as dynamiting 
or poisoning, allocates the resource away 
from the present-day  poorest fishers to 
both those who  can afford legitimate gear 
and to Future harvesters. Banning trwl- 
ers, as in Indonesia (Sardjono 1980),  means 
that distant fishing grounds may be 
underutilized, since they are beyond the 
reach of small-scale fishing craft and gear. 
Thls has negative impacts on economic 
eficiency and innovation. Again, without 
entry limitation, area allocation, and the 
like, gear restrictions alone will probably 
create more problems than they solve. 
However, they are usually  adopted for 
sociopolitical reasons. 
Closed season. Thls  regulation  relies 
heavily on the relationship between catch 
per unit effort and stock abundance. There 
are two types. One prohibits fishing dur- 
ing the times of the year when there is a 
need to protect n  particular stage of the 
IiFe cycle, e.g.,  spawning, or juveniles.  Its 
disadvantages are: effort can be increased 
in  the  open  season  and  it  causes 
discontinuities in  supply, disrupting the 
industry "downstream". The second type 
occurs as  a response to  fishing  effort: when 
some predetermined catch rate that cor- 
responds to a level of stock abundance is 
attained, the fisheries are  closed. This regu- 
lation  does not solve the problem of 
overcapitalization either outside the sea- 
son (first type) or at  the beginning of the 
season (second type). 
Seasonal closures alone are largely in- 
effective. Further, they often tend to  work 
against small-scale fishers by allocating the 
resource to  the offshore, capital-intensive 
fishery. 
Closed areas. Another method of pro- 
tecting stock during certain stages of the 
life cycle is area closure where fishing is 
banned. This technique has three main 
problems: effort tends to concentrate on 
the boundaries of  closed areas; pressure 
increases on other species and the same 
species at different ages; and area closures 
are pointless if industrial fisheries target 
the same stock offshore as it comes into 
closed inshore waters for spawning. This would be perceived as unfair by  artisanal 
fishers who work inshore. 
Areal closures are relatively easy and 
cheap to  monitor and enforce inshore, but 
not  offshore. But like seasonal closures, they 
tend to be inequitable because they real- 
loate resources away from the Inshore  Fisher 
to  the offshore operator. However, under 
some form of  territorial selF-regulation by 
fishing communities, both  seasonal and areal 
closures can be highly effective. 
Techniques that Restrict Access 
Lkensing. Access to  fisheries is restricted 
under this technlque because only persons 
with a license may operate in them.  Li- 
censing has been seen as an effective way 
to  control effort and ensure stock conser- 
vation,  if introduced early in the devel- 
opment of  fisheries. More  often than not, 
however, licensing  is introduced when fish- 
eries are overcapitalized.  Based on a cal- 
culated maximum sustainable yleld (MSY), 
issuance of  license is limited to  the number 
of  vessels and/or gear required to attain 
that figure. 
A wide variety of licensing programs 
exists, reflecting differences in  social, eco- 
nomic  and political  conditions. Most  are 
based on  historical precedent, with "grand- 
father clauses" permitting  continued entry 
to fishers with established precedents, 
however tenuous, owing largely to eq- 
uity considerations. Those that have more 
restrictions and conditions are time-con- 
suming and expensive to administer. 
Restrictions tend to  be added to restric- 
tions, as fishers find a way around pre- 
vious ones. 
But licensing is ineffective when data 
are Few and unreliable, and in  the absence 
of  research. Data are hard to  come by for 
most tropical small-scale  fisheries: since 
catches are sold at many unmonitored rural 
points, data gathering is usually' haphaz- 
ard.  Moreover, licensing programs are 
difficult to enforce, especially where the 
level of  professionalism among local offi- 
cials is  not  high. 
/nciiv/dua/ fish quotas. These are essen- 
tially a particular form of  license that lim- 
Its the right of  access it grants to  specific 
fisheries by specifying the amount of  fish 
that an individual operator is allowed to 
land. This can be done by apportioning a 
TAC among licensed fishers.  While this 
regulatory technique has the advantage 
of both restricting access and specifying 
catch amounts, it suffers from the drw- 
back of administrative and enforcement 
expense. 
Proper@ rights. The preceding regula- 
tory measures have been applied to  fish- 
eries where property rights  are either weak 
or ineffective. Where property rights ex- 
ist, indlvldual rights holders make their own 
regulations. There are various forms of 
property rights in fisheries (vide  infra). 
The choice of  which among  those regu- 
latory techniques to  employ must depend 
on local conditions.  Inevitably the deci- 
sion will be  very much colored by the lo- 
cal political environment. But, under the 
best circumstances, and to ensure a rea- 
sonable likelihood of  successful implemen- 
tation, the following main factors should 
govern  the choice oftdniques.  They should 
be supported by most fishers:  amenable 
to gradual implementation and flexible 
enough to adjust to  changing situations; 
encourage operations at minimum cost: 
account fully for all costs of research, 
monitoring  and enforcement; and take full 
consideration of  the allocational and em- 
ployment generation aspects of the fish- 
ing  sector (Panayotou 1982). 
The inherent characteristics of  fisheries 
limit  the type of  regulatory techniques that 
can be applied with any hope of  success. 
In  inshore tropical waters, the two  princi- 
pal types of Fisheries to be regulated are 
coastal rnultispecies and sedentary spe- 
cies. 
The diversity of  species that character- 
izes tropical small-scale  fisheries poses special management problems (see  Pauly 
and Murphy  1982). A major one is  that 
catch rates can decline substantially with 
increased harvesting, as has occurred wldely 
in Southeast Asia, owing to "ecosystem 
overfishing" (Pauly 1988).  Species change 
toward smaller and less valuable species, 
with a higher proportion of "by-catches". 
is the result. An important basis for man- 
agement is that effort reduction results in 
a more economically beneficial catch com- 
position over time, and increased catches 
(Alcala 198  1 ;  Russ 1985;  Alcala and Russ 
1  990). 
Related is the problem of fish size com- 
position and gear selectivity, since opti- 
mu3  mesh sizes vary by species. Further, 
the different species interact biologically, 
thereby complicating analysis of data on 
which management plans are predicated. 
Thus, at the present state of knowledge. 
regulation of effort and mesh size should 
not be considered primary management 
mechanisms for tropical multispecies fish- 
eries. 
Conservation of stocks is  the principal 
management concern for fisheries for sed- 
entaty species. They are  vulnerable to  growth 
overflshing. Sedentary species can be ef- 
fectively managed by  the allocation of 
property rights. Where these do  not exist 
or have been eroded and with no possi- 
bility of  either creation or re-creation, such 
fisheries can be managed by area and sea- 
sonal closure and by size limits. Licens- 
ing for such fisheries is  rare. Sedentary 
species are particularly vulnerable to  mo- 
bile gear that damage or destroy their 
habitat, and should be protected from them 
by zoning. 
Characteristics of Troplcal 
Small-scale  Flsherles 
The experience and research of devel- 
oped countries require considerable ad- 
aptation to be made relevant to the de- 
velopment and management of  tropical 
small-scale fisheries. Tropical small-scale 
fishing communities are characterized by 
their reliance on inshore resources located 
close to  home: limited alternative employ- 
ment opportunities; use of small craft and 
simple gear (although often sophisticated 
techniques): and traditional community 
norms of behavior. But there are excep- 
tions. 
Seven important aspects of small-scale 
fisheries must be considered in devising 
management programs for them. 
1. Fishing activities are limited geo- 
graphlcaiiy to  small inshore areas because 
craft are small and unmotorized; there is 
usually no way to keep fish  fresh: and 
neighboring sea areas might be off-limits 
owing to  territorial rights systems. Therefore. 
opportunities for increased catches are lim- 
ited. 
2. Fishlng communities are dispersed 
geographidlyand often isolated in remote 
rural regions, since (unlike industrial fisheries) 
they are not dependent on onshore 
infrastructure. They are thus difficult and 
expensive to  develop and manage. 
3. Employment options are Iimlted and 
alternative jobs are scarce, although these 
vary considerably, depending on local 
context. Cultural factors, like caste systems 
that limit or  preclude occupational mobility, 
also limit employment alternatives, as  does 
a lack  of  education and access to basic 
information. Persistent indebtedness through 
traditional credit systems also binds fishers 
to their communities and occupation, as 
well as the "ethos of the fisher" and the 
related sense of subcultural identity. 
Bioeconomlc models Fail  to  consider situ- 
ations where the  opportunity cost of labor 
is zero or close to  zero, and where there 
exist strong barriers to  exlt from the fish- 
eries sector. Also, conventional models and 
the management mechanisms to  which they 
give rise do  not distinguish between the 
capital and labor components of  fishing 
(Christy 1986). Labor costs are low but capital costs are high, and the  two  are often 
complexly interrelated In  ways that are not 
well understood (Christy  1986). For  ex- 
ample, crew sizes may be determined not 
just  by work load,  but by the social im- 
perative to  share limited  economic oppor- 
tunities and benefits. It is also dificult to 
define the term "labor" precisely, since a 
great many people  onshore have a role in 
the fisheries system, as in Indonesia (Col- 
lier et al. 1979: Emmerson 1980: Kendrick 
1993).  Introduction of capital-intensive 
techniques can devastate these relation- 
ships,  as  well as  heighten inequity and 
eventual conflict among segments of  the 
overall fisheries sector and within com- 
munities.  In contrast,  management that 
regulates capital equipment would give 
priority to  preserving  traditional employ- 
ment patterns and concepts of  social eq- 
uity and sharing. Thus, distinction between 
capital and labor components of fishing 
effort is critical to  the sound management 
of tropical small-scale  fisheries  (Christy 
1  986). 
4.  Discount rates and  future returns 
also militate against conventional West- 
ern-style  development. Small-scale fish- 
ers are severely limited in their ability to 
reduce present catches in anticipation of 
future higher yields. Such behavior always 
has associated costs. These  may be as 
extreme as hunger or even starvation in 
impoverished communities. Thus, although 
dynamiting  and poison fishing are destruc- 
tive of  fish habitats, and so reduce or elimi- 
nate future harvests, they will still be prac- 
tised if  the only alternative is hunger. High 
discount rates therefore make effective fish- 
eries management based on  conventional 
Western-style concepts virtually impossible. 
(They also illustrate the futility of  planning 
for the fisheries sector alone, without con- 
sideration of  job creation in  other economic 
sectors.). 
5. Geographfcai and social territori- 
d&is  widespread among small-xale fishing 
communities. In contrast to its positive 
aspects, this limits the mobility of  small- 
scale fishers and socially prevents access 
to  other fishing communities. 
6. Economic rent extraction is affected 
by  the factors noted  above. They combine 
to  create market imperfections such that 
fishers receive less than the free-market 
price for their catch, yet pay excessively 
for inputs and usuriously for loans. These 
are the principal ways in which rents are 
extracted. Secondary is the requirement 
to  share in  small, traditional communities 
and among kin, as well as other custom- 
ary practices, such as ritual performance 
and donation (Collier et al. 1979: Kendrick 
1893). 
7.  Conflict is a characteristic of small- 
scale fisheries in  the tropics, resulting pri- 
marily from its multispecies nature. Con- 
flict is essentially of two types:  gear ex- 
ternalities and target conflict, where the 
prime  target species of one group of  fish- 
ers is the incidental catch of  another. The 
main source of conflict in  Southeast Asia 
has been the development of the shrimp 
industry and the highly capitalized shrimp 
trawlers using Rne-meshed nets and op- 
erating in  inshore waters. Thus, they have 
a very high incidence of by-catch, up to 
80°/o,  of which a large proportion is un- 
dersized, immature specimens ofcommer- 
cially valuable fish (Sharom Majid 1984). 
This problem led to  the trawler ban in In- 
donesia (Sardjono  1980). Conflicts have 
been widespread  and severe (Thomson 
1980). In Malaysia, for example, during 
the period 1970- 1973, they involved 1,200 
boats, of  which more than 60  were sunk, 
and the death of 23 fishers (Smith 1979). 
in India, both life and property were lost 
as the result of such incidents (Silas and 
Alagaswaml 1980). These conflicts are a 
symptom of both an institutional failure 
in  the allocation of natural resources and 
a demand for decisions on the distribu- 
tion  of  wealth. Solving these is the essentiai 
first step to  effective fisheries management 
In developing countries (Christy 1986). The  Property Rlghts 
Alternatlve 
Fisheries management through systems 
of specific property rights based on the 
sole ownership of resources has been ad- 
vocated as  the best way of averting the 
"tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968). 
Where the fisheries are the property of a 
sole owner, there is  an inherent incen- 
tive to  manage them wisely to  ensure sus- 
tainable and lower-cost harvesting into 
the foreseeable future (Scott 1955).  Here, 
sole ownership is invested in a manag- 
ing agency with exclusive rights to  con- 
trol catching and marketing (Keen 1983). 
But the potential of sole ownership as  a 
fisheries management tool has been rela- 
tively little examined, largely, it seems, 
because of ideology (Keen 1783),  rather 
than as a  consequence of any inherent 
weakness. 
Yet the efficacy of sole ownership in 
fish management has long been recog- 
nized, at  least in convehtional economic 
terms, such as by Gordon (1953),  who 
concluded that private rights, group  property 
rights, sole owner management, or taxation 
appear to  be the  only ways of optimizing 
fishing effort, and who observed that in 
a monopoly, social optima and maximum 
monopoly revenue could be coincident 
(Gordon  1954); by Scott (1  955).  who 
pointed out that management by sole 
ownership would require a property that 
embraced the entire asset; by Crutchfield 
( 186 1  ) who argued that the principal need 
was to foster the formation of property 
rights that would permit the  dismantling 
of contradictory and adhocfisheries regu- 
lations: by Crutchfield and Zeliner (1  962). 
who contended that hiring an optimal 
amount  of labor and capital would maximize 
rents in such fisheries; and by Copes (1  972), 
who observed that net social beneMs under 
a public sole ownership agency could be 
higher than under a private one. The ap- 
plicatlon of the sole ownership concept 
to  marine fisheries was discussed briefly 
by Crutchfield and Pontecorvo ( 1 969)  and 
more comprehensively by Keen (1  983, 
1 988). 
In contrast, Wilson (1  882)  asserted that 
no evidence shows that property rights 
schemes  are dearly superior to  other fisheries 
management designs or that they are socially 
economical, given that the  costs of rnan- 
agement should not exceed the social 
opportunity cost of the  problem that led 
to  the implementation of rules. But "clearly, 
given the dearth of detailed studies of 
sole ownership management systems of 
marine fisheries, these various views re- 
main assertions in want of verification" 
(Ruddle 198813). 
Various forms of property rights in fisheries 
exlst. These include territorial use rights 
in fisheries (TURFs) (vide  Infia).  The TACs 
can be allocated as individual transfer- 
able quota, a form of property right. as 
in Canada and New Zealand. There has 
been a  growing recognition that prop- 
erty rights probably offer "  ... the best possible 
management option for scattered, remote 
and fluid, small-scale fisheries" (Panayotou 
1982).  Particularly, awareness has increased 
on the potential modern role of traditional 
systems of community self-management 
For  fisheries and coastal resources. But 
since many such systems have broken down, 
to accomplish this would  require a  re- 
moval of the factors responsible for that 
breakdown by:  (1) a policy decision to 
explicitly allocate resources to  small-scale 
fishing communities and to divide the 
resources among  communities; (2)  regu- 
lation of entry into the fisheries: and (3) 
facilitating exit from the sector by  the 
creation  of  employment alternatives 
(Panayotou 1782). 
One approach to  implementing prop- 
erty rights in small-scale fisheries is the 
TURF concept (Christy 1982, 1,992).  De- 
centralization to  create, recreate or pro- 
tect TURFs is a means of improved fish- 
eries management. The concept rests on the ability to  defend an identifiable boundary 
around a particular aquatic resource or 
resource assemblage. Thus, TURFs are best 
suited to easily definable tracts of  coast, 
llke bays or estuaries, and to  areas with- 
out  actual or potential complex or incom- 
patible interactions of resource use. The 
TURFS also function best for sedentary rather 
than migratory species and for passive 
(fixed) gear. 
The TURFs'  advantage Is  that through 
self-regulation, a local community of fishers 
may itself select how to use its rights. 
On the other hand, especially in hetero- 
geneous communities where social co- 
hesion is  weak, they may be abused by 
the elite who extract rents as free rld- 
ers. 
The TURFs  also arise around Rsh  ag- 
gregating devices (FADs) and artificial reek, 
as  in the Philippines, where the increased 
use of FADs for tuna has been accompa- 
nied by the establishment of  deIradoTURFS 
by the FAD  owners, who control all Bsh- 
ins  activity In their vicinity (Christy 1986). 
(But these have not prevented a very high 
rate of  growth overfishing [Floyd and Pauly 
19841.) Artificial reefs placed on the  seabed 
in parts of the Mediterranean to  prevent 
illegal trawling also provide habitats for 
shellfish and Finfish.  Exclusive rights to 
these devices can then be allocated to 
local communities, as  in Italy (FA0:GFCM 
1  984). 
One  advantage of such property rights 
systems is that for small-scale fishers, risk 
and uncertainty about resources and so- 
cial organization are reduced (Runge 1986). 
Risk and ill-affordable  wasted effort are 
greatly diminished because fishing behavior 
Is  predicated on local knowledge of re- 
sources; socially, because cooperation and 
reciprocity, among  other values, are em- 
phasized,  as Is  long-term  resource 
sustainablllty: and by protection of  the 
resource through the exclusion of out- 
siders. 
Prlnclpal Organlzatlonal 
Characterlstlcs of Tradltlonal 
Community-  based Flsherles 
Management Systems 
In many parts of the world, and espe- 
cially in the Asia-PaciFic  region, coastal 
fisheries are or were managed tradition- 
ally by community-based systems of prop- 
erty rights and associated regimes  OF rights 
and rules that closely reflect  social  or- 
ganization and local power structure. Such 
systems seem not to have been based 
principally on ecological conditions, which 
would be the  case were their primary pur- 
pose resource conservation.  Rather, as 
would be expected, since property is  a 
social relationship that defines its hold- 
er's security of claim to  a resource or to 
the servlces or benefits it provides, they 
reflect a  correlation among property, 
property rights and social organization 
(Ruddle 1988a).  Management systems In 
the aquatic domain often, but not always. 
mirror those on land. 
In  these traditional community-based 
systems of marine resource management, 
an individual's sea rights depend on his 
or her social  status within a corporate 
community, which ranges from villages 
through clans, subclans and lineages, to 
the family. Resource territories and user 
groups are defined. Resource use is gov- 
erned by  rules and controlled by tradi- 
tional authorities who mete  out  sanctions 
and punishments For  infringement of regu- 
lations. Conservation For  sustalnabie re- 
source use is  a widespread objective of 
these systems (Ruddle 1988b; 1994a, b). 
Authority 
In these systems, resource control and 
management is  usually vested in tradi- 
tional authority, whose nature varies ac- 
cording to social organization. Four principal 
types  can  be recognized: traditional secular leaders, traditional religious leaders, spe- 
cialists and rights holders. These utegories 
Frequently overlap, and responsibility is 
divided and shared. 
Secular leaders - In  many societies, 
a group of traditional  leaders or an 
organization, usually some kind of "vil- 
lage council",  manages marine re- 
sources by regulating the  use ofcom- 
munity sea space and protecting re- 
sources against overexploitation. 
However, in many Pacific islands, in 
particular, land and sea  are disposed 
of by a chief, who exercises his au- 
thority on behalf of the entire com- 
munity. 
Religious leaders - With a widespread 
role in  conventional  resource man- 
agement in  the Asia-Pacific  reglon, 
these religious leaders can be tradi- 
tional, as  In  Indonesia and in parts of 
the Pacific  Basin, or members of  a 
formally organized church. as In  Sri 
Lanka. 
Specialists - Commonly, marine re- 
sources are managed by fisheries 
specialists, who functlon under some 
form of higher authority. Such "mas- 
ter Fishers" are particularly common 
in Paciflc Island societies. 
Rights holders -These commonly have 
management authority over marine 
resources. Frequently, this level of 
authority is vested in the senior per- 
son of a lineage, family or other small 
social groups. 
Under traditional community-based sys- 
tems, marine resource exploitatlon is gov- 
erned by use rights to  a property. A property 
rlght is a claim, consciously protected by 
customary law and practice, to  a resource 
and/or the services or benefits that are 
derived From  it. Such a grant of authority 
defines the uses legitimately viewed as 
exclusive, as well as  the penalties for vio- 
lating those rights. The characteristics of 
property rights may vary situationally. 
Common characteristics are exclusivity; the 
right to determine who can use a fishing 
ground; transferability:  the rlght to sell, 
lease or bequeath the rights; and enforce- 
ment, the right to apprehend and penal- 
ize violators of the rights.  The  right of 
enforcement, and in particular that to  ex- 
clude the free-riding  outsider, is  a  key 
characteristic, for without it all other rights 
are diminished either actually or poten- 
tially. 
Almost universal throughout the Asia- 
Pacific region is  the principle that mem- 
bers of Fishing communities have primary 
resource rights by virtue of their status as 
members of a social group. Such rights to 
exploit fisheries are subject to various 
degrees of exclusiveness, which depends 
on  community social organization and local 
culture. Most commonly, traditional flsh- 
erles rights apply to areas, but superim- 
posed on these may be claims held  by 
I 
individuals or groups to a particular spe- 
cies or to  a specific fishing technology. 
Traditional rights to marine resources 
may be exclusive, primary or secondary. 
and may be further classified  into rlghts 
of occupation and use.' The relationships 
between the two main types, primary and 
secondary, are an important and complex 
characteristic of many traditional manage- 
ment systems. in which overlapping and 
detailed regulations on the use of tech- 
nologies and particular species are wide- 
spread. Individual rights as subdivisions 
'nested  wlthln" corporate marine holdings 
occur widely throughout the Asia-Pacific 
'Such tradltlonal rlghts are better deflhed as  those 
to use rather than to own. Moreover, rights to use 
can be excluslve, since they can imply prlrnary rights 
holders' subsldiaty rlght to prwent others from uslng 
certaln resources wlthln the area over which tradl- 
tlonal control Is exerted (Pulea 1985). region. Rights of transfer and loan and shared 
property rights also occur. 
Exclusive Rlghts 
Exclusive rights have been handed from 
generation to  generation through ancestral 
families, spirits or  gods, and are  validated 
by historical-mythological associations. 
In the Pacific Islands, myths, legends  and 
oral history frequently allude to the in- 
habitants' exclusive rights to  their islands' 
resources (Pulea 1985). Subsequently, 
fishing rights in defined territories have 
been defined by customary law. 
Primary Rights 
Most commonly, these are rights to  which 
a group or an individual is  entitled via 
inheritance (i.e., a birthright), by direct 
descent from the core of  a corporate group. 
Primary rights are  generally comprehensive, 
since only they confer access to all re- 
sources  within a defined territory. Inher- 
itance, ancestral interests, social obllga- 
tions and cooperative relationships within 
a social group  provide continuity of own- 
ership and rights. 
Secondary Rights 
Secondary rights are  more limited than 
primary rights, often being restricted to 
specific fishing methods. They are acquired 
through affiliation with a corporate group, 
by marriage, traditional purchiue, exchange, 
as a gift, or as reciprocity for  services. 
Sometimes they may be Inherited. Sec- 
ondary rights are often given to inland 
villagers lacking direct access to  the  coast, 
particularly when their villages have historical 
and kinship ties with a coastal village. 
Systems with "Nested Rights" 
In  some societies, rights to fisheries, 
which are usually to  areas, are overlain 
by other rights, generally those to spe- 
cles and gear types. Most are quite sim- 
ple, like those to  locations with stone  fish 
traps. 
One complex and unusual system of 
such rights is that of Ponam Island, Manus 
Province,  Papua New Guinea, where 
ownership is  composed of three main 
independent and overlapping elements: 
(1) reef and inshore marine waters, (2) 
species and (3)  flshing techniques (Carrier 
1981  ;  Carrier and Carrier  1989). There, 
ownership of tenured sea  and reef areas 
is not exclusive, owing to  strict limits set 
by these countervailing, nested rights. 
Right of Transfer and Loan 
Some  traditional management systems 
permit the  permanent, temporary or oc- 
casional transfer of  rights to  other social 
units.  Often, temporary and occasional 
transfer requires users to  compensate  rights 
owners in cash or more commonly, in kind, 
usually with a portion of the catch. In other 
societies, however, individual fishers are 
proscribed by either statutory or customary 
law from transferring their rights. 
Shared Rlghts 
In  some parts of  the Asia-Pacific  re- 
gion, areal rights are shared between or 
among  different corporate communities. 
Commonly shared rights have deep  his- 
torical  roots, and Invariably, sharing is 
done only for the most productive wa- 
ters or  where kinship ties are strong. Rules  Eligibility Rules 
Rules give substance and structure to 
property rights by defining how a right 
is to  be exercised, through specification 
of  required, permitted and forbidden acts 
in  exercising the authority provided by 
the right. Thus, whereas a right author- 
izes a fisher  to  work a specific  fishing  ground, 
his options in exercising it are governed 
by rules which may, for example, specify 
gear type used or seasonal restrictions, 
among  other limitations. The more complete 
a set of rights, the less exposed are fish- 
ers to the actions of others. 
Basic rules define the geographical areas 
to  which rights are applied; identify those 
persons eligible to  fish within a community's 
sea  space; ad  govern access of outsiders. 
Operational rules govern flshing behavior, 
gear externalities, assignment issues, as 
well as specify unacceptable flshing behavior, 
conservation practices and distribution of 
the catch within the community. 
Definition of Fishing Territories 
In the Asia-Pacific region, the sea  terri- 
tory of a social group is  commonly, but 
not always, defined by proximity or adja- 
'  cency to its settlement(s),  and by lateral 
and seaward boundaries.  As a general 
principle, the exclusive fishing territory of 
a community is  the adjacent marine wa- 
ters within the reef. But this varies con- 
siderably according to both local history 
and the  more recent processes of national 
modernization. 
In most places, cornmunlties maintain 
exclusive rights to all known adjacent sub- 
merged reefs, which are  named and owned 
exclusively by particular families, clans, 
municipalities. Islands, groups of islands 
or atolls, as  the local social organization 
dictates. Seaward of  the reek, the de- 
gree of exclusiveness of rights gradually 
declines. 
In  addition to holding rights, in  many 
societies the persons who can actually 
engage in fishing are limited by community- 
based, national or cultural rules. In  a great 
many societies in the Asia-Pacific region, 
membership of a corporate descent group, 
and thus inheritance, and/or residence are 
the only rules that must be satisfied in order 
to become a  fisher: in  others, further 
preconditions must be met. Such eligibility 
rules include caste membership, gender 
and skill level, among others. 
Intercommunity Access Rules 
Access controls are applied to  outsiders, 
people from other social groups. There is 
often boundary permeability between 
rieighboring groups, a consequence of long 
friendship, kinship or other close association. 
Boundaries are less permeable the more 
distant the "outsider" group is either socially 
or  geographically. But increased commercial 
resource use often leads to  strong access 
controls, even for close neighbors. 
Throughout the  Asia-Pacific region, the 
rights of outsider fishers are usually closely 
specified by rules defining access condi- 
tions. However, there is considerable vari- 
ation in local details. Invariably, such rules 
require that prior permisslon be obtained 
before commencing fishing. Failure to  do 
so is  usually  regarded as trespass, the 
penalties for which can be severe. Corn- 
monly, rules specify that some  form of fee. 
compensation or royalty  be paid  once 
permission has been granted. 
In  some cases, outsiders seeking fish 
for subsistence are allowed free access, 
whereas commercial fishers might be 
granted access on payment of cash or kind, 
or prohibited entirely. Almost universally, 
commercialization and "cornrnoditization" 
result in a demand for fees or prohibition, 
even when the target species has not traditionally been harvested by the "host" 
community.  Species  restrictions  are 
sometimes placed on  outsiders. 
Use Behavior Rules 
Gear rules. Gear rules are prevalent in 
the Asia-Pacific region. Gear perceived of 
as harmful to  fish stoclts or habitats is widely 
prohibited. Similarly, generally in the in- 
terests of equity, gear regarded as being 
too efficient or exacerbating socioeconomic 
divisions within a community is also of- 
ten banned.  Many gear  rules are estab- 
lished to  prevent gear externalities. 
Temporal allocation  rules.  In many 
places, rules are enforced to  promote both 
orderly and equitable Fishing. Frequently, 
such rules limit the number of  canoes in  a 
line, and ensure that the position of ca- 
noes is changed in  a specific order, so all 
fishers can share equally in  the best spots. 
Lottery systems for allocating space-time 
among  fishing groups are widespread, es- 
pecially in  South Asia. 
fishing behavior rules. Almost universal 
are local rules aimed at promoting  orderly 
fishing as well as protecting fish schools. 
Such rules are detailed and usually locally 
specific. Examples include the ban on  indi- 
vidual fishing with flares, in favor of  group 
efforts: acceptable levels of  noise; and the 
way in  which boats and gear must be han- 
dled so as not to disturb schooling fish. 
Species rules. Rules are common regard- 
ing  the harvest of  certain species: for ex- 
ample, turtles are reserved for high-rank- 
ing persons, such as chiefs in the Pacific 
islands. Other rules forbid catching totemic 
and sacred specles. 
1994a). It is important, therefore, not to 
assume a priori that traditional manage- 
ment systems are intentionally conserva- 
tionist. Rather, local rationale and possi- 
ble conservational functions  must be ex- 
amined for in each case. 
If  traditional management systems were 
originally designed as  a  conservation 
measure (admittedly an unprovable assump- 
tion in most placesj, they would have been 
the  most widespread  one employed 
throughout the Pacific Basin. Prevalent in 
the Asia-Pacific  region is the imposition 
of  closed seasons that Follow local knowl- 
edge about the spawning periods of key 
Fish species and prohibit their capture during 
such times, together with other types of 
customary fishing regulations, often based 
on nonecological rationale, such as  reli- 
gious taboos, that appear to have similar 
conservational implications (Johannes  1978). 
Such practices are not static. Some of 
the new regulations that village commu- 
nities devise to  cope with changing tech- 
nology and fishing practices are explic- 
itly conservationist. 
A wide range of  conservation rules was 
traditionally employed by many commu- 
nities in the Asia-Pacific region, especially 
in  Oceania (johannes 1978, 1981, 1982), 
to  ensure sustained yields. Some were clearly 
designed to  conserve stocks; others also 
functioned coincidentally as conservation 
devices. Among  these were the live stor- 
age or freeing of surplus Fish caught dur- 
ing spawning migrations; setting up of 
closed seasons (particularly during  spawn- 
ing); placing taboos on  fishing areas; res- 
ervation of  particular areas for fishing during 
bad weather; size restrictions (although this 
was uncommon in Oceania); and.  in re- 
cent times, gear restrlctions (johannes 1978). 
Conservation Rules 
Distribution of  Catch Rules 
The conservation intent within  traditional 
community-based marine resource man- 
agement systems is controversial (Ruddle 
Rules defining access to harvested fish 
are widespread in the Asia-Pacific region. These are an extremely important set of 
rules in many societies, since in terms of 
equity within a community, access to  fish 
once harvested can be as  or more important 
than access to  fishlng grounds (Collier et 
al. 1979;  Kendrick 1993).  Such rules include 
those  to  provision  the  family  and 
community; those required as subsequent 
and continual repayment for the acquisition 
of fishing rights; and those enmeshed in 
general community sharing, reciprocity and 
related norms concerning equity and falmess 
(Ruddle 1994a). 
Monitoring, A ccountability 
and Enforcement 
If rights are to  be meaningful, provision 
must be made within the system for moni- 
toring compliance with rules and impos- 
ing sanctions on violators. Under commu- 
nity-based marine resource management 
systems in the Asia-Pacific region, moni- 
toring and enforcement are generally un- 
dertaken within the local community: re- 
source users police themselves, and are 
observed by all others as they do  so. 
For a variety of reasons, traditional au- 
thorities frequently imposed temporary or 
permanent bans, as well as spatial, tem- 
poral, gear or species restrictions on the 
exploitation of  marine resources. These 
commonly took the form of taboos. 
Sanctions 
Sanctions are widely invoked through- 
out the Asia-Pacific region for the infringe- 
ment of fisheries rights and the breaking 
or ignoring of  locally  formulated rules 
governing fishing and other marine resource 
uses. The four principal types of sanctions 
are social, economic, physical punishment 
and supernatural. 
Socia/sanctionsinciude ridicule, shaming, 
ostracism and banishment.  Ridicule  was 
widely  used  in  Polynesian societies. 
Economic  sanctions consist of  monetary 
and in-kind fines, destruction of  gear and 
forced labor, among others.  Physlcal 
punishment  including death, was a fairly 
common penalty in the region, especially 
throughout Oceania, for the vlolatlon of 
rules.  Supernatural sanctions are all- 
pervasive throughout the region, and fear 
of  them reinforces the other types of 
sanctions. 
Determlnlng a Future for 
Tradltlonal Marlne Resource 
Management Systems 
For  much of the tropical world, tradi- 
tional fishing rights are an ill-defined fac- 
tor that can be construed either as hin- 
dering the use and development of na- 
tional Fisheries or in contrast, encourag- 
Ing their effective use and management. 
Two major problems commonly arise from 
traditional fishing rights: 
1 . that of providing "outsider" commercial 
fishers access to  underutilized grounds 
and species from which they are now 
excluded by traditional fishing rights 
claimed  by  people who themselves 
do  not fish commercially; and 
2. that of preserving the valuable role 
played by social organizations asso- 
ciated with community-based tradi- 
tional management systems and con- 
ventional rights. 
Regardless of the precise legal situation, 
Individuals, groups, clans or villages, as 
locally appropriate, claim exclusive Rsh- 
Ing rights over certain areas. Further, de- 
spite their legal basis, or lack of it. such 
claims will  be zealously guarded. Thus, 
outsider commercial fishing is  not possi- 
ble, and this hampers the development 
of  a modern, efficient, Inshore national fish- 
ery sector. That being the case, it has been 
suggested that for  Papua New Guinea, 
legislation should be considered to oblige traditianal fishing rights holders to  allow 
outsiders access to  grounds that are not 
fully exploited (Anon. 1979). 
On the other hand, these inherent diP 
ficulties need not preclude attempts to 
transfer some of  the underlying principles 
on which some traditional systems are 
based.  However.  much Interdisciplinary 
research - based on  combined human eco- 
logical, biological and economic approaches  - Is first requlred to  elucidate those prln- 
clples, as well as to correct many of the 
misplaced concepts and erroneous Inter- 
pretations that have characterized some 
of  the earlier research on  the topic (Ruddle 
1988a, b;  1994a, b). 
Pdcy  Alternatives for the 
Future of  Systems 
Clearly,  some traditional community- 
based management systems will have a 
future usefulness, both nationally and lo- 
cally. But equally there will be  valid grounds 
for either diluting,  modifying or abollsh- 
ing  outright other systems. Deciding  which 
alternative course to follow will certainly 
depend on national priorities. But it  should 
also be based on national fisheries man- 
agement capacities. In  virtually all cases, 
however, the future of  community-based 
marine resources management lies in  a form 
of  co-management with some higher level 
of government. 
Essentlally, there are three basic alter- 
native poky  approaches regarding tradi- 
tional community-based fisheries manage- 
ment, particularly with respect to  its rela- 
tionship to the development of fisheries 
and other economic sectors. 
Ad Hoc Approach 
Basically, this implies that no clearcut 
policy is established  and legislated for, and 
that each problem is resolved as it arises, 
based on Its merits In terms of the rela- 
tive costs and benefits to  the nation, re- 
glon and local community. This has the 
advantage of  political acceptability, slnce 
no changes are requlred, and tradltlonal 
sentiments and rlghts are relnforced. The 
disadvantages are that traditlonal rights 
holders Incur no obllgations.  such that 
development of other sectors will be dif- 
flcult at best and imposslble at worst. 
Moreover, because thls process Is ad  hoc. 
solutions to  problems wlll be piecemeal, 
and no  guidelines will emerge for the le- 
gal Interpretation  of  traditional fishing rights 
and thelr articulation with  national devel- 
opment priorities. It is therefore at best a 
stopgap approach,  slnce It is obviously 
unsatisfactory in  the long  term. 
Legislation to  Dilute Traditional 
Systems 
This approach requires legislative action 
to curtail and strictly define the powers 
of  traditional rights holders. It could also 
modify traditional management systems 
to enable the use of  certain fishing rlghts 
areas for other economic activities, lnduding 
commerclal fisheries. Under certain con- 
ditions, systems would be abolished en- 
tlrely. 
It makes little sense in  terms of overall 
national development to prolong unnec- 
essarily the existence of  community-based 
management systems that have outlived 
their historical usefulness. Such a situa- 
tion arises most clearly near urban-indus- 
trial centers,  where,  depending on the 
density of onshore developments, the in- 
validation of systems could also be justi- 
fied by the potential health hazard of fish 
taken from polluted waters. Weakening or 
invalidating traditlonal systems Is a course 
of action that can be justified where such 
systems impede alternative and more 
important uses of  coast-marine space,  as 
in  those parts of Japan where they have become a "living fossil" (Ruddle 1985, 1987. 
1989, 1990). 
But  some would demur. Johannes 
(198813). for example, believed that the  irk 
validation or weakening of systems Is un- 
justified, except where they are  finely sub- 
divided through "nested" rights, since rights 
withln rights seem to have a great poten- 
tial for problems, and little or none for con- 
servation. Regarding situations where tra- 
ditional authority has lapsed beyond the 
point of possible revival, as  around urban 
centers, Johannes (1  988b) felt that Fisher- 
ies management may best be pursued by 
cooperatives.  This was done  in japan (Ruddle 
1985, 1987).  Nevertheless, this is no easy 
task, and failures have been legion. 
The advantages of  this approach are  that 
it allows both commercial fisheries and other 
economic  sectors to  develop rapidly; clarifies 
the issues; and defines the modern rights 
of  traditional rights holders. The disadvan- 
tages are that the approach is  often politi- 
cally difficult and numerous implementa- 
tion problems would arise. In many cases, 
the losses  OF rent, administrative costs  and 
problems, and possible social unrest would 
outweigh the  economic  and other benefits 
derived. Further, once systems were either 
abolished or severely eroded, they would 
be dificult if not impossible to  re-introduce 
at some later date, should the need arise. 
In  many cases, community-based man- 
agement systems ought to be invalidated 
or weakened locally, but in the national or 
regional interest, such a policy implemented 
nationwide carries with it enormous  costs. 
This is  particularly  obvious in  far-flung 
archipelagic nations, such as  Indonesia, the 
Philippines. Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands 
or Vanuatu, but no less in any developing 
nation that lacks the financial and physical 
ability and personnel capacity to  police its 
inshore waters. Solving this major problem 
of  costs  provides one  of the most valid rea- 
sons  for retaining well-functioning commu- 
nity-based  marine resource management 
systems. 
Invalidating traditional comrnunlty-based 
systems together with the local knowledge 
base that underpins them also eliminates 
local  policing OF  resources, which results 
In  increased  financial, administrative  and 
personnel burdens on governments that 
cannot handle them. In dispensing with such 
systems "the government would thus be 
disposing of services it got  for free and as- 
suming  expensive new responsibilities it was 
ill-equipped to  handle" (Johannes 198813). 
As Bailey and Zerner (1992) observed of 
Indonesia: 
The Indonesian government is incapa- 
ble oFdesigning effective Rshery man- 
agement systems due to limited un- 
derstanding of the complex and highly 
variable nature of fisheries resources. 
Government management policies 
which fail  to recognize local  institu- 
tions and economic  needs may be  cre- 
ating more problems than they solve. 
Moreover, the Indonesian government 
has limited ability to  enforce what regu- 
lations are in  place due to staff  and 
budgetary constraints. 
But the ability of local community man- 
agement  systems, based on  a depth of  tra- 
ditional ecological knowledge, is quite  the 
opposite. However, apart from the excep- 
tions noted in the previous section, to be 
effective, these  local rules require recogni- 
tion, acceptance and protection under state 
law. 
In  many  instances.  practical 
considerations, such as  the  inability ofa  poor 
and/or large nation to police its fisheries, 
logically  lead  to the  alternative  of 
community-based management. It has been 
demonstrated that under certain conditions. 
traditional systems represent a  viable 
solution  to  the  inadequacies  and 
inefficiencies  of  centralization  and 
unisectoralization. Co-management  is a 
logical  approach  (Bailey  and Zerner 
1  992). In those rural, mostly subsistence-level 
societies, where conventional authority 
remains strong, enforcement and punish- 
ment are  often largely traditional. This can 
also be used to serve a modern purpose. 
Traditional punishment can be severe and 
feared more than that meted out by gov- 
ernment. as in  Oklnawa (Ruddle and 
Akimichl 1989),  Palau (johannes 198  1  ) or 
Arneriwn Samoa (Wass 1882). As Wass 
(1982) observed of  American Samoa, 
'Management regulations instituted on the 
village level are  much more effective than 
those of the territorial or federal govern- 
ments because they are promulgated within 
the cultural context by traditional leaders 
and, consequently, are more likely to re- 
ceive the approval and fealty of the vil- 
lagers." Thus, where traditional authorlty 
remains strong, a communlty-based man- 
agement system can still provide a solid 
foundation for modern fisheries manage- 
ment. However.  ironlcally.  when such 
authority is  eroding or  has disappeared, 
it is often the fault of the government (vide 
supra). 
In summary, replacing a traditional system 
with  "open access" would entail all the 
discouraging results so familiar in open- 
access fisheries. In  tropical small-scale fish- 
eries, those problems would be com- 
pounded by the following factors. 
1. The multlspecies nature of  fisheries 
would require more cumbersome regu- 
lations and correspondingly  more 
enforcement than systems in temperate 
waters. 
2. The scantiness of  biological data for 
use in  management and the large 
percentage of  the small-scale catch 
used for subsistence would create 
immense logistical  problems in  de- 
veloping essential data sets  from very 
widely scattered fishing communities. 
3. The vast number of  geographlcally 
scattered flshlng units would cause 
almost insuperable financial  and 
logistical problems for regulation and 
monitoring compared with Western 
commercial fisheries. 
4. The zeal with which data are collected 
and analyzed, together with oFficial 
enforcement of regulations and hon- 
esty among officials leaves much to 
be desired. 
5.  Most governments are too poor (or 
fisheries have too low a priority) to 
implement conventional regulatory 
systems required by open-access re- 
gimes or to  handle the resultant prob- 
lems. 
Legislation to Reinforce but 
SpeciFy the Scope and Power 
of Traditional Rights 
The advantages of  this are a  recognl- 
tion of historical and present situations and, 
possibly, the promotion of resource con- 
servation. That this approach would make 
conventional development difFicult is cer- 
tainly not a bad thing, although many would 
regard  it as a disadvantage. The reduc- 
tion of the powers of  the central govern- 
ment while placing responsibility on the 
rights holders would likely be construed 
as a  disadvantage by  vested interests. 
However, this could be overcome by re- 
inforcing the scope of traditional systems 
within a concurrently legislated Framework 
of co-management. 
Selecting among those three alternative 
approaches is  not easy; there are  no  quick 
and simple solutions to the problem. In 
the Asia-Pacific  region, for example, the 
question of  tradltlonal fishing rights is one 
of the most interesting and vexing prac- 
tical, political and philosophical problems 
confronting fisheries management. If the 
present situation is  maintained and rights 
reinforced, fisheries development will have 
to  take place within the context of  exclu- 
sive properties, which is the historid pattern 
of the Pacific. Full  debate on the issue is 
required at  vlllage, local and national Iwelr, and the national government should thor- 
oughly appraise local  governments and 
villages of their rights. Before any actlon 
Is  taken, however, it is imperative that local 
governments document the nature of  ex- 
lsting fishing rights systems nationwide. 
particularly those that have been or are 
being exercised. 
Crlterla for Determlnlng a Role 
for Traditional Management 
Systems 
johannes (1  988a, b) and Johannes and 
MacFarlane  ( 1990. 199  1  ) suggested ba- 
sic criteria for determining whether ma- 
rine resource management should be tai- 
lored to an existing traditional manage- 
ment system or whether an entirely new 
system should be created: (1) contribu- 
tion to conservation; (2) definition and 
robustness of  rights; and (3)  compatibil- 
ity with government policy. 
The order is reversed here to better re- 
flect what I regard as  a more realistic pri- 
ority for evaluation, in what is  after all a 
highly charged political process. Compat- 
ibility with policy - where oneexists -would 
be the principal  basic criterion in  most 
nations (Ruddle 199413). 
CompatlblIlty with Government 
Policy 
National  development policies and 
fisheries policies within them, differ widely 
in objective and definition. But it should 
be determined if policy favors maximizing 
rents, food or employment. The future 
role,  if  any,  of  traditional  resource 
management would vary depending on 
policy priorities. 
Formerly, colonial governments often 
ignored or overrode traditional systems. 
granting access to industrial fishers lacking 
Cradltlonal rights in an area (e.g., Johannes 
1978). Nowadays many governments, 
especially In the Pacific Islands, recognize 
the legitimacy of traditional management 
systems. When such systems are likely 
to hamper Rsheries development, they 
may reconcile through mediation the needs 
of tradltlonal and industrial fishers. This 
Is  sornetlmes done by cornpensatlng 
traditional rights holders for allowing access 
to outsiders (e.g., Johannes  1982; Baines 
1985).  Thus, a balance is sought between 
employment  and  rent  for  national 
development. 
If maximizing economic rent is the maln 
government Rsheries objective, then it 
should be determined if traditional rights 
holders exercise their property rights in 
a manner that discourages overcapitalimtion 
as well as  overfishing. When a traditional 
system operates to  discourage outsiders 
from entering heavily exploited fisheries, 
thls helps limit overcapitalization. But 
overcapitalization may still occur within 
the  traditional  rights-holding  group 
itself. 
Such a performance test of the ability 
of a traditional management system to 
forestall rent dissipation was performed 
in Sri Lanka by Panayotou (1  984, 1989). 
If fisheries are being managed successfully 
by such a system, then the members ought 
to be  earning  incomes  above  their 
opportunity costs, whlch can be estimated 
by comparing what other socioeconomic 
groups earn in other sectors. Incomes of 
boat owners and crewmen were estimated 
and compared with their opportunity costs. 
Boat owners were found to  have average 
annual incomes ranging from USB1.1 SO 
(for traditional vessels) to  US$5,000 (for 
3.5 t-mechanized vessels). In  comparlson. 
owner-cultivators, sharecroppers, office 
workers and state employees earned an 
average of less than US$500 per annum. 
Crewmen earned an  average of US$S/day, 
2-3 times more than the daily earnings 
of  agricultural laborers or unskilled and semi-skilled workers. In contrast, in Thailand 
and the Philippines, where traditional 
systems of fisheries management have 
totally or largely disappeared, small-scale 
flshers earn incomes far  below their 
opportunity costs, and must engage in a 
range of  other economlc actlvitles to  earn 
a living (Panayotou 1985).  The relatively 
higher incomes enjoyed by Sri Lankan fishers 
were attributed to the efficiency of the 
traditlonal restrlcted-access management 
system. after competing hypotheses, such 
as  religious prohibitions on Buddhists taking 
life,  were  rejected  (Fernando et al. 
1985). 
Deflnitlon and Robustness 
of  Flshlng Rights 
The clarity of definition, strength with 
which they are upheld and permeability 
of  fishing rlghts vary enormously. Thls is 
potentially a major difficulty. One main 
problem might be precise determination 
of the location of  tradltlonal boundarles; 
they may be impe&ctly  remembered, and 
written record would but rarely permit a 
legal settlement of wnfllcting claims (e.g., 
Johannes  1982, 198813). Equally complex 
is the identification of  traditional rights 
holders. Deliberate relocation of settlements 
by churches or governments is compounded 
more recently  by  urbanization  having 
dlmlnlshed the role of  kin groupings, such 
that individuals'  rights are only hazily 
recalled. Thus, efforts to resuscitate or 
resurrect a traditional system under such 
circumstances might lead to territorial 
disputes and long-lasting confllcts (e.g.. 
lohannes 1982). Given such potential 
problems  it  is  not  surprising  that 
governments might be loathe to  codify 
traditional tenure systems within state  law. 
unless they have hrnctloned continuously 
or  at  least until historical times, as  in the 
Solomon Islands (Allan 1957). 
Contribution to Marine Resources 
Conservatiod 
Although traditional management sys- 
tems generally provide an incentive to 
harvest in moderation, some rights hold- 
ers do not limit their own fishing pres- 
sure (e.g.. Polunin 1984; Carrier 1987). In 
some  communltles, for example, a causal 
relationship between the  contemporary rates 
of exploitation and future fish yields is not 
perceived (e.g., Carrier 1982,1987).  Some- 
times this might be because there has been 
no such relationship, abundant supplies 
having always exceeded demand,  as in parts 
of  Melanesia where human population 
denslties are low, or in  the Torres Strait 
Islands (johannes and MacFarlane 199  1  ). 
Later, when marine resources in such ar- 
eas are threatened  by  increased fishing 
pressure,  as  when  they  become 
commoditized, for example, fishers may 
not recognize the need for conservation 
because there is no  cultural precedent (e.g., 
Johannes and MacFarlane 1991  ). 
But  thls is  not to say that traditional 
management systems  serve no  conserva- 
tion purpose. Almost universally,  rights 
holders limit fishing by outslders. Regardless 
of  motive, and although not guarantee- 
ing efficient marine resource management, 
this is  a vital  prerequlslte for conserva- 
tlon  In  fisherles  threatened  with 
overexploltation. 
The  common assertion  Is  that the 
traditional  practice of area or temporal 
closures on reek enhances fish stocks by: 
( 1 ) maintaining species abundance and 
diversity and possibly  enhancing these 
characteristics over the long term: (2) 
providing undisturbed breeding sites; (3) 
qo  evaluate a system In terms of Its actual or po- 
tentlal conservation value presupposes a prlor as- 
sessment of whether or not rnarlne resources In- 
volved are now or llkely to be overexploited and/ 
or degraded or destroyed by pollutlon, destructlve 
flshlng practices or other human actlvltles. exporting  biomass by emigration of adult 
individuals; and (4)  exporting biomass  over 
a wider area via larval dispersal. However, 
there have been few direct tests to  verify 
this assertion through natural or  manipulative 
experiments. This is  a severe drawback, 
since further advances in tropical coastal 
fisheries  management  depend  on 
experimenting  and testing empirically the 
consequences of  various management 
regimes (Larkln 1984). 
In one  such test, Alcala ( 198  1  ) attempted 
to relate protective management to fish 
yields at  the  Sumilon Island Reserve, Central 
Visayas, Philippines, which was closed to 
all  fishing from  1974 to 1984. At  16.5 
t.km-2-year over a five-year period, the  areas 
adjacent to the reserve produced one of 
the  highest average  yields of any reef area 
in the world. However, because no data 
were available on reef fish abundance at 
Sumilon before the reserve was established, 
it was impossible to  verify the assertion 
that protective management caused the 
high abundance and species richness at 
the  site. But given the  extremely high fishing 
pressure on Philippine reefs, it can be  ar- 
gued that protective management was a 
major Factor in maintaining the high abun- 
dance of  many species. Also in  Central 
Vlsayas, Russ (1  985) compared three sites 
at  Sumilon Island, Apo lsland and Balicasag 
Island, and Focused on Serranidae stocks, 
a highly favored target species worldwide, 
and therefore vulnerable (Randall 1982). 
Limited evidence in support of the first 
three of the  assertions noted above is pro- 
vided by the Sumilon study. The fourth 
needs detailed research on the patterns 
OF dispersal and recruitment of coral reef 
fish. 
Alcala and Russ (1  990)  reported further 
on a  natural  experiment to test directly 
the use of area closure as  a management 
strategy on Sumilon Island. After a  ten- 
year closure, protective management broke 
down in  1984, resulting in intensive fish- 
ing by  100 municipal fishers.  In  the 18 
months Following the breakdown of pro- 
tective management compared with the 
same  period while it was in operation, there 
was a 54% increase in  the total yield of 
reef fisheries. Their research indicated that 
protective management maintained high 
abundance of Ash  in the reserve and re- 
sulted in significantly higher yields in ad- 
jacent areas, presumably owing to the 
migration of adult fish. 
Other such tests have been performed 
on St. Lucia, in the Caribbean (Smith and 
Berkes  199  1 )  and some coastal lagoons 
of  Ghana, West Africa (Ntiamoa-kidu 199  1  ). 
In  both areas, the beneficial  qualities of 
community-based fisheries management 
were substantiated. 
Conclusion 
Most nations face an array of dilemmas 
In  determining rights and delineating re- 
sponsibilities in marine resources manage- 
ment and development. These include 
deciding what institutions should manage 
and enforce regulations For  subsistence 
fisheries;  legal support for traditional regu- 
lation and enforcement: the managerial and 
developmental role of  the central govern- 
ment in small-scale commercial fisheries; 
the feasibility of centralized management 
plans versus local decisionmaking;  and the 
nature of the consultative and collabora- 
tive process among fishers, local govern- 
ments and national authorities. Initially these 
look like local versus central jurisdictional 
matters, but the underlying issues are  policy, 
and the means of  managing marine re- 
sources and adapting traditional concepts 
to modern needs and Frameworks,  such 
that the range from subsistence fisheries 
to the highly commercialized industrial 
fishing is served properly. 
It is becoming increasingly asserted that 
traditional  community-based  marine re- 
source management systems may have an 
important role in  the co-management of inshore fisheries. That may well be the future 
for many such systems. But  it is  impor- 
tant to exercise caution, lest yet another 
poorly conceived, fisheries management 
fad  blossom, with all the failures, disap- 
pointments. disillusionment and wastage 
that would inevitably result. 
There are several important cautionary 
points to  be borne in mind (Ruddle 199413): 
1. Verification  of  the assertions about 
traditional systems Is  still lacking. 
2. Wholesale transfers of concepts would 
be hazardous at the very least, since 
such systems. by definition, arise from 
the deeper cultural  patterns of  the 
societies in which they are  enmeshed 
(Ruddle  and  Akimichi  1984; 
Durrenberger and  Palsson 1987).  So. 
much more than an understanding of 
just the local, traditional fisheries alone 
is required; entire nhtlonal systems 
of fisheries production, particularly the 
relationship between household (tra- 
ditional) and capitalistic (modern) 
production, need comprehension 
(Ruddle 1988a). 
3. Traditional systems could be "fossil- 
ized" through explicit, detailed legal 
definition in the terms of state law. 
This may weaken the adaptive flex- 
ibility of a traditional system (Ruddle 
and Johannes 1985). 
4. The application of traditional knowl- 
edge and management practices to 
the solution of  contemporary resource 
management problems is also a rela- 
tively new approach, at  least in Western 
terms, but is now the focus of con- 
slderable academic and applied in- 
terest, partly because of the inadequacy 
of  the biologid and economic  models 
usually applied. Largely as a conse- 
quence of  this newness, the relevant 
concepts  and methodologies are not 
yet well-defined. 
5. Perhaps most important, traditional 
community-based management sys- 
tems are not an automatic godsend 
to fisheries managers. They create 
dificulties. Not uncommonly, there- 
fore, governments and entrepreneurs 
attempt to either weaken or invali- 
date them. 
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I 
n the mounting frenzy over our endan- 
gered natural resources, traditional con- 
servationists have been quick to accuse 
forest farmers and coastal fishers of envl- 
ronmental rape. They cite intenslve  swidden 
cultivation as the despoiler of upland wa- 
tersheds, and overflshlng  coupled with the 
use of poison or dynamite as the equiva- 
lent in  coastal waters and coral reefs. Nothing 
less than strong punitive measures, they 
argue, can restrain these environmental 
criminals From performing their dastardly 
deeds. 
For many years, therefore -  indeed to 
this day -  upland dwellers have been har- 
assed by government forest guards bent 
on driving out 'squatters."  Erring fishers 
face arrest,  flnes or confiscation of their 
catch and equipment by the local police 
or military. Fortunately, the punltlve ap- 
proach to natural resource management 
has in recent years fallen upon hard times. 
The inabllity of state- or private-property 
regimes to  slow down, much less reverse, 
environmental  degradation despite authori- 
tarian tactics, has forced a redefinition of 
the problem and 'its solutions.  Underpin- 
ning  this transformation has been the emer- 
gence of people-centered, sustainable 
development movements. The  resulting 
alternative paradigm embodying an equi- 
table, participatory, environmentally sound 
and holistlc approach is Forcing  out  authori- 
tarlan modes in favor of democratic ones. 
Revltallzlng  Stewardship 
Former forest 'squatters"  are thus gain- 
ing  recognltion as citizens wlth a right to 
permanent tenure In their mountain habi- 
tats or seaside dwellings. Those who have obtained secure tenure now have a stake 
in the protection and nurturing of their en- 
vironment. The government's former po- 
licing role is  shifting to  one  of service. The 
new orientation stresses  people's steward- 
ship capacities; guarantees their tenure 
rights: and affords them access to  tools and 
technology, livelihood opportunities and 
basic services like health, nutrition, edu- 
cation, housing, clean water and sanita- 
tion. 
Community-based nongovernmental or- 
ganizations (NGOs) facilitate these devel- 
opmental thrusts through community or- 
ganization, management skills training and 
technology transfer. 
Where organized community groups of 
poor people once risked identification as 
"Communists", with its accompanying per- 
secution, the label has lost its meaning in 
the aftermath of the Cold War. The result- 
ing democratic openness has led to a vir- 
tual explosion on the scene of NGOs and 
people's organizations (POs). In  the Phil- 
ippines, the 1986 people power overthrow 
of the  Marcos dictatorship accelerated this 
process. Local government initiatives, too, 
have grown in  strength with the demise 
of top-down, centrallzed, authoritarian re- 
gimes of the left and the right  and the 
passage of local autonomy laws. Grassroots 
movements, honed by years of struggle. 
find further support in the global environ- 
mental movem'ent's championing of citi- 
zen participation as  crucial to  genuine de- 
velopment. 
People empowerment, then, is intrinsic 
to  the  sustainable development paradigm. 
It is also the basis for effective community 
resource management. People aware of their 
rights and ready to exercise them; Luild- 
ing new forms oftechnology and information 
into their indigenous knowledge systems: 
and convinced that government can pro- 
vide basic social and support servlces while 
maintaining an orderly and  peaceful envi- 
ronment -  this is  the context in  which 
people as genuine stakeholders of  com- 
munity resources re-establish  thelr stew- 
ardship over forests and coastal waters. 
Shlftlng to Communlty 
Management 
People who are chronically poor, mal- 
nourished, in  ill health; unsure of their resi- 
dential tenure and sources of livelihood; 
and afraid of defying exploitative and en- 
trenched power groups can emerge from 
this vortex only if they find ways of exert- 
ing significant control over the resources 
around them.  This transformation can come 
about through an empowerment process 
nurtured by specific catalytic forces. 
Communlty organlzlns 
Various modes of community organiz- 
ing exist, some more effective than oth- 
ers. Among the best in terms of sustainability 
is basic issue organizing. Here community 
groups define, analyze and priorltlze the 
problems they face. These may Include evic- 
tion threats; poor quality seedlings from 
the government: an abusive policeman; a 
rural health team reluctant to  visit the  vil- 
lage regularly; mangrove swamp conver- 
sions into shrimp cultivation ponds; dy- 
namite fishing protected by,local officials: 
and others. A next step is  for the people 
to  identify power figures who are in a po- 
sition to  change the situation but are usu- 
ally unwilling to do  so. People then de- 
cide on actions they will  take: work out 
strategies and tactics for confrontation and 
negotiation; take action, then assess the 
outcome collectively. The resulting prob- 
lem redefinition generates the next action- 
reflection cycle. 
A series of victories enables formerly dis- 
advantaged individuals to  achieve through 
group action a sense of power and self- 
realization about their ability to address 
and solve local problems. In the  course of thls empowerment process, they also learn 
to  plan and manage community concerns. 
Usually, trained local or outside organk- 
ers initiate thls empowering process. fo- 
cusing on the more disadvantaged peo- 
ple. Actual managerial projects come later 
as people's confidence In  their awn effi- 
cacy grows. In time, consclentlous, organ- 
ized groups learn to  deal effectlvely with 
both power and management issues on a 
continuing basis even after outslde organ- 
izers or project initiators have departed. 
Social development or project-based 
organizingrepresents  another mode. Here. 
outslde organizers have usually predeter- 
mined the kinds of projects they will en- 
courage  a community to  undertake, based 
largely on the  outsider's afflllatlon and cor- 
responding analysis of  what the people 
need. Sometimes needs are defined through 
a participatory rural appraisal *heme,  which 
promotes joint  learning and commits the 
collaboratlng parties to carry out the re- 
sulting projects together. Particular thrusts 
may range from health, family planning or 
nutrition to  agrarian reform, forest conser- 
vation, modern fishing technology and 
women's income generation. Government 
extension agents  and NGO  technicians alike 
focus on  technology transfer and manage- 
ment training through collaborative com- 
munity efforts. A variation on this is  the 
community development mode  that also 
starts by helping people identify needs  and 
problems but tends to prlorltlze these in 
the context of  the agency's own service 
delivery capacity. 
A major difference between Issue-based 
organizing and the various social devel- 
opment thrusts is the  initial confrontation- 
negotiation mode  of the  former versus the 
collaboration-harmony relatlonshlps favored 
by the latter vis-a-vis  powerful figures In 
government or the private sector. In  the 
end. issue-based organizing combined with 
sound project management activates 
sustainability. This process is  enhanced If 
the govemment Forces are open to  a genuine 
tripartite government organization-PO-NGO 
partnership. While project organizing leaves 
POs with the  capacity to  handle the Intro- 
duced technology fairly efficiently even after 
the departure of the NGO, they are less 
able to tackle different types of projects 
or address the recurring problems of in- 
equitable and arbitrary resource allocation 
decisions by local or national power fig- 
ures. Combining issue-based, or empow- 
erment organizing with project manage- 
ment organizing therefore is a strategy worth 
pursuing. 
Clearly, community organizing should 
be recognized as a process of confidence 
and solidarity building derived From people's 
actual experience of struggle to attain a 
common objective. Although confronting 
the basic power issues is  essential from 
the beginning, success Is  more likely when 
groups start with small, manageable issues 
wlthln that context, like demands for 
improved seedlings or better transport 
facilltles for sending goods to  the market. 
As the  groups  analyze and learn from each 
small victory or defeat, they gain tile 
confidence to  tackle lncreaslngiy complex 
resource allocatlon matters, like govemment 
contract reforestation requirements, land 
titling and illegal loggers and trawlers. New 
values are reinforced, namely, solidarity, 
fighting for one's rights and democratic 
community resource management. 
Security of  tenure 
If  people residing in  upland or coastal 
areas remain unsure of their tenure, they 
are not likely to Invest their time, talent 
or hard work in their surroundings beyond 
minimal  survival levels. Hence, any pro- 
gram aiming to foster sound community 
resource management must necessarily face 
thls problem at the outset. It need not be 
solved before other project activities start, 
but should be addressed concurrently with 
them. Sensitivity to gender, age, ethnIcI@ 
and soclal class 
These factors, too, have an important 
bearing in the design of programs. Local 
residents themselves may fail to include 
these sector-specific concerns into their 
planning. Men tend to  undervalue the  con- 
tributions of women to production, even 
though the latter often handle a major if 
not dominant share of subsistence plus other 
work. Encouraging women to speak out 
and take leadership positions in commu- 
nity matters must be a part of all comrnu- 
nity organizing, not only for egalitarian rea- 
sons but also for  efficiency. Adults also 
ignore the volces 0f  youth and children, 
and sometimes leave out the  views of the 
elderly as well. Ethnic minorities have lit- 
tle say in  the deliberations of the major- 
ity, even though the land rnay have once 
been under their control, tilled according 
to the precepts of indigenous knowledge 
about sustainable land and sea use. The 
wealthier families assume to  represent the 
interests of the entire community, even 
though their comprehension of  the lives 
of the poor shows little connection with 
reality or social justice.  A  balanced judg- 
ment is  needed, therefore, to ensure that 
these and other marginalized groups par- 
ticipate actively in deliberations about the 
future of their community. Targeting pov- 
erty and then designing and monitoring 
project  activities with  a  systematic bias 
toward the poor complete the picture. 
Attention to IIvelIhood and Its 
soclocu/tural context 
Those who work with upland or coastal 
people for improved resource management 
need to  understand the problem from the 
people's holistic perspective.  Given  the 
context of structural poverty, most of the 
rural poor seek merely to  grow enough food 
for subsistence; earn some cash income; 
acquire value-enhancing technology: and 
gain access to  markets so  their families can 
survive and prosper and their children can 
have a brighter future. While the professional 
forester rnay  focus on reforestation  and 
conservation programs, and the coastal 
resource technician on minimizing damage 
to fish  and coral species, both need to 
recognize that rural  families must daily 
engage in a mix of activities whose priorities 
change from one day to  the next. If this is 
the fishing season, the father may go  out 
to sea while his wife dries and sells last 
night's catch assisted by the children and 
other family members. The following week 
may find the entire household weeding the 
irrigated rice plot; followed by a climb to 
their forest farm to harvest sweet potatoes, 
build  soil-retaining  rock walls, plant tree 
seedlings or cut rattan for the market. 
Rural families must also address recurring 
health problems. Many a farming couple 
have had to surrender valuable working 
time to  illness, their own or more commonly 
that of their children. Diarrhea brought about 
by unsafe drinking water and exacerbated 
by  inadequate food intake: unchecked 
measles epidemics stemming from out-of- 
reach immunization services; chronic colds 
and chills leading to  pneumonia-all  of these 
and more take their toll on people's lives. 
Women in particular suffer hom too frequent 
childbearing, anemia, reproductive tract 
infections and chronic malnutrition. Parents 
anxious to  ensure the survival into adulthood 
of at least some of  thelr chlldren and 
convinced that a few of them are bound 
to  die young will understandably resist family 
planning measures. Many of these illnesses 
and resulting deaths can be prevented by 
effective social service outreach programs 
emphasizing preventive and primary health 
care, nutrition, environmental sanitation, 
education, responsible parenthood and 
women's health programs. 
Pursuing a constantly changing mix of 
activities represents a  typical  survival strategy of poor families. Forest farmers and 
fishers have woven together over thsyears 
an intricate tapestry of actMties to  maximize 
their livelihood options and economic 
security. Kinshlp and broader alliance ties, 
reciprocal  obligations, power relations, 
religious tenets and cultural values keep the 
system going by clarifylng who should do 
what with whom. when, how and why. 
External agents who demand prlority 
attentlon to their single-facet  program; 
ignore the wlde array of  other demands on 
rural dwellers'  time; and fail to integrate 
their own innovatlons into the people's lives 
cannot be serious about helping. 
Partners In  Communlty 
Management 
While the people of a community are best 
situated to manage local  resources most 
effectively, they can benefit from the con- 
tributions of  several important partners. 
Among these are other forest farmers an3 
fishers with experience in modern commu- 
nity resource management; issue-based and 
social development NCOs; academics com- 
mitted to participatory research wlth the 
people; and enlightened government 
groups. Empowered community resource 
management emerges from an organiza- 
tional process that highlights creative ten- 
sion leading to healthy confrontation and 
negotlatlon, with mutually beneflclal  col- 
laboration as  the outcome. 
Expedenced forest  farmer* 
and ffshers 
Probably the most credible promoters of 
new  approaches and technologies are those 
with whom one can Identiljt. Forest farrn- 
ers will readily listen to  and believe their 
peers who work side by side with them on 
the farm, showing them how to build  A- 
frames and retaining walls,or plant hedge- 
rows agalnst soil erosion. Fishing farnllies 
are more likely to follow the examples of 
thelr counterparts farther down the coast, 
who have banded together and success- 
Fully  pressured local government officials 
to stop trawlers from encroaching on thelr 
territory. The men, women and youth who 
manage these resources well should have 
the opportunlty and financial support to 
share their skills and conduct on-site train- 
Ing/learning workshops In nelghboring vil- 
lages-farmers  teaching farmers.  fishers 
teachlng fishers. 
Nongovernmental organfzations 
It  often takes an outsider to jar  rural 
dwellers into alternative ways of thinking 
and doing. Accustomed to following tra- 
ditional risk-minlmizing patterns of  resource 
use and local power relations and also lack- 
ing information on and control over new 
technology, most follow the safe path of 
repeating and reinforcing the known. lnto 
this plcture come NGOs committed to  help- 
ing local residents understand and adopt 
promising new options. Their ideas, tralning 
and other forms of support lead to com- 
munity actions that can reverse the drift 
of inertia, transforming a once passive group 
of people lnto actlve managers and citi- 
zens willing to challenge the status quo. 
The NGOs organize and facilitate rneet- 
ings, conduct learning workshops and llnk 
the village with the outside world in pro- 
ductlve new ways. They serve as advo- 
cates for the interests of the poor among 
government officials,  local  ellte and 
pollcymakers. The best among these in- 
termediary organizations ensure, however, 
that they do  not speak for the people but 
enable people to think, decide. act and 
represent themselves. Since self-reliance 
Is  their criterion for successful community 
organizlng, NCOs strive to  wean POs away 
from any dependency that may have de- 
veloped earlier In  the process. At the same time, the notion of NGOs 
"working themselves out of a job" has come 
under question in the light of long experi- 
ence. While POs  should and do  take over 
the direction of their activities, the situa- 
tions in which they operate change so  rap- 
idly, with new opportunities continuously 
emerging, that NGOs able to stay on the 
cutting edge  of innovation benefitting POs 
can keep revitalizing their partnership with- 
out apology. The key element is to build a 
relationship of trust and equality in which 
the NGO shifts from its initially dominant 
facilitating role to one of technical assist- 
ance at the behest of the PO. 
Government offIcIals 
Providing technology, services and ef- 
fective governance is  the role of  public 
officials.  A people-centered development 
paradigm, however, demands a shift from 
the traditional authoritarian, controlling and 
patronage mode  of governance to a demo- 
cratic, enabling and egalitarian one. Thls 
requires a new kind of public official, who 
is  comfortable interacting with  ordinary 
people as  equals; listens to  and learns from 
them; is service-oriented; and builds his/ 
her credibility  through transparency in 
dealing with them. This model official also 
respects people's  rights: recognizes the 
wlsdom of  much of their indigenous knowl- 
edge; accepts the validity of  their tech- 
nology in particular contexts; values their 
worldview and way of life; and takes quick 
and effective action to address their con- 
cerns. Appreciating the salutary role played 
by people-oriented  NGOs constitutes part 
of this new orientation in public adminis- 
tration. 
Academlc researchers 
Acceptance of the alternative paradlgrn 
should likewise affect the ways in  which 
university scholars conduct their research 
on community resource management. More 
of them must start by attempting to see 
the world through the eyes of  the com- 
munity, adjusting the conceptual  frame- 
work for data gathering to reflect the peo- 
ple's insight. Problem  identification with 
the people and academics as  coresearchers 
will emerge from this framework and pro- 
vide a  realistic guide to the subjects for 
study, the specific information needed, the 
selection of respondents, the types of analy- 
sis required, and the conclusions reached. 
The people, assisted by NGOs, technicians, 
government officials and academics, can 
thus devise sound solutions for enhanc- 
ing community resource management. 
Participat'ing in a practical, productive ac- 
tivity can bring added beneFits to  researcher 
who can continue writing up the research 
for their peers and advocating among 
policymakers their scientific perspective. 
now validated by the community. 
Donors 
IF donors are to  do  their share in foster- 
ing community resource management, they 
need to understand well the wide range 
of situations at the grassroots level. Thls 
can be facilitated  by visits to rural com- 
munities, where they can talk with POs made 
up of men, women and youth actually en- 
gaged in resource management activities, 
and ascertain the kinds of  concerns that 
alternatively drive and constrain them. Close 
contact wlth community-based NGOs and 
their linked urban-based networks, alliances 
and federations Is  crucial for keeping abreast 
of developments on that front. Following 
the  writings of participatory researchers will 
further expedite comprehension. Meetlng 
government officials not only In the capi- 
tal but also in provinces, municipalities and 
villages will  round out their information 
and better gulde their efforts toward giv- 
ing useful grants or loans. The world's resources are declining at 
such a rapld rate that unless new and im- 
aginative measures promising slgnifiwnt 
levels of  success are established, succeeding 
generatlons wlll have few benefits left to 
inherit. People-centered resource manage- 
ment is  the key principle of  our time. As 
Senior Forest Speclallst Barin  N.  Gangull 
(1993) of the Asian Development Bank 
categorically stated: 
...  developmental asslstance to the 
forestry sector wlll succeed only if the 
projects make a deliberate attempt to 
bring about changes in policies which 
will encourage handing over the for- 
ests to the community for manage- 
ment and protection. Common re- 
source ownership and management 
regimes are the most effective insti- 
tutions for sustainable development 
of  forests in  developing countries. 
Forest resource development projects 
that do not actlvely involve local us- 
ers wlll not succeed. 
All parties stand to  benefit from the  col- 
laboratlon of  forest farmers and fishers, 
NGOs, local and national government of- 
ficials, academic researchers and donors 
In  a synergistic, mutual leamlng process 
yielding effectlve systems of community 
resource  management. The  real winners will 
be the people. their resources and envi- 
ronment. 
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lntroductlon 
T" 
is  paper has four primary objectives: 
first, to  briefly review arguments for peo- 
ple's  participation in  co-management 
through fishers' cooperative-type organi- 
zations; second, to go  over quantitative 
research directed at isolating factors in- 
fluencing success of these organizations; 
third, to  examine factors identified as  po- 
tentially influencing the success of  these 
organizations in ca-management: and fourth, 
to  outline a quantitative research agenda 
directed at  determining Factors associated 
with the success of the use of the fishers' 
organizations in co-management. The pro- 
posed research Is  not expected to  provide 
a fool-proof, cookbook approach.  Local 
differences require a certain  amount of 
incrementalism or "muddling through" to 
develop policy directed at  this type of  co- 
management. Nevertheless, most govern- 
ments, development banks and develop- 
ment agencies prefer project guidelines 
much more specific than an open-ended 
type of incrementalism permits. As McCny 
(1  989)  noted, research  on "muddling 
through" projects enable "...more inbrmed 
incrernentalisrn in the Future." It Is  argued 
here that quantitative research based on 
many such projects will reduce the amount 
of "muddling" necessary and more clearly 
specify where and why In a specific project 
an incrementalist approach is needed, thus 
increasing the likelihood of  success and 
cost-effectiveness. Use of  Flshers' Cooperatlve- 
type Organlzatlons 
In  Co-management 
To  begin, It  Is  assumed that there is 
suMclent justification  for  the claim that 
people's participation, when appropriately 
used, can improve the fisheries manage- 
ment process (McGoodwin 1990).  How 
then can such participation be implemented? 
There are  numerous, obvious reasons that 
local organizations, rather than individu- 
als, can efficiently functlon to facilitate 
people's participation in fishery manage- 
ment. One is the difficulty of  determining 
an appropriate time and place to  convene 
a potentially large, heterogeneous group 
of lndivlduals with interest in the fisher- 
ies. By  approprlate is  meant a time suit- 
able to the work hours of fishers and other 
interested parties and a locatlon conven- 
ient to  all. Second Is  the onerous and  some- 
times impossible task of  achlevlng agree- 
ment in a large group. The larger the group, 
the more people who  will want to have 
input, and  the  greater the chances for con- 
flicts  to arise which  will  inhibit  the 
decisionmaking process. 
A third argument is that those who usually 
participate effectively in  public forums 
directed at achieving people's partlclpa- 
tion rarely represent the masses of  peo- 
ple who will  be affected by  proposed 
changes. Effective  participants are often 
the relatively well-educated, wealthy elite 
who elther have or plan to  have some in- 
terest in the resource. The poor and less 
educated frequently have difficulty flnd- 
lng time to participate, and when they do. 
their lower level of  education reduces the 
effectiveness of  their input. It is assumed 
that the person or panel representing the 
members of the local organization at  man- 
agement  meetings would be able to  over- 
come these Ilmltatlons. 
Fourth. obvlously an individual partici- 
pant Is  more vulnerable to pressure than 
one  supported by and delegated author- 
ity by an organization. Pressures applied 
to  the individual can range from obviously 
illegal (e.g., threats of  bodily injury), to 
marginally legal (e.g., finding "cause" to 
have the individual terminated from present 
employment), to  the legal (a  wealthy vested 
interest instigating a costly, time-consuming 
lawsuit against the individual petitioner). 
Most private individuals could afford nei- 
ther the time nor the expense to defend 
themselves against this type of legal ac- 
tion. Such 'legal"  maneuvers have occurred 
frequently enough In the United States that 
they are referred to  by an acronym-SLAPP 
(strategic  lawsuit against publlc participa- 
tion). Organizations would be less vulnerable 
to  such threats. 
It is thus relatively simple to establish 
that there are numerous reasons to  advo- 
cate use of organizations to facilitate peo- 
ple's participation in fisheries management. 
Factors Influencing the success of 
flshers' organizations 
The next question tackles the type of 
Involvement in  fisheries management.  If 
we eliminate the polar extremes (e.g., 
dictatorlal management by government or 
self-management). most researchers dealing 
with  this  issue  distinguish  between 
consultative management and cooperative 
co-management (e.g.,  McGoodwln 1990). 
Consultatlve management would involve 
establishment of  government entitles which 
would consult with fishers' organizations 
before and during the preparation of 
management plans. The content, style and 
frequency of  consultation will, of  course. 
vary  from  system  to  system.  Co- 
management is succlnctly defined by 
Plnkerton  (1  992) as '...power-sharing  in 
the exercise of resource management 
between a government agency and a 
community or organhtion of  stakeholders." 
The realization of  this concept also Includes 
several variables such as content, structure. and most importantly, degree of  power 
sharing. For example, a precise description 
of  any system of co-management must 
evaluate  the  degree  of  rights  and 
responsibilities of both the government and 
the fisher organization with respect to 
information  generation,  rulemaking, 
surveillance and enforcement. Given the 
growing support For  some type of  co- 
management (Pinierton 1989a;  McGoodwin 
1990),  it will be the focus of this paper. 
The  next question involves the type of 
organization. While various types of or- 
ganizations such as  nongovernmental or- 
ganizations (NGOs) (Thomas-Slayter 1992), 
regional native associations (Anders and 
Langdon 1989),  fishers' wives' associations 
(Biro 1993)  and others (Pinkerton 1989a, 
1992;  McGoodwin 1990)  have been sug- 
gested as facilitators for people's partici- 
pation in  resource management, numer- 
ous researchers have provided evidence 
suggesting that fishers' cooperative-type 
assoclatlons'  are appropriate for this ac- 
tivity  (eg., McCay  1980: Berkes  1986; 
Jentoft 1989; Bailey and JentoFt 1990). 
Although this suggestion has detractors 
and potential problems (cf. Kearney 1985; 
McGoodwin  1990), it  should be taken 
seriously for two important reasons. First, 
some management plans about to  be irn- 
plernented (e.g.,  the Lingayen Gulf Coastal 
Area Management Plan) include the use 
of fishers' organizations (NEDA 1992). 
Second,  the  fishers' cooperative Is  perhaps 
the most widespread and best known formal 
organization among fishers worldwide. 
'in many countries, cooperatives are subject to regu- 
iatlons which,  in some cases,  are viewed  as  too 
restrlctlve by fishers. As a means oFob:ainlng  some 
of the benefits of a cooperative orga~iidlon  wlth- 
out the restrlctlons, they sometlrnes create fishers' 
associations whlch perform many of the same functions 
as  cooperatives. in this paper, the term "coopera- 
tive" includes both formal and cooperative-type as- 
sociations. 
Jentoft (1  989), basing his position on 
an extensive literature review and his own 
research experience, argued that fishers' 
cooperatives provide an excellent organi- 
zational framework for their participation 
in the management process. He did, how- 
ever, indicate that the involvement of fishers 
through cooperatives does  not guarantee 
successhd management: that perceptions 
of  "unfairness" and conflicts can develop 
among flshers within and among coop- 
eratives; and that the level of success of a 
cooperative as  a functioning organization 
Influences its  effectiveness as an entity 
involved in management. 
Facto~  potentially influenc/ng the 
success of  flshers' organizations 
It is  essential to keep in mind the final 
point mentioned above when assessing 
the potential of  fishers' cooperatives in 
management, for two major reasons. 
First,  one frequently finds inaccurate 
statistics concerning the level ~Fwoperative 
development in many countries. There are 
many reasons for these inaccuracies (see 
Pollnac 1987),  but it should suffice to  note 
that this author has spent much time in 
developing countries, bouncing over back 
roads in search of "on paper" fishers' co- 
operatives only to And  an empty build- 
ing, rumors of "managers" who ran off with 
the funds, or nothing at all.  Hence, be- 
fore deciding to  use fishers' cooperatives 
as a basis for  people's participation  in 
management, It  will  be essential to go 
beyond government reports on the exist- 
ence of  the organizations and determine 
their present 'levels of effectiveness as  well 
as  structural capability to  take on the ad- 
ditional effort and responsibility of involve- 
ment in management. This may seem ob- 
vious, but  I have observed fisheries de- 
velopment projects based on nonexistent, 
"on paper" fishers' cooperatives. Second, fishers' cooperatives are noto- 
riously difficult to  develop (Pollnac 1988, 
1991). In many areas,  the failure rate is 
so high that the reputation of the institu- 
tion has been damaged.2This suggests that 
special care must be taken in projects  aimed 
at developing fishers'  cooperatives to 
enhance people's participation In  manage- 
ment. 
Research to determine factom 
Influencing the success  or failure 
of flshetx' cooperatives 
A fair amount of literature reviews case 
studles and research on factors influenc- 
ing  the success or fallure of  fishers' coop- 
eratives (e.g.. JentoH 1986: Pollnac 1988, 
1991  ; Meynell 1990). Most of the case 
studles and research Involved  -individual 
cooperatives or reviews of case studles 
which were difficult to compare due to 
dikrlng  research approaches and lack of 
systematic data collection (e.g..  different 
researchers focusing on  and recording dif- 
ferent categories of data). Only recently 
have researchers gone to the field and 
systematically gathered cornparable data 
from a reasonably large sample of  fishers' 
cooperatives (see Poggie et al. 1888; Lubls 
1990.  1992;  Poggie and Pollnac  1991; 
Pollnac et dl.  1991  ;  Meynell 1990). These 
studies have systematically and quantita- 
tively Identified  numerous factors influencing 
the relative success or failure of fishers' 
cooperatives. These same factors need to 
be evaluated concerning existing and pro- 
posed organhtlons to be used to facili- 
tate people's participation in  fisheries man- 
agement. 
IFor example. In lndonesla the flshers' cooperatlve 
Koperasl Unlt Desa-Mlna, referred to by Its lnltlals 
KUD, also stands for ketua uang dulu (head [of the 
cooperatlve] gets the money flrst) or kemana uang 
desa (where dld the vlllage money go?). 
Evaluatlng Fishers' 
Cooperatives 
This section focuses on  aspects of  evalu- 
ating fishers' cooperatives as facilitators 
for people's participation In the Fisheries 
management process. In  situations where 
the organizations are in the process of 
formation, it is Important to  evaluate the 
plans in  terms of factors known to influ- 
ence relative success of fishers' coopera- 
tives. Where there are pre-existing coop- 
eratlves, current organlzational effective- 
ness needs to  be assessed along with evdu- 
atlon of factors that can be used to pre- 
dict sustainablllty of the organlzntion.  If 
the organizations are, or can be predicted 
to be relatively successful, they must be 
assessed as to  whether they could or should 
be used to  facilitate people's participation 
In  the management process. 
Cooperative success 
Review of  project documents and other 
published literature led Pollnac ( 1  988) to 
develop a checklist For fishers' organizational 
development composed of 29  distlnct 
categories of information. He concluded 
that characterlstics of the occupation of 
marine  capture fishing  Influence  sociocultural 
aspects of  fishing communities that result 
in  the need for organizational development 
methods different From those used for other 
occupatlonal subgroups, such as Farmers. 
The literature review (Pollnac 1988) w,&, 
in  part, funded by the Unlted Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization's  Fisheries 
Department,  which commissioned  13 
authors In 1  1 developing countries to 
prepare case studles of 1 failed and I 
successful flshers' organlation, resulting 
in 26 case studies.  Each case study was 
conducted using a slmllar format and 
detalled  questlonnalre  to  facllltate 
comparison. Many of the data categorles 
In the questlonnalre paralleled those identified by  Pollnac (1988),  and the results 
of  the data analysis, for  the most  part, 
confirmed his conclusions (Meynell 1990). 
These conclusions were tested more rig- 
orously in  a comparative analysis of  fac- 
tors influencing  the success or failure of 
48 fishers' cooperatives In Ecuador (Poggie 
et al. 1  988;  Poggie and Pollnac 1 99  1 ;  Pollnac 
et al. 1891).  This type of  analysis control- 
led  For  variance in  national government 
factors (e.g., legislation governing coop- 
eratives, number of  agencies  involved, 
degree of  government involvement, etc.; 
see Pollnac 1988) and minimlzed variance 
in  the cultural context. The sample of  co- 
operatives also included shrimp mariculture 
cooperatives,  allowi~g  tests of hypotheses 
concerning influence of  aspects of  the 
occupation of  marine capture fishing on 
organization formation. Finally, the meas- 
urement of degree of  cooperative success 
went beyond the dichotomy of  failure or 
success. Degree of  success manifested a 
range of values, being based on factor scores 
derived from a factor analysis of  seven 
indicators of  cooperative success. 
Briefly, Pollnac et al. (1981) collected 
informatlon From 48 fishers' cooperatives 
along the coast of Ecuador. Information 
included 17 items concerning community 
context (e.g., types of  services, schools, 
health care): 17 items about material prop- 
erty of the cooperative (e.g.. boats, mo- 
tors, types of  facilities); 18  items reflect- 
ing the operating style of  the organiza- 
tion (e.g., behavior of  members, charac- 
teristics of administrators, functions);  and 
7 items indicating relative success. 
Each  category of  items was factor- 
analyzed to determine if Interrelationships 
among individual  items reflected  some 
underlying commonality. The community 
context, cooperative material and oper- 
ating style Items were reduced to two di- 
menslons each: basic arid advanced de- 
velopment context: producthe and facilities 
cooperative material items; and manage- 
rial  and social solidarity operating char- 
acteristics. As discussed above, the fac- 
tor analysis of  the cooperative success 
Indicators resulted  in one factor. These 
analyses resulted in one dependent and 
six independent variables. 
Zero-order  correlations among these 
variables indicated that among shrimp 
culture cooperatives, entrepreneurial rnan- 
agement style was the most important 
predictor of  cooperative success followed 
by  activities promoting social solidarity, 
then productive equipment. Other vari- 
ables were not significantly related to suc- 
cess. Among capture fishers' cooperatives. 
factors promoting social solidarity (meetings, 
social events, etc.) were most important, 
followed by  facilities. It is important to note 
that facilities  promoted solidarity by making 
the cooperative a convenient place for 
socializing (e.g.. furniture. TV,  toilet, lights). 
Other variables, examined one at a time, 
(e.g.. community context, productive equip- 
ment and entrepreneurial management 
style)  were not statistically significant pre- 
dictors of success for capture fishers' co- 
operatives. Best subset regression analy- 
sis, which accounts for interrelationships 
among the independent variables, Indicated 
that the best combination of  variables for 
predicting success of  both types of  coop- 
eratives was the managerial and social 
solidarity operatlng styles. However, while 
social solidarity operating style accounted 
for 52% of  the variance in success of  cap- 
ture fisheries cooperatives, it contributed 
only 15%  with respect to shrimp culture 
cooperatives, again indicating the impor- 
tance of  fostering social solidarity among 
capture fishers. In  contrast, managerial 
operating style accounted for only 7% of 
the variance in  success of  capture flsher- 
les cooperatives. 
The  findings  confirm  many  of  the 
conclusions in  Pollnac (1988),  as well as 
the basic argument that psychocultural 
adaptation to the occupation of  capture 
fishing  selects  a  personality  profile 
emphasizing self-reliance and independence -factors  antithetical to  effective cooperative 
membership unless corrective measures 
are taken. These measures could include 
tralnlng and development of activities and 
facilities to  promote social solidarity. Most 
importantly, however, the more rigorous 
approach permits one  to  assess the relative 
slgniRcance of  different factors  contributing 
to cooperative success or failure. .For 
example, It  is  argued that emphasis on 
factors Influencing soclal solidarity Is  most 
essential for establishing capture fisheries 
cooperatives. Such recomrnendatlons can 
result in more efficient allocation OF scarce 
development funds. 
The foregolng discussion of  cooperative 
success has two purposes. The first, and 
most obvious. Is  to delineate the factors 
useful for evaluation of these organizations. 
The second, and less obvious, is to Illus- 
trate the type of methodologies necessary 
for a more rigorous understanding of fac- 
tors Influencing the successful use of Fishers' 
cooperatives. 
Thus far.  I am aware of only one rigor- 
ous. comparative research project inves- 
tigating factors influencing people's par- 
ticipation in a marine management issue, 
1.e.. in  1 1 estuary management programs 
In  the United States (Imperial  1993). A 
sample of respondents from each program 
(ems.,  program managers, publlc particl- 
pation coordinators and cltlzen advisory 
committee chairmen) completed a ques- 
tionnalre concerning aspects of  the pro- 
gram, including outreach activitles and 
perceptions of degree and effectiveness 
of publlc participation. Contextual variables 
such as population density, percent of urban 
land use, surface water area, dralnage area. 
were also examined for their effects. 
While not definitive. Imperial's (1993) 
research Is  a first step in the rlght direc- 
tion, and Illustrates the type of research 
necessary for the Issues we are address- 
ing here. The remainder of  this paper will 
outline the elements to be considered In 
developing research for investigating f.rs 
lnfluencing success of  the use of fishers' 
cooperatives. 
Research Needs 
Good quantitative research rests on a 
foundation of careful qualitative research. 
As with the identification of factors Influ- 
encing the success oFfishersr  cooperatives, 
early comments concerning use of  coop- 
eratives in management were anecdotal, 
after the fact, unsystematic interpretations. 
Jentoft (1989)  made a first step from the 
anecdotal to the analytical by reviewing 
the literature and conducting unstructured 
Interviews to identify factors facilitating 
or inhibiting the involvement of  flshers' 
cooperatives in co-ma~gement.~  Jentoft's 
(1989) summary of  critical factors facill- 
tating involvement include the: (1  ) exlst- 
ence of legislation delegating to flshers' 
organizntions the responsiblllty and au- 
thority to  implement and enforce regula- 
tlons; (2)  relatively small organizntlonal scale 
in  terms of  size of  membership and re- 
gional scope; (3) socioeconomic homo- 
geneity of the organization's members; (4) 
tradition of cooperation and collective action 
among  members; (5)  fishers' degree oftrust 
in organizations; (6)  existence of long-term, 
multifaceted Interactions among members 
or proposed members; (7)  multiple func- 
tions performed by the  organization (e.g.. 
marketing, supply. as  well as  co-manage- 
ment): and (8)  nonincremental as opposed 
to  Incremental Introduction of  the co-man- 
agement Function. 
The eight factors mentioned above have 
been derived From case studies involving 
co-management with fishers' cooperative- 
type organbtions.  If the measure of success 
3Not all of Jentoft's  case studles were strlctly co- 
operatlve-type organlzatlons. The  flshers' organl- 
zatlons  In the  Lofoten flsherles were comrnlttees 
formed spedflcally for  management purposes (Jentoft 
and KrlstofFersen 1989). will  rely  on co-management, factors 
facilitating co-management,  irrespective 
of organizational  base, should also be 
examined in a research framework. Pinkerton 
(1  989b) derived 20 propositions concerning 
successful co-management in fisheries from 
the case studies found in her book (Pinkerton 
1989a). Those not overlapping with the 
factors above are summarized below.4 
According to  Pinkerton (1989b),  favorable 
preconditions for co-management include: 
(I) a perceived crisis in  stock depletion 
on the part of Fishers and government: and 
(2)  a situation where fishers are willing to 
contribute financially. The best mechanisms 
and conditions for co-management con- 
sist of: (3)  returning some of the wealth 
generated to  the communities involved; 
(4) using the same mechanisms to con- 
serve and enhance both the fisheries and 
the cultural system: and (5)  involving ex- 
ternal support and forums for discussion 
(e.g., nongovernmental, for example, uni- 
versity scientists) In co-management. Co- 
management operates best where (6)  gov- 
ernment bureaucracy is  small with a re- 
gional or local mandate; (7) boundaries 
can be clearly defined resulting in clarity 
of membership and effective application 
of allocations and regulations; (8)  crew as 
well as skippers belong to  the managing 
body; (9)  there is a higher authority to  appeal 
to on questions concerning local equity: 
( 10) bureaucrats have direct Industry ex- 
perlence and willingly work with fishers: 
(1  1)  technical concerns such as  stock site 
are separated from alloation decisions when 
there  are  more  than  one group  of 
stakeholders; (1  2) but both are made on 
the same level when one large group is 
involved; (1  3) opportunities exist for ln- 
formal problem solving among multlple 
stakeholders; (1  4) "...a culturally cohesive 
4Fa~tors  1, 2. 3 and 8 derived from Jentoft  (1989) 
overlap wlth proposltlons 4. 8. and 9. 11 and 3, 
respectively. as  orlglnally numbered In Plnkerton 
(1  989b). 
group  practices self-regulation, the use of 
individual quotas may be an acceptable 
management tool,  if accepted cultural 
rrrechanisms rather than the market are  used 
for allocatlng and transferring quotas." 
Finally, several of the case studies clearly 
demonstrate that ( 1 5) "...motivations  and 
attitudes of key individuals can make or 
break co-management ..." and there is a 
need for constant pressure by a core of 
one  or more dedicated individuals. 
Several other researchers' observations 
can supplement Pinkerton's ( 1989b) Ilst. 
In a review of problems involved In  insti- 
tuting fisheries co-management, Felt ( 1990) 
also listed a number of  factors influenc- 
ing its success. Among those not sirnllar 
to the above, Felt (1890) suggested that 
successhl co-management is  positively 
related to  the: (1  ) amount of decisionmaking 
authority granted to partlclpants: (2)  de- 
gree of  equity in  allocation of  cost and 
restrictions among  participants; (3)  degree 
of involvement in  enforcement: and (4) 
amount of  agreement In  the content of 
regulations and participants' perceptions 
of the phenomena being regulated. As  an 
additional factor, Doulrnan (1993) stated 
that community-based management sys- 
tems may be least effective in  urban ar- 
eas where customary practices have been 
weakened  by inward migration. Flnally, 
Pomeroy (  1 99  1 ) pointed out  that the short- 
run, survlval strategy of many subslstence- 
level fishers, although rational given their 
clrcumstances, is antithetical to manage- 
ment directed at  long-run productlvily of 
the resource. In thls type of fisheries, co- 
management schemes  will be more diffi- 
cult to Implement. 
Some  of the proposed relationships listed 
above deserve further comment. While most 
of  the factors Identified by Jentoft (1  989) 
as  influencing the success of flshers'  or- 
ganizations in co-management parallel those 
affecting the relative success of fishers' 
organlzatlons In  general (Pollnac 1988). 
two factors differ. First, It is suggested that multipllclty of functions beyond co-man- 
agement would serve to reinforce the 
management function. It has been argued 
elsewhere (Jentoft 1986;  Pollnac 1988)  that 
multiplicity of  functions in fishers' organi- 
zations can lead to  increased complexity 
and  conflicts that could alienate members. 
Perhaps there is  a nonlinear relationship 
between organizational  success in  co- 
management and multiple functions-as 
the number of  functions Increases,  the 
degree  of success rises up  to  a certain point, 
then beglns to fall. For example, perhaps 
only one or two functions in addition to 
co-management are  advisable. Beyond that 
relatively small number, the added corn- 
plexlty may lead to failure. This is an em- 
pirical question that can only be resolved 
through further research. 
Second Is  the incremental Issue.  One 
case study revlewed by Jentoft (1  989) 
suggested that Incremental implementa- 
tion of co-management through fishers' 
organitatlons may result in its operation 
In a dysfunctional or  hostile environment. 
It is not clear if Jentoft referred to a social 
environment turned hostile by an island 
of  co-management or to micro-envlron- 
mental differences (socioeconomic, cultural, 
physical, etc.)  whlch may affect implemen- 
tat10.n.  If  it was the former, the  degree of 
isolation of  the community would be an 
important consideratlon. Otherwise, with 
the latter, there is clearly a need for quan- 
titative analysis of  these environmental 
factors influencing implementation success. 
In thls author's view, both aspects require 
attention. 
Another essential consideration for co- 
operative success in co-management im- 
plicit in Jenfoft's (1989)  review is the de- 
gree  of an  organization's freedom to fine- 
tune  the  management options. Jentoft  and 
Krlstoffersen ( 1989)  noted that one  of  the 
sallent features of the Lofoten (an island 
group  in Norway) fisheries  co-management 
system Is  Its  adaptability to local  varia- 
tions and flexiblllty In response to chang- 
ing conditlons. The degree of  adaptabil- 
ity obviously depends on the specificity 
and flexlblllty of  government guldelines 
and/or directives wlthin which the  organi- 
zation must work.  It Is  unrealistic to as- 
sume  that the  government would delegate 
all management responsibility to the  flshers 
with no guidelines whatsoever.= 
More explicitly, Ruddle (1  987)  noted that 
the rules and regulations for fisheries co- 
operative  associations set  by the  Japanese 
Mlnistry of  Agriculture, Forestry, and Fish- 
eries permit a wide latitude for Interpre- 
tation, facilitating adaptation to local needs 
and fisheries conditions. Both the  Lofoten 
and Japanese cases suggest that the de- 
gree of  specificity and flexlblllty of  gov- 
ernment guidelines is  an important vari- 
able wlth a potential impact on the suc- 
cess of  flshers' organizations involved In 
co-management. 
Excluslvlty  in  fishing rights was men- 
tioned by Jentoft (I  989) but not one of 
the  critical variables in his conclusion. Clearly. 
exclusivity in flshing rights would act as  a 
powerful incentive to join the  cooperative; 
nevertheless, mere existence of  a coop- 
erative does  not guarantee either successful 
cooperation among fishers or successful 
co-management. It could, however. be a 
beginning (Ruddle 1987), as well as in- 
fluence members' willingness to  manage 
S~s  evldence accumulated. some researchers (e.g., 
McCay and Acheson 1987; Cordell 1989; McGoodwln 
1990; Pollnac and Poggle 1991 :  Ruddle et al. 1992) 
questioned the ldeallstlc assumptlons In the early 
1980s on the ablllty of lndlgenous peuples or local 
cornrnunltles to  manage thelr  marine resources. 
Although some of the early  optlmlsm on the po- 
tentlal of ttadltlonal marine management was gcn- 
erated from a study of Occanla (Johannes  1978). a 
look at the archaeology of the Paclflc provldes ex- 
tensive evldence of the negative Impacts of pre- 
hlstorlc peoples on the flora and fauna of thelr en- 
vironments (e.g.. Cassels 1984;  Klrch 1984. 1985: 
Dye and ~t&dman 1990). Thls Is not meant to Im- 
ply that the various forms of self-  or w-manage- 
ment will not work; It merely suggests the need 
for  more research and a cautlous approach. the resource (Miller 1989). Miller (1  989). 
however, cautioned that exclusive access 
can be affected by technological changes 
as  well as by-catch, especially where ex- 
clusive access to  a specific species is granted 
in an environment of open access to  other 
species. Impacts of technological changes 
on use rights have also been noted by several 
other researchers  (e.g., Akimichi  1984; 
Matsuda and Kaneda 1984: Ohtsuka and 
Kuchikura  1984: Pollnac 1984). Finally, 
Pollnac ( 1984)  reviewed evidence indicatlng 
that changes in  levels of commercializa- 
tion; human populatlon density; occupa- 
tion structure: environmental features In- 
fluencing boundary definition; and species 
composition and distribution can  have eficts 
on use rights. Dahl (1988) provided fur- 
ther evidence emphasizing the Importance 
of  some  of these variables. Hence, if  some 
form of  exclusivity  in  use rights will  be 
part of  the co-management scheme, all 
these  variables must be considered as having 
potential Impacts on the system. 
Although not corroborated  by  a case 
study, lentoft (1989)  also suggested that 
the more organizations involved, the fewer 
the functions that can be delegated. Thls 
was based on the assumptlon that large 
numbers of organizations with many re- 
source management functions would in- 
crease the probability of interorganizational 
conflict. I  would assume that the probability 
of conflict is  related to the density of or- 
ganizations in terms of the dispersal of the 
target resource(s).  This is again an empirical 
questlon for further research. 
The variables derived from the litera- 
ture reviewed above are organized Into 
the categorles' organizational  context. 
membership and structure in Appendix 1. 
These same  varlables can be organized into 
the research  framework suggested by 
Pomeroy (1  993).  It can  be  argued that these 
predictor variables should be considered 
in all attempts  to  develop co-management 
programs with fishers' cooperatives. Per- 
haps a stronger argument is that we  should 
conduct quantitative analysis of these various 
predictors in terms of both their interre- 
lationships and relative  importance in 
determining the relative success of  such 
co-management programs. 
The first step  in this type of analysis would 
be  to  operationalize the independent and 
dependent variables. In  some cases, this 
would  be relatively  simple; e.g.,  crew 
members either are or are not members 
of the managing body-a  simple dichotomy: 
the size of the management area can be 
relatively easily quantified in terms of square 
kilometers, etc. In  other cases, e.g.. ho- 
mogeneity of membership, measurement 
would be a bit more difficult. Cultural het- 
erogeneity might be measured  by the 
number of ethnic groups or relative sizes 
of  different groups; economic heteroge- 
neity on the basis of income distributlons: 
technological heterogeneity by dlstribu- 
tions of  different gear types within the 
organization, etc. Cohesiveness of  social 
systems would be relatively  difficult to 
operationalize,  and would probably  be 
measured on an ordinal scale (e.g.,  slightly, 
moderately or extensively cohesive). The 
variables must be operatlonalized, how- 
ever, in a manner that allows for reliable 
comparisons among cases. 
The dependent variable, success in co- 
rmnagement, could be measured on a xale 
(or scales) derived from the ten items sug- 
gested by Pinkerton (1  989b).  These items 
could be operationalized and factor analyzed 
like the cooperative success scale discussed 
above (see  Pollnac et  al. 1991)  or used as 
ten independent indicators of success. In 
addition; it would probably be advisable 
to  append a success measure deallng with 
the status of the resource, e.g.. its main- 
tenance or Improvement since that is the 
primary objective of resource management. 
Drawing the sample for such a  study 
would be an interesting problem. The first 
wmpling universe that comes to mind is 
the thousands of inshore fishers' coopera- 
tlves in Japan.  There, certain variables would apparently be held constant (q.g., cultural 
homogenelty, legislation) whlle others 
would vary (e.g., size and density of co- 
operatives, technological heterogeneity, 
etc.). This would permit a study compa- 
rable to the cooperative studies  conducted 
In  Ecuador (Pollnac  et al. 1991  ) and Indo- 
nesia (Lubis 1992). Another approach, whlch 
could maximize variance on the leglsla- 
tive and cultural varlables, would  be to 
select case studies from various regions 
around the world, as was done for the 
Meyncll ( 1990) analysis. Finally, where a 
project is being implemented, a monitor- 
ing and evaluation program targeting Iden- 
tified variables would provide compara- 
ble data across areas Involved in the project. 
Quantitative analysis of  factors influencing 
the success of  flsherles co-management 
using fishers' cooperative-type organiza- 
tions will  allow one to determine devel- 
opment tactics that need to be empha- 
sized under differing circumstances. Thus. 
scarce development funds may  be allo- 
cated more appropriately. "Muddling 
through" Is acceptable where project wsts 
are relatlvely low (in comparison to avail- 
able funds and personnel) and the scope 
is relatively narrow (e.g..  one fishery In  a 
small region); It  Is less easily justified when 
costs are relatively high and the scope is 
grand (e.g., involving 15 or 20 coopera- 
tives spread across a relatively large re- 
gion). In  the latter case, focus on factors 
(or  combinations of  factors) with the highest 
probablllty of  success is the most rational 
approach, as well as being the one most 
likely to be funded. Only research, such 
as that descrlbed above, will  furnish the 
information necessary for this type of  ap- 
proach. 
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Appendix 1. Factors potentially Influencing success or fallure of co- 
management systems using fishers' cooperative-type organizations. 
1,  Organizational context 
Enabling legislation 
-  Degree of generality and flexibility 
-  Exclusivit  in fishing rights  -  Amount o !  decisionmaking authority granted to participants 
-  Fisher involvement in enforcement 
-  Distinctness of boundary definition 
Perceived crisis in stock depletion 
Small government bureaucracy with a local or regional mandate 
Tradition of cooperation and collective action 
Bureaucrats with industry experience willing to work with fishers 
Degree of urbanization 
Degree of dependence on fisheries for survival 
Technology 
Population density 
Species composition and distribution 
Level of commercialization 
Occupation structure 
Environmental features influencing boundary definition 
2.  Membership 
Homo  eneity of membership  B  Fishers degree of trust in organizations 
Long-term,.multifaceted interaction among members 
Both crew and skippers as members 
Dedication of core mdividuals 
Financial contribution by fishers 
3.  Structure 
a.  Organization 
Organizational scale 
Multiplicity of organization's functions b.  Decisionmaking 
Nonincremental introduction of management function 
Use of external support and forums for comanagement 
Higher authority for questions involving local equity 
Technical concerns such as stock size separated from allocation decisions 
where more than one group of stakeholders are involved 
Technical concerns such as stock size made on same level as allocation 
decisions when one large group is involved 
Opportunity for informal problem solving among multiple stakeholders 
c.  Regulations resulting from co-management 
Mechanism for returning some benefits to involved community 
Use of same mechanisms to enhance the fisheries and the culture 
Use of individual quotas within a culturally cohesive group with allocation 
and transferability based on accepted cultural mechanisms rather than 
the market 
Degree of equity in allocation of cost and restrictions 
Agreement between regulations and fisher's perceptions Towards  an Integrated Community Management 
of  Coastal Fisheries 
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Intraductlon 
I 
n the recent past, there had been a va- 
riety of initiatives aimed at creating an 
awareness about the necessity of instl- 
tutions at the community level for sus- 
tainable development and management 
of  natural resources. The call for community 
development and management of  coastal 
fisheries is but a specific case of  this rapldly 
growing global preoccupation. 
Based on my  academic background and 
experience as  a social activist working 
with coastal fishing comrnunlties.  1 want 
to  stress that integrated community man- 
agement of coastal fisheries can be as- 
sured only by (1  ) a rebuilding  of  the 'com- 
munity"  in coastal villages and (2) the 
simultaneous and conscious multisectoral 
and transnational awareness and action 
on the ecological and econornlc fronts. 
The primary reason for this Is that the 
"community" referred to has undergone 
significant socioeconomic and cultural 
metamorphosis as a result of "Incorpo- 
ration" into larger national and interna- 
tional ecological and economic processes. 
We are therefore talking about a "com- 
munity" which has significantly altered 
its relationships both withln and with- 
out. It also continues to  be in a process 
of dynamlc transition. 
Consequently, this paper Is structured 
along the following lines: first, a sketchy 
generallzntion  of  what the early community 
was probably like: second, a brief history 
ofthe incorporation process and the resultant 
breakdown of community in the coastal 
villages; and third, the efforts taken to 
revive small-scale coastal nshing. Finally, 
measures are recommended to redefine 
and rebulld the community which will take 
the new initiatives for an integrated and sustalnable community management of 
coastal fisheries. 
Early Communlty 
The Asia-Pacific region has had a long 
history of maritime contacts for trade. It 
was  the  sea-the  samudrwhich  brought 
the old societies in the region closer to- 
gether. I have argued elsewhere that such 
a  maritime tradition must have had its 
origin In the  humbler occupation of coastal 
fishing. These maritime contacts have left 
their mark on many coastal fishing com- 
munities. The most obvious of these was 
the  strong exotic element In the craft and 
gear  designs  of many artisanal Bshlng com- 
munities in the region (Kurien 1990); 
It can be argued that coastal commu- 
nities of the reglon had earlier been more 
open to influences from other societies 
across the  sea  and relatively less to  their 
own land-based  neighboring communi- 
ties. This latter phenomenon is more pro- 
nounced in large nonisland societies like 
India. 
This isolation and the compulsions of 
a maritime occupation created a special 
psyche and culture among these com- 
munities, thus retarding their integration 
into the  sociocultural and ecopolitical main- 
stream of land-based society. 
There was  possibly a time in Asian so- 
cieties when small communities were au- 
tonomously in control of the ownership 
and use of wastal fisheries resources through 
various institutional  forms. The lnstitu- 
tlons were probably not all very egali- 
tarian, yet It  is  certain that due to so- 
cially sanctioned community caring and 
sharing mechanisms, no  one  was too  poor 
or destitute. 
The Asian  reality  of today is  remote 
frorn these idyllic village societies. However, 
the revival of some  of these  communltarlan 
dimensions is still possible in some "is- 
lands". 
lncorporatlon and Breakdown 
of  Comrnunlty 
The process of lncorporatlon into the 
large socioeconomic fabric was lnltially 
primarily through the trade of the out- 
put of the  sector-the  fish. Fishers could 
not llve by thls perishable commodity alone. 
A fisher who netted more than two flsh 
had a 'surplus".  The compulsion for trade 
thus came  very early In the  development 
of the productive forces. 
With the advent of independence and 
the modem state  In  most developing Aslan 
countrles, the coastal fisheries were con- 
sidered 'backward"  and sought to be 
"modernized" through a variety of means. 
As a result, the incorporation process was 
hastened through the input markets. The 
most popular of these  were the  introduction 
of mechanized crafts and the use of ny- 
lon for net construction. This big dose of 
capital was infused into the traditional 
artisanal fishery presumably to rake the 
'productlon  of flsh for food by exploit- 
ing deeper  waters more efficiently"' (Platteau 
1  989). 
In general, these new technologies were 
introduced without due  recognition of the 
existing artisanal fishlng methods or the 
traditional community instltutlons whlch 
held the  key to  the customary-use rights 
of the coastal commons. This new pro- 
duction-oriented approach to fisheries de- 
velopment introduced a strong element 
of  multisectoral linkages between the fish- 
eries and the  other sectors  of the  national 
and transnational economies. 
It is important to  note that the Intended 
objectives  of  the new development 
'Much of thls modem "hardware"  was state-sponsored 
and came largely frorn outslde the developlng Aslan 
wuntrles--Germany.  Norway, Canada and Japan, 
to name a few. Rarely, If ever, were these Inputs 
accornpanled by the "software" of the manage- 
ment rneasures/lnstltutions  whlch existed In these 
countries. programs went adriff in most Asian countries 
around the 1960s. One common factor 
can be Isolated for thls: the strong  market 
compulsions resulted  In  a continuing 
demand for prawns for exp~rt.~ 
This new productlon and export -ori- 
entation also caused a major change in 
the property reglme of the coastal wa- 
ters: what was untll  then consldered a 
"community heritage" was converted into 
an 'open-access"  realm.3 The main ben- 
eficlarles were lnvestors from outside the 
fishlng communities  who  were best able 
to control and manage these new capl- 
td-intenstve technologies for fish harvesting. 
Consequently, the pace and direction 
of coastal fisheries in developing Asia were 
thereafter largely determined by  two 
exogenous factors: investors from out- 
slde the  coastal flshlng communities, and 
the demands and preferences of the de- 
veloped world. 
The incorporation process through the 
market was nearly total. Fishing villages 
In Isolated parts of South and Southeast 
Asia were Instantly "Ilnked" to  japan and 
the  Unlted States the moment they net- 
ted prawns (shrimp), even if they con- 
tinued to  use the most rudimentary craft 
and gear. 
By  the mid-1970s and well into the 1980s, 
the coastal waters of  Asia were ridden 
with physical and socloecological con- 
fllcts between the vast majority of fish- 
ers from coastal communities who con- 
tinued to  use artisanal technologies and 
=There had been a thrlvlng trade In  dried prawns 
among Aslan countries prlor to World War  II, but 
thls never resulted In a contlnuing demand for prawns 
alone. Prawns were earller harvested uslng gill nets. 
enclrcllng nets and trammel nets In the seasons 
when they came up to the surface coastal waters 
From thelr usual habltat at the bottom. 
many AsIan coastal flshlng communlties, a rich 
traditlon consldered the coastal waters the herlt- 
age of "the dead, the Iivlng and those yet to be 
born". 
the operators of larger mechanized boats, 
partlcularly trawlers (Kurlen 199  1  ). 
An important dlmenslon of these  conflicts. 
not usually hlghllghted. is that thelr in- 
tenslty and ramifications depended largely 
on who were the owners and operators 
of  the larger wssels. Across Asia, the  owners 
were rarely actlve fishers from coastal flshlng 
communlties. They were generally flsh 
merchants, Investors from outside the  fish- 
erles sector or  nonfishers from among the 
coastal vlllage communities. The owners 
were mostly nationals but often from an 
ethnlc group different from the coastal 
communltles. 
The crew of the mechanized vessels 
belonged to diverse soclo-occupational 
groups in the economy but often came 
from the coastal cornmunitles themselves. 
The most common crew  composition was 
a mix of  skilled workers ftom coastal fishing 
communities and the relatively less skllled 
peasants and/or indigenous peoples of 
different ethnlc backgrounds. 
These new ownership and occupatlonal 
patterns have brought many socioeco- 
nomic changes Into coastal fishing com- 
rnunltles and deprived them of  their earller 
relatively greater community harmony and 
equality. 
Consequently, the often-mentioned "con- 
flicts between the coastal small-scale fish- 
ermen and the trawlers", were not with- 
out contradictlons from the perspective 
of the coastal communlties. Moreover. 
the inequalities in wealth and income be- 
tween the coastal fishworkers and the 
owners and operators of trawlers exac- 
erbated social tensions on land. 
In  most countries, the state had been 
inclined to  view these conflicts at sea and 
on land as 'law  and order issue." They 
were rarely percelved as an expression 
of dissent against a distorted fisheries de- 
velopment process which deprived the 
coastal artisanal flshing communities of 
their commons and resulted in deprlva- 
tion not previously experienced by them. In  the ultimate analysis, the conflicts 
also  reflected  the  breakdown  of 
"community" in the coastal fishing villages. 
Revlvlng Small-scale 
Fisherles 
The late 1970s  and the early 1980s- 
that is, the middle of the phase of con- 
flicts in the fish economies of the region- 
saw  a revival of academic Interest in small- 
scale coastal fisheries. The most concerted 
effort in  this realm has emanated from 
the International Center for Living Aquatic 
Resources Management, thanks to the 
perseverance of our late friend Ian R. Smith 
and his colleagues. The Food and Agri- 
culture Organization (FAO)  which had earlier 
given technical assistance for the mod- 
ernization programs in Asia also took an 
interest in the said revival (Smith 1979; 
Panayotou 1982).  International donor agen- 
cies began to  review their assistance pro- 
grams  and sought  to  give a greater thrust 
to  funding which explicitly promoted small- 
scale Fisherles. The 1984 FA0 World Con- 
ference on Fisheries Management and 
Development, though preoccupied with 
the implications of  the United  Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, was 
also pressured From  within and without 
to maice significant pronouncements about 
the status of coastal communltles and the 
role of small-scale fisheries in the future 
strategy for global fisheries management 
and de~elopment.~ 
A closer look at  these concerns shows 
that with a few outstanding exceptions, 
the emphasis was entirely on the Issue 
of scale alone. Concretely it merely meant 
4Paraliel to thls was  a conference of  100 smaii- 
scale fishworkers and thelr supporters from 34 countries 
which highlighted the plight of coastal communi- 
ties and stressed the need to reorient fisheries 
development and management to focus on their 
needs  and aspirations. 
stressing beachlanding craft rather than 
harbor-based vessels or outboard motor- 
fitted canoes instead of large mechanized 
trawlers. There was certainly no appre- 
ciation of the linkages among smallness 
of scale: the nature of  tropical  coastal 
resources; the knowledge systems of coastal 
fishing communities: and their traditional 
sociocultural institutions (Ruddle and 
Johannes 1985). 
Fortunately for us, some of the ency- 
clopedic knowledge of coastal fishlng com- 
munities and their traditional institutions 
for managing their resources as well as 
caring for individuals, have survived through 
the  modernization phase. Quite often, this 
had happened because these communi- 
ties were not Fully "incorporated" into the 
divisive dimensions of modernization, or 
as  in some cases, they were able to "contain" 
modernization within the punriew of their 
earlier institutions. We need to  blend this 
concern for scale with the revival of tra- 
ditional knowledge and community in- 
stitutions to  begin rebuilding community. 
Rebulldlng Communlty 
Given the socioeconomic realities of 
Asia, particularly South Asia, where pressure 
on coastal resources is still on the increase 
and gainful employment opportunities 
outside the fisheries sector are hard to 
come by, it is my assessment that for another 
generation at least, the solution to the 
problems in the coastal fisheries must be 
found largely within the sector itself. 
In the reality which confronts them, fishers 
have devised many individual survival strat- 
egies to keep their necks above water. 
These have taken diverse forms ranging 
from investing in  more fishing assets; 
devising various crew rotation and mu- 
tual assistance measures: taking to de- 
structive fishing; migrating to  other countries 
In  search of jobs;  turning to other sec- 
tors of the economy to  eke out a living: and making efforts to rejuvenate the re- 
source (Kurien 1988). 
Equally important have been their ef- 
forts at  collective action to  pressure the 
state to Intervene, bring order into their 
commons  and initiate measures to  man- 
age the coastal fisheries resources. The 
best examples of  these come from Indo- 
nesia, the Philippines and India. 
There are potentials and limits to  both 
these forms  of action by individuals and 
the state. The evidence, again from In- 
dia and the Philippines, seems  to  be that 
unless there is some form of medlatlon 
between individual and state action, coastal 
fishing communities face a bleak future. 
The basic need of  the times is  there- 
fore to  redefine and rediscover the "com- 
munlty" In coastal fishing villages in the 
context of the socioeconomic and political 
realities. 
It is  very unlikely that all  those who 
llve along the coastal zone today have 
common interests as  regards the coastal 
fisheries and their future. There is thus a 
need to  IdentlFy and bolster a core group 
among these communltles who can be- 
come  the "beacons  and guardians of the 
sea" around whom one can envisage 
concentric  circles of supportive interests. 
At least three supportive  conditions must 
be ensured to  achleve this objectlve: (1) 
aquarlan reform.  (2) community devel- 
opment and (3)  new relationships. 
Aguarlan reform 
A key condition For rebulldlng wmmunlty 
will be the successful lmplementatlon of 
an aquarian reform package. Initially, this 
has four facets. First. the right of  access 
to harvesting technology should be re- 
stricted exdushrely to  fishers. Second, there 
must be a ceiling on  the number of units 
such persons can own. Third,  with an 
increase in the scale and capltal Invest- 
ment In  the harvestlng unlts of such ln- 
dividuals/groups,  their realm of  fishlng 
should be appropriately restricted to  the 
specified area of access In  the exclusive 
economic zone. Fourth, such persons should 
be vested with the right of first sale of 
thelr catch. 
Under the stewardship of such a class 
of workers and owner-workers, the  coastal 
waters can regain their status of  "corn- 
munity property". 
Such rebrrns are  obviously rarely granted 
on a silver platter. They will only mate- 
rlalize if there is sufficient pressure from 
the grass roots. Again the evidence from 
the Philippines and from Kerala State in 
India gives room for optimism. 
Community development 
Rebuilding  community implies not merely 
regaining the rights to  the coastal com- 
mons but also simultaneous action on  the 
socioeconomic development front. 
Despite three to  four decades of con- 
sciously planned development efforts in 
many developing Asian countries, coastal 
fishing  communities continue to  be at  the 
bottom of both the soclai and economic 
ladders. Changlng this situation is imperative 
if the galns from aquarian reforms are to 
be consolidated and sustained into the 
future. 
Spelling out a general strategy to  bridge 
the socioeconomlc gap between fishing 
and other communities would be a  fu- 
tile exercise given the diverse sociopo- 
lltical considerations that determine the 
degrees of  freedom available for actlon 
on these fronts. However, concretely, this 
calls for better organization of  the fish 
marketing activities to be able to earn 
more income: better credit arrangements; 
easier access to  improved education and 
health facilities; and more job-oriented 
skills for the youth and women. 
Based on my personal experiences in 
community development work and an understanding of what Is  happening in 
some  other countrles, It can be said with 
confidence that people-managed and 
people-controlled organizations  supported 
by voluntary agencies are the best bet 
to  achieve a participatory and holistic de- 
velopment process In coastal fishing com- 
munitles. 
This is not to  minimize the role of the 
state  and enlightened public policy In re- 
building community. To achieve this calls 
for a reorientation of fisheries develop- 
ment policy to  focus more on the nature. 
human and social capital in the  sector  and 
less on the manmade capital in the form 
of artifacts alone. 
New relationships 
Rebuilding community is not achieved 
by redefining and changing property re- 
lations and socioeconomic institutions alone. 
Reinstating the relationships of  nurtur- 
ing, caring and sharing among humans 
and nature and among  human kings  them- 
selves is an intrinsic goal of this endeavor. 
In this context I see  a very central role 
for women in the coastal communities, 
particularly those from fishing households. 
Motherhood bestows on women the  very 
special trait of caring without counting 
the cost or being calculative about fu- 
ture returns. Such values are essential to 
underscore the need to  move towards a 
"nurturing, caring and sharing approach" 
to  coastal fisheries. 
Integrated Communlty 
Management 
Integrated community management 
cannot be seen as an isolated project of 
the inhabitants in a series of coastal vil- 
lages who have been able to rebuild a 
community as sketched out above. 
Ecologically,  integrated community 
management of coastal fisheries starts in 
the forests. Economically. it begins in the 
yillage but Its linkages are often in Ja- 
pan, the United States or Europe. There- 
fore,  this  strong  multisectoral  and 
transnational dimension is totally outside 
the control of this community. This fact 
seems  often ignored in much of the discus- 
sions on community management. Thus. 
a more concrete explanation is called for. 
Multlsectoral ecological action 
The coastal Fisheries of a country are 
not just  affected by the fishing activity 
in the seaward side of the coastal zone. 
They are also greatly influenced by all the 
negative externalities of the economic 
activities in the hinterland, largely via the 
links in the aquatic systems. 
Increased silt loads due to deforesta- 
tlon; reduced river water flow following 
dam construction; effluents from agriculture. 
industry, urban settlements and tourism 
which dumped into the rivers and the sea, 
all  affect the ecological integrity of the 
coastal ecosystems. In  the initial stages, 
such externalities cause no harm. They 
are quite easily  "managed" within the 
eapaclties of the natural physico-chemi- 
cal processes in the coastal waters (Scura 
et  al. 1992). 
However, a point Is  reached when these 
negative externalities "accumulate" at  a 
rate faster than they can be "absorbed", 
thus pushing the system to an ecologi- 
cal precipice. 
Most coastal ecosystems in Asia seem 
to have reached the fringes of this cliff. 
To retrace steps back to the plateau of 
ecological stability requires an awareness 
of coastal communities that collective action 
on their part alone for the management 
of their common resources is only a par- 
tial solution, and a poor one at that. Since the 'sea  starts in  the forests", 
cooperation from the 'upstream"  sectors 
of the economy is  a prerequisite for to- 
tal success of  the  community venture. This 
in turn implies a willingness on the part 
of these upstream sectors  to  regulate their 
polluting and resource degrading activities. 
Such are the multisectorai compulsions 
of integrated community management of 
coastal fisheries. 
A beginning on this front calls for both 
state intervention and community action. 
We  do  see some  new, enlightened, high- 
level state  initiatives for more holistic eco- 
system planning and project implemen- 
tation. However, the earlier compartmen- 
tallzed approach has become very rigid 
and It will take a long time before such 
integrated practices trickle down to the 
lower levels of state  administration. One 
way to  hasten this is for more concerted. 
popular community action across sectors 
of the economy. 
My personal experiences of the latter 
has  been  in  assisting  the  National 
Fishworkers Forum of India (a  confederation 
of artisanal fishworkers' unions/assocla- 
tions) to organlze an ail-India  people's 
awareness jatha  (march) In  1989 on the 
theme 'Protect  water. protect Ilfe". This 
socioecologlcal march which covered about 
5,000 km of  coastline was uniquely spear- 
headed by the laboring men and women 
of the coastal flshing communities-the 
beacons and guardians of the sea. They 
were joined by many middle-class envi- 
ronmental groups, other workers' groups 
and people's organizations from the "up- 
stream" sectors of society. The march pro- 
vided a broad platform for creating aware- 
ness of the fact that our common iink- 
ages to life are through water! 
The transnational dimension of integrated 
community management of coastal fish- 
eries requires greater attention than it now 
receives. This Is  because a significant share 
of the value of the coastal fisheries re- 
sources"output  in developing Asian countries 
is  obtained from exports to the devel- 
oped world. There is  no reason to ex- 
pect any  change in these economic Iink- 
ages In  the near future. Consequently, 
the nature and quantum of coastal fish- 
ing effort, even assuming community 
management, will largely be dictated by 
consumer demand in Japan, the United 
States and Europe. 
Will  local community efforts for sus- 
tainable coastal fisheries succumb to  the 
insatiable demand for exotic tropical coastal 
seafood in the developed world? 
The answer is a big "YES". 
The solution to  this dilemma is  to in- 
tegrate community management efforts 
with global initiatives to reduce the de- 
gree of discord in  the nexus between 
transnational trade and consumption 
patterns on the one hand and sustain- 
able community management of coastal 
resources on the other. 
To achieve this we need NOT  ban all 
fish exports from developing Asian countries 
or stop  the Imports of fisheries technol- 
ogy from the developed world. That would 
jeopardize the livelihood of millions of 
fishworkers. The need of the hour is  to 
arrive at a proper balance-be  it in har- 
vesting of the resource or the use of tech- 
nology for fishing and related activities. 
For example, one of the most crucial 
transitions in  Asian coastal waters will 
be a shift from using trawls (to  catch prawns) 
back to the more passive and environ- 
mentally benign nets for this purpose. The 
economic and ecological effects of "trawi- 
free prawn exports" have been partially 
demonstrated In  Indonesia and can be 
done in other countries as well. 
Achievlng such transitions Is  an important 
prerequisite for a long-term, integrated 
community management of  coastal fisheries. 
But such transitions cannot materialize without the right signals to  this effect from 
the developed world. For example, if the 
Japanese consumer movement can get 
their prawn importers to refuse prawns 
below a specified count/kilo from India, 
the salutary environmental and economic 
impact on coastal fisheries will be far greater 
than all our costly efforts to  manage the 
extremely socially and politically charged 
conflict between trawler owners and small- 
scale fishers. 
The success of integrated community 
management of coastal Fisheries at the 
local level depends on an integration of 
rnultisectoral and transnational awareness 
and action. This can be achieved only in 
the process of the struggle to  rebuild com- 
munity in the coastal villages. The com- 
munity focus is  not necessarily in  con- 
flict with the need for multisectoral and 
transnational action. In  fact, we should 
strive towards the ability to  blend the two 
without losing the cutting edge of any 
of their respective concerns. Let this not 
be mistaken as  a search for harmony and 
coexistence; far from it. It is only a crea- 
tive effort to  balance countervailing forces. 
In  that sense, we may never reach an 
lntegrated community management of 
coastal flsheries-we will always be moving 
towards it. But first we  must make a firm 
commitment in that direction. 
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T" 
e experience of fisheries management 
In  Southeast Asia has shown that flsh- 
ing is a soclai and economic activity. As 
such, social and economic aspects have 
major impacts on management. These 
aspects of the  fisheries  system rekr to  human 
and social elements which influence fish- 
eries objectives and economic actlvlty. The 
problems and issues in planning and man- 
agement  of small-scale coastal fisheries are 
discussed In this paper. The approprlate- 
ness of  co-management for small-scale 
coastal fisherles In  the Southeast Asian 
region is also exarnlned. Some Irnplica- 
tions for fisheries management in the re- 
gion are taken up. 
Plannlng and  Settlng 
ObJectlves 
Planning  and setting objectives for 
management requires a good understanding 
of small-scale coastal fisheries, the resource 
attributes, the traditional values of  fishers, 
the institutional arrangements and the 
overall environment in whlch the small- 
scale  fishers  operate.  Without  prior 
knowledge of these attributes, any  attempts 
to manage the small-scale  fisheries will 
often be met wlth serious resistance and 
problems of noncompliance.  In  fisheries 
literature, there is apparently no  consensus 
on, or even clear spelling out  of, the exact 
meaning of  'small-scale  coastal fisheries." 
Smith  (1979) and  Panayotou  (1985) provided some detailed guidelines for 
classiQing small-scale fisheries in Asia. The 
small-scale  fisheries are often described 
as fishing unlts consisting of kin groups 
using small, occasionally powered boats 
or none at all.  Fishing is  often part-time 
and  household  income  may  be 
supplemented by other nonfishing activities 
of  the fishers. The fishers normally use 
traditional gear and investment levels are 
low, with capital often borrowed from those 
who market the catch. Catch per fishing 
unit is  low and up to half or more of the 
catch most often does  not enter organized 
market but is rather consumed by the fisher 
and family. The fishing community is 
frequently  isolated, geographically and 
socially, and their income is  much lower 
than the stated national poverty line. 
These fishers tend to  operate in nearshore 
areas where the resources are clearly 
overexploited.  Besides declining catch, 
small-scale fishers also face competition 
From illegal flshlng activities by commer- 
cial  fishing boats. Small-scale  fishers of- 
ten feel  that institutions enforcing regu- 
lations are not effective and thus, com- 
mercial fishers, especially trawlers, are able 
to overfish in the coastal areas. The het- 
erogeneous nature of fishers operating in 
the nearshore areas with differing objec- 
tives of  resource utilization, will provide 
serious challenge to decisionmakers in 
planning and managing small-scale fish- 
eries. 
Platteau (1989) used two broad ap- 
proaches for defining small-scale coastal 
fisheries.  First,  in  technol~glcal  terms, 
artisanal or  small-scale coastal fishing would 
be composed of all beachlanding flshlng 
units, whether of the traditional varlet-  (e.g.. 
canoes, rafts) or of a  new type (e.g.. 
beachlanding plywood boats). Defined thus, 
the small-scale sector is  not technologl- 
cally stagnant; not only can it comprise 
new types of  craft (uslng new materlals 
and designs), but also tradltlonal crafts which 
have undergone transformations to improve 
efficiency (e.g., canoes fitted with outboard 
motors or adjusted to handle new types 
of  nets). This  deFinition  ensures that the 
small-scale fishing sector is characterized 
by relatively  low-capital  intensity, since 
heavy infrastructure (anchorage and harbor 
facilities) can be dispensed with, and me- 
dium or large vessels are excluded. Small- 
scale coastal Rshing communities  are also 
identified by a decentralized and scattered 
pattern of settlement since there is no  need 
to  cluster around a harbor point. Fishing 
technologies are also relatively easy to 
acquire by traditional fisher communities 
themselves due  to  the  obvious line of con- 
tinuity between the old and new techniques 
and crafts, and reasonable investment costs. 
A second definition considers artisanal 
fisheries to be composed of all fishing units 
whose proprietors are actually involved 
in fishing operations, whether manual or 
direct supervisory or coordlnatlon tasks. 
This Implies that management Functions 
have not been completely specialized. In 
this paper, small-scale coastal fishers are 
those  who fit the descrlptions given above 
by Smith (1979). Panayotou (1985)  and 
Platteau ( 1 989). 
Management objectives 
Quite often there is  a mlsunderstand- 
ing between declslonmakers and flshers 
regarding management of the coastal fish- 
eries resources. The standard package ap- 
proach of  management as  practised by many 
national governments may be in conflict 
with local condltlons. When fishers do  not 
participate In  or accept the programs. it 
is felt that they are not actlng in their own 
best Interest. However, they may  be ra- 
tlonal In their action because the  two  partles 
have different economic strategies on  re- 
source use. 
Many small-scale  fishers exist at the 
subsistence level and have a short-run, 
survival strategy oftaking  care of themselves and their family each day (Pomeroy 1991  ). 
These fishers have limited mobility to  seek 
alternative employment, and will  utilize 
whatever resources are  available to  harvest 
as  much fish as  possible. They prefer food 
now rather than a continual flow into 
perpetulty; in other words, these fishers 
have a very high dlscount rate concerning 
the resource use. 
In  contrast, the government is  prima- 
rily concerned with the sustainable use  of 
the resource for food, employment and 
-  resource rents. Therefore, any development 
program to malntain the long-term pro- 
ductivity of  the resource will  be consid- 
ered by  the society as the rational eco- 
nomic strategy.  From the government's 
point of view, the logical economic strat- 
egy as percelved by fishers is irrational for 
eventually it causes total destruction to 
the fishery biomass.  Nonetheless, these 
conflicting perspectives of resource man- 
agement  an  be reconciled by incorporating 
both  views into the fisheries management 
strategy. More effective development pro- 
grams  can be established if both the gov- 
ernment and fishers develop new,-mutu- 
ally beneficial  economic strategies. Thls 
approach Is  popularly known as  co-man- 
agement  or  community-based management. 
Resource management models 
In  surveying the literature on manag- 
ing natural resources. Ostrom ( 1990)  bund 
that researchers use three major models 
to  explain why natural resources are ex- 
plolted to  the point of  endangerlng their 
long-term  economlc viability.  The first 
model, often called the tragedy of the 
commons. Is  attributed to  Hardin's (1968) 
artlcle.  Using a pasture land open to all 
as an example of a natural resource. Hardin 
demonstrated that herders wlll be moti- 
vated to add more and more animals to 
the llmlted pasture because each herder 
Is  concerned only with the direct benefit 
of his own animals  and incurs only a share 
of the costs resulting from overgrazing. 
The result is  the degradation of  the pas- 
ture land and loss of benefits to  all herd- 
ers. 
The second model is called the prison- 
er's dilemma game (Dawes 1973, 1975). 
Here, individuals utilizing a natural resource 
are seen to  be similar to  players In a non- 
cooperatlve game  who  possess complete 
information. Each player has a dominant 
strategy in the sense that he is always better 
OR choosing the strategy to  defect no  matter 
what the other player selects. When all 
players pick their dominant strategy, a non- 
pared optlmal equilibrium is the result. A 
non-pared optlmal outcome  occurs when 
there is no  other outcome strlctly preferred 
by at least one player that Is  at least as 
good for the others. The fascination of the 
prisoner's dilemma game lies in the  para- 
dox that lndlvidually rational strategies lead 
to  collectively irrational outcomes. 
The  third model is the outcome of Olson's 
(1  965)  work on  group  theory. In his book, 
The Ioglc of  collecCive actlon, Olson chal- 
lenged the optimism expressed In group 
theory that lndlviduals with common in- 
terests would voluntarily act to  try to  fur- 
ther those interests (Bentley 1949; Truman 
1958).  Olson (1  965)  argued that "unless 
the number of  Individuals Is  qulte small. 
or unless there is coercion or some  other 
speclal device to  make individuals act In 
their common Interest, rational seif-lnter- 
ested individuals will not act to achieve 
the1  r common or  group interest. " He  used 
the free-rider problem as  a basis for ex- 
plalnlng why individuals have little incenthre 
to  contribute voluntarily to  the provision 
of  a good that benefits the group. 
Arising from the three models mentioned 
above, poky  prescriptlons for resource 
management dl  for regulations of various 
kinds to  protect natural resources and ensure 
long-term economic viability. Heilbroner 
(1  974)  felt  that  strong government 
interventloa would be necessary to  achlwe control over ecological problems. Ehrenfield 
( 1972)  suggested that if "private interest 
cannot be expected to protect the public 
domain then external regulation by public 
agencies, governments, or international 
authorities is needed." Carruthers and Sfoner 
(I  98 1  ) argued that without public control, 
"overgrazing and soil erosion of communal 
pastures, or less fish at  higher average cost" 
would result. They concluded that "common 
property resources require public control 
if economic efficiency is to  result From their 
development." An alternative recommend- 
ation has been establishing private property 
rights (Dernsetz 1967: Johnson 1972;  Smith 
198  1 ; Welch 1983),  which is  particularly 
difficult in the case of the fisheries resources. 
What is evident from the policy prescrip- 
tions arising from the  tragedy of the com- 
mons, the prisoner's dilemma and the logic 
of collective action is  the call  for an ex- 
ternal agent or  authority for regulating the 
resource or parcelling out rights of  use. 
In many developing countries, centralized 
control of natural resources has been based 
on such prescriptions. These prescriptions 
have often failed to consider the experi- 
ences and capacities of local management 
systems and have tended to  overestimate 
the national government's ability to  manage 
the coastal resources. In a number of cases, 
a large amount of state resources is  used 
to  manage, often ineffectively, a resource 
that does not generate enough rents to 
pay for the high cost of centralized bu- 
reaucracies. 
In the context of small-scale coastal flsh- 
eries, governments In  most of Asia have 
increased their role in management. The 
general tendency is to  reduce completely 
the authority of local communities through 
legislation and the establishment of insti- 
tutions that provide a minimal partlcipa- 
tory role for fishers In the management of 
the  coastal resources. The general outcome 
has been a greater difficulty  of  govern- 
ment agencies in communicating to  coastal 
fishing communities  the need for resource 
management and the benefits that may 
arise from it.  Co-management  of  small- 
scale coastal fisheries may be an avenue 
for improvement, wherein the national 
government and the community could share 
authority. 
Co-management of coastal 
fisheries 
The co-management  concept can be 
considered an advancement in  property 
tights research  because it examines fur- 
ther the interactions between fishing com- 
munities and regulatory regimes and does 
raise questions on the universal validity 
of the "tragedy of  the commons" paradigm 
(Charles 1988).  The existence of informal 
property rights, territorial use rights, and 
informal contracting for the management 
of a common property resource indicates 
that self-interested  individuals can work 
out arrangements among themselves to 
manage a common property for their overall 
benefit (Ruddle and Akimichi 1984;  Berkes 
1986; Made 1987; Pinkerton  1989).  Pri- 
vatization or state regulation may not al- 
ways be essential to manage a common- 
property resource. Apparently, a critical 
requirement for the success of any cam- 
mon-property management scheme is the 
extent to which  fishers will  voluntarily 
cooperate to advance their collective ln- 
terest at the expense of a short-term pri- 
vate interest. Essentially, the question is 
what motivates fishers to  voluntarily ad- 
here to regulations. Evidence shows that 
sf  fishers willingly accept the regulations 
as appropriate and consistent with their 
existing values. the regulatory agency will 
gain legitimacy with the fishers, thus re- 
ducing noncompliance with the regulatlons 
(Kuperan 1992).  It is in securing legitimacy 
that co-management promises to  be a better 
fisheries resource management arrange- 
ment. Co-management of coastal flsherles 
therefore means that government agencies 
and fishers, through their cooperative 
organizations, share responsibilities for 
management functions. Governments 
formally recognize  informally enforced 
regulations by the fishers themselves. A 
part of the  regulatory power is transferred 
From  the  government  to  fishers' 
organizations. Therefore,  they not only 
participate in the declslonmaklng process, 
but also have the authority to make and 




Universally acceptable properties of well- 
managed small-scale coastal flsherles can 
be categorized into two separate charac- 
terlstics (Miller 1990).  They are given here 
as a prerequisite for discussing how co- 
management can lead to this ideal. 
Resource characteristics 
1.  The quality and quantity of  resource 
habitats are maintained. 
2. Catch is  stable and is  managed to 
change by only a moderate amount. 
e.g.,  a factor of less than 1.3, in suc- 
cessive years. 
3. Market demand, processing capac- 
ity, resource yield and fishing capac- 
Ity are well-matched. 
4. Annual yield predictions are avoided, 
but if required, are based on recruit 
year-class strength and yield per re- 
cruit rather than on an assumed stock- 
recruitment relationship. 
5. Resource waste is  low: discards and 
bycatch are less than 30% of the  yield 
to the fishery, and the yield per re- 
cruit is at least two-thirds of the maxi- 
mum. 
Management characteristics 
1. The Fishers/fishers'  organizations par- 
ticipate in wrltlng and implementing 
regulations. 
2. Regulations in place are enforceable 
and enforced. 
3. Reasons for regulations are understood 
by the Fishing industry, enforcement 
personnel,  resource managers and 
scientists. 
4. The resource managers and fisheries 
sclentlsts are visible and can be per- 
sonally identified by  Rshers/fishers' 
organizations. 
Can co-management ensure 
well-managed coastal flsherles? 
One of the key arguments for the co- 
management approach is that it attempts 
to  use fisheries management systems  well- 
adapted for local conditions. In  particu- 
lar, effort is made to recognize custom- 
ary marine tenure (CMT) systems for the 
management of local marine resources. 
The essence of CMT systems is  people 
managing and negotiating access to  valued 
marine resources, each individual or  group 
acting from a  firm basis within a  social 
system. Knowledge of the environment 
will  indicate where a  fisher should fish 
to maximize the catch, but marine ten- 
ure regulations constrain these choices 
to where fishing may legitimately take 
place, according to  rights held or permissions 
sought (Ruddle et al.  1992). The CMT 
systems thus have fisheries management 
as but one  aspect of their role in society 
and history,  and contain a  number of 
opportunities for achieving ecologically, 
economically and socially integrated ap- 
proaches in resource management. Hviding 
( 1990) considered CMT as basically sys- 
tems of social relationships that involve 
participants and operators. declsionmakers. 
Insiders and outsiders. The systems are generated, maintained and transformed 
in social process. 
To understand these processes, an aware- 
ness of certain basic social principles un- 
derlying their dynamics is required. Ruddle 
(1  988) identified six underlying principles 
for the  South Pacific: (1  ) sea rights depend 
on social status; (2)  resource exploitation 
is  governed by use rights; (3)  resource- 
use territories are defined; (4)  marine re- 
sources are controlled by traditional au- 
thorities; (5)  conservation is traditionally 
and widely practised: and (6)  sanctions and 
punishments are meted out for Infringe- 
ment of  regulations. These principles are 
to a large extent consistent with the  char- 
acteristics outlined above for well-man- 
aged small-scale  coastal fisheries. The 
question now is to  what extent the prln- 
ciples outlined by Ruddle (1  988) are dis- 
cernible in the Southeast Asian setting. 
Management of Small-scale 
Coastal Flsherles In 
Southeast Asla 
It is  now almost unlversally  accepted 
that much of the  coastal regions of Southeast 
Asia have been overfished. The govern- 
ments of these countries (Brunei Darussalam. 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillppines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea) 
are  working to  attain sustainable improve- 
ments in the socioeconomlc  conditions of 
small-scale fishlng communities. They see 
the need to maxlmlze the net economic 
and social benefits from the flsheries. They 
are also grappling with the issue of  allo- 
cating the country's limited marine fish- 
eries between small-scale fishing commu- 
nities and Industrial fisheries to  minimize 
confllct between the  two. In Malaysia. In- 
donesia and Thailand, explicit political 
attention Is  given to income and wealth 
distribution issues among  different ethnic 
groups. Most governments recognize the 
need for well-managed fisheries with re- 
duced internal conflict as  a basis for alle- 
viating poverty among  fishers and increasing 
society's overall returns. In  most South- 
east Asian tountries, except Papua New 
Guinea, active fishers far exceed the re- 
quired number under a socially optimum 
fisheries management. Sound management 
therefore entails the creation of other outlets 
for fishers such as employment opportu- 
nities in aquaculture, processing, mining 
and tourism. To handle these issues, greater 
central control of the fisheries is  seen in 
most of  Southeast Asia. 
Traditional sea  tenure systems that may 
have existed in the region have been largely 
replaced by centralized government con- 
trol  often originating  from the colonial 
experiences of each country. The author- 
ity  for planning and management of the 
fisheries resources often lies in a govern- 
ment department that makes decisions on 
effort restrictions and allocation  of fish- 
Ing grounds. There is often little or no role 
for fishers or fishers' organizations to  par- 
ticipate in the planning and management 
process. Most of  the fisheries plans have 
specific development objectives such as 
'to  attain and maintain self-sufflclency  in 
fish production" in the case of the Philip- 
pines, and 'to  make optimal use of fish- 
ery resources" in Malaysia. 
The market economy Is well-developed 
In most of Southeast  Asia, wherein fishlng 
communities are quite integrated. In  the 
case of Malaysia, a political system based 
on the concept of a federation of 13 states 
provides centralized power to the federal 
government to manage the fisheries. 
Coupled with an almost free market system, 
this has almost removed any form of CMT 
that has any serious support from fishing 
comrnunitles. In  his study of  social relations 
of  production in rural Malay society, Bailey 
( 199 1  )  concluded  that  in  fishing 
comrnunitles, moral economy values have 
long been relegated to the  cultural dustbin, 
Coordinating the  efforts of fishers through 
cooperative formatlon or encouraging their collective participation in  rural development 
programs  Is a  far  more challenging 
proposltlon.  He found  that  fishing 
communities do  not have a pre-existing 
organiational capacity to  build  cooperatives 
which are often seen as an important 
institution for the co-management  of 
flsherles. The cursory evidence on  fishing 
comrnunlties in Malaysia and a  well- 
established centralist fisheries management 
system polnt to a limited scope for co- 
management. 
What has happened in most of  South- 
east Asia,  except Papua New  Guinea and 
some parts of  the Philippines, Is the trans- 
formation from traditional sea systems to 
centralist state-controlled resource man- 
agement regimes. We argued earlier that 
co-management does satisfy the requlre- 
ments  of  well-managed small-scale coastal 
flsheries. The question now is: is there a 
prospect for co-management in  the Rsh- 
erles of Southeast Asia? The answer is 
perhaps yes or no depending on which 
country we are considering. The transfer 
of power to local comrnunlties to man- 
age flsheries resources may not be an at- 
tractive proposition  to  many governments 
in  Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, for exam- 
ple, the co-management idea is unlikely 
to be politically feasible and the political 
and legal framework in  the country strongly 
favors central control of  resource manage- 
ment. The general feeling among politi- 
cians and resource managers in  this small 
country with  a multi-ethnic society is that 
common property resources can only be 
best managed by a centrallzed authority. 
The implementation  of  the co-management 
approach will similarly be difficult in  countries 
like  Thailand and Brunei Darussalam where 
the trend Is For centralist control of  resources. 
The Philippines and Indonesia,  on the 
other hand, may have better prospects for 
co-management as  these countries are 
geographically dispersed and made up  of 
many Islands.  Localized marine tenure 
systems that make both ecological and 
cultural sense to  the different fishing com- 
munltles  could be marshalled for improved 
resource management. There  is greater 
prospect for using CMT as found in the 
Pacific Islands (Ruddle et al. 1992) withln 
a co-management framework for some of 
the coastal fisheries in  the Philippines and 
Indonesia. In  Indonesia, however, the ten- 
dency for a strong  central government may 
impede the prospects for co-management. 
In the case of Malaysia and Thailand, 
the move  towards a regional management 
of  their fisheries would be in  the right di- 
rection. This will enable greater flexibility 
in  the incorporation of  the specific differ- 
ences in  resource and socioeconomic char- 
acteristics among the regions in  the fish- 
eries management plans. 
The ranking  of  the prospects for the co- 
management approach for the coastal fish- 
eries of Southeast Asian countries (Table 
1 ) is based on  some of  the factors discussed 
above. It is also interesting to note that 
except for Myanmar, those countries that 
have exhibited high  economic growth rates 
and with a good record of managing the 
overall economy are ranked as having  low 
prospects for co-management. This is ex- 
pected as communities that have found 
governments failing badly are more un- 
likely to believe that centralized govern- 
ment-based approaches to  managing  the 
fisheries will be successful, as in the case 
of the Philippines.  Its high prospect for 
co-management is largely due to  a changed 
political climate which shifts more respon- 
sibilities to  local governments and encour- 
ages  the  active  participation  of 
nongovernmental  organizations in com- 
munity development. 
This  article addressed the issues of 
planning and management of small-scale 
coastal fisheries  in Southeast  Asia.  The Table  1.  Prospects for the adoptlon of the co- 
management approach for  coastal flsherles  In 
southeast Asla. 
Country  Rank 
High  Average  Low 
Brunel Darussalam  x 
Myanmar  x 
lndonesla  x 
Malaysia  x 
Papua New Gulnea  x 
Phllipplnes  x 
Slngapore  x 
understanding of  the resource attributes 
and the objectives of small-scale fishers 
as distlnct from the goals of  the state or 
central agency is crucial to ensure effective 
management of the coastal  fisheries 
resources. Community-based management 
is  seen as an alternative and possibly 
improved approach for managing common- 
property resources such as fisheries, The 
increased legitimization of the regulatory 
agencles through communlty participation 
in the regulatory and management plans 
is  expected to ensure better compliance 
and thus reduce management costs. The 
prospects  for  adoption  of  the  co- 
management approach among the countries 
in Southeast Asia are however varied, with 
only the Philippines given a high rank. 
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onsiderable attention has  been given  C(  o tools and techniques designed to 
generate dialogue between development 
practitioners and  community-based client 
groups.  The bulk OF this effort has Focused 
on  promoting communication between ag- 
riculture researchers and Farm families. The 
general premise has been that through such 
interaction,  researchers will  gain an un- 
derstanding of  conditions within which most 
small farmers operate and be better able 
to develop technologies applicable to  their 
unique conditions. 
Funding proposals generally mention 
techniques that will be used -to  generate 
farmer input. Research reports commonly 
describe the rationale and/or goals  of farmer/ 
community participation. Seldom, however, 
are procedures for involving villagers and 
their impacts documented in a meaning- 
ful way. Even more scarce are  statements 
of the desired relationship between the 
researchers and the  villagers. There are  many 
approaches to enhancing interaction be- 
tween community groups on one hand, 
and researchers, planners and development 
practitioners, on  the other. The value and 
potential impact of  a particular method or 
approach depend on the goals of  the in- 
teraction and the nature of  the relation- 
ship established with the client groups. 
Rhoades and Booth (1982)  noted that 
techniques of interaction likely to  elicit farmer 
knowledge and views can be learned: 
however, there will be no incentive to do 
so until reward systems are altered to reflect 
the  importance  of  field  experience. 
Chambers ( 1389)  went even further to  argue 
not only for the recognition of the value 
of fieldwork,  but also far the need to  promote 
a major reversal in roles if researchers are 
to establish truly collaborative learning relationships with villagers. Clearly, it Is 
easier to state what approaches and attitudes 
are desirable than to  Implement the required 
changes (Farrington and Martin 1988). 
The investment in and use of a particu- 
lar methodology to create dialogue with 
community-based clients is directly related 
to the objectives of the community, the 
anticipated mode of  interaction and the 
desired relationship with the community. 
Researchers can vary in  their objectives 
in  initiating interaction with community 
groups. Projects and research programs 
that have involved dialogue with commu- 
nity-based clients have generally Focused 
on either technology assessment and trans- 
fer, rural  resource management, or em- 
powerment for community-based problem 
solving. Agriculture researchers and bio- 
physical scientists concerned with prob- 
lem identification, farm research and tech- 
nology assessment have generally selected 
different methods from those used by so- 
cial scientists and development practitioners 
interested more in fostering client partici- 
pation and local level empowerment. 
Process: Deslgnlng a Strategy 
for Generating Effectlve 
Dlalogue 
Once the objective of the dialogue has 
been established, researchers can select 
an appropriate mode of  interaction. In 
reviewing various formats of on-farm cli- 
ent-oriented research (OFCOR). Biggs (1  987) 
identified four models of researcher-farmer 
interaction: contract, consultative, collabo- 
rative and collegiate. In the contract mode, 
the relationship between researcher and 
farmer consists of little more than an agree- 
ment allowing the researcher to use or rent 
a field for the purpose of conducting on- 
farm trials. In  the consultative mode, the 
most prevalent form of interaction in the 
implementation of farming systems research 
(FSR). the farmer is  consulted, usually by 
means of an informal interview, during the 
diagnostic and technology evaluation stages 
of the research process. The collaborative 
and collegiate modes have been associ- 
ated with a process referred to  as farmer 
participatory research (FPR) (Farrington and 
Martin 1988).  Unlike the contract and con- 
sultative modes, collaboration involves 
continuous interaction between researcher 
and client and may ultimately lead to or 
entail a collegiate relationship Focused on 
strengthening the capacity of  the client 
group to develop its own problem solu- 
tions and development options. 
The various methods and techniques that 
have been developed to assist research- 
ers in  communicating with villagers can 
be grouped and evaluated it1 terms  OF the 
underlying conceptual orientation, objective 
of the activity, research framework used 
and type of researcher-client relationship 
envisioned. This paper will briefly summarize 
a process for generating meaningful dia- 
logue and discuss the key techniques and 
their potential application to coastal re- 
sources management and development. 
Certain techniques and tools such as  rapid 
rural appraisal (RRA), mapping and dia- 
gramming are common to different con- 
ceptual orientations and research frame- 
works (Table 1).  The key factors that vary 
are who leads the process; what kind  of 
interaction is  generated; and who is  the 
primary beneficiary. In  the  case of the  transfer 
of technology (TOT) approach, the researcher 
is in control OF the dialogue process which 
Is  used primarily to identify or verify the 
exlstence of certain problems usually as- 
sociated with production. This diagnostic 
process provides a base on which research 
priorities are established and on-farm tri- 
als are designed by researchers. 
Within the context of agroecology, some 
of  the same tools are used  to help 
researchers gain an understanding of 
complex interactions between human social 
systems and environmental systems. Here, 
the  emphasis  is  on  environmental Table  1. Generatlng community  dialogue. 
Conceptual  Objectives  Research  Tools and  Relatlonshlp  Antlclpatcd 
orlentations  frameworks  techniques  wlth cllent  outcomes 





assessment  systems  appraisal (RRA)  consultative 
and transfer  research (FSR) 
Rural resource 
research 
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analysls (AEA),  observation, rapid 
human ecology  hlstorlcai appralsal 
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management and farmer knowledge rather 
than agriculture and/or livestock production. 
In  participatory research, the focus Is  on 
villagers as  active participants and teachers 
in a process OF collaborative learning and 
problem solving. Each of these approaches 
involves interacting with rural  residents 
in  the  diagnostic  phase  of  project 
development, but the results are very 
different. 
The focus of the diagnosis and the re- 
sulting product can vary greatly depend- 
ing on the  conceptual orientation and the 
research  framework employed. In  FSR, 
diagnosis generally leads to some form 
of experimentation related to  the  generation 
and/or assessment of potential technologid 
improvements. In  agroecosystem analy- 
sis (AEA), diagnosis results in an evalua- 
tion in  terms of different system proper- 
ties-productivity,  stability, sustain-abil- 
ity, diversity, equitability, solidarity, au- 
tonomy and adaptability (Conway 1984, 
1985, 1987; Patanothai  1991). This can 
then be used as a basis for further policy 
analysis and recommendations. With FPR, 
diagnosis often leads to  the identification 
of a particular intervention and/or coop- 
erative development activity (Fig.  1). 
Methodology 
Three distinct conceptual orientations, 
namely, TOT, agroecology and partlclpa- 
tory action research (PAR), have provided 
a base for the  development of most of the 
methods and techniques for enhancing 
dialogue between researchers and rural 
villagers. This section will not summarize 
each of these orientations. Rather, it will 
attempt to illustrate how certain kinds of I  Policy analysis  \TiGaK= 
J 
Flg.  1. The process of establlshlng effective dlalogue begins wlth establlshlng a clear set of 
objectives whlch wlll Influence the content and focus of the lnteractlon and the cholcc of 
methodology and speclflc techniques to be used. 
objectives are related to  specific research 
frameworks that in turn influence the se- 
lection of  the field  methods that foster 
different types of client relationships (Flg. 
2). 
If the primary purpose of the interac- 
tion is to develop a diagnostic base which 
gives priority to  agriculture research and 
technology assessment, It Is  likely that FSR 
will provlde the dominant research frame- 
work. If  the researcher's  objectives are 
focused more on resource management 
and understanding the flow of  knowledge, 
energy and materials within and between 
human social systems and environment. 
AEA  Is  the framework of  choice.  If  the 
emphasis is on helping people solve their 
own problems, one of the participatory 
approaches is the most appropriate kame- 
work upon which to  develop an interac- 
tion strategy. 
In  FSR  the crop, field and farm household 
are the key variables of concern. The 
emphasis is on how farm families can better 
manage the resources under their direct 
control to  improve agricultural production. Steps in initiating community-based dialogue 
(Step 1') 
Determine objective 
Technology assessment  Resource systems management  Community empowerment 
(Step 2) 
ldentify relevant client groups 
Cooperative managers  Bank officers  Money lenders 
Farmers  Fishers  Village heads  Extension agents  School teachers 
Fish traders  Women  Poorest of the poor  Innovative farmers  Entrepreneurs 
(Step 3) 
Determine desired relationship  I 
Contractual  Consultative  Collaborative  Collegial 
Define initial content and focus 
Key topics  Minimum data set  Critical factors 
RRA  RHA 
- 
(Step 5) 
Select approach and methodology  I 
FSR  AEA  FPR 
(Step 6) 
Identify appropriate tools and techniques 
PRA  Transects  Flow diagrams  Matrix ranking 
(Step 7) 
Initiate interaction and dialogue 
Evaluate impact 
Fig. 2.  Steps In  lnltlatlng community-based dlakgue. 
The larger physical and social environments  the watershed; agricultural fields, including 
are of interest only to  the degree to  which  water management systems; and human 
they influence farm household production  residence and resource management 
strategies. With AEA, understanding human-  patterns.  In  FPR and other participatory 
'environmental interactions is the main focus  approaches, farmers are the top priority. 
OF investigation. The critical elements are  Here the emphasis is  not on technology transfer or  environmental management, but 
rather on human resource development. 
In the  case  of FSR technology improvement 
is the  core concern. With AEA, the  central 
issue Is  resource management. The  FPR 
stresses learning from and bulldlng upon 
indigenous  social and technical knowledge 
and/or training of  farmers in  scientific 
problem-solving methods. 
Tools and  Technlques 
The various methods and techniques 
commonly utilized in communicating  with 
villagers and community-based clients can 
be categorized into one of three groups 
depending on the degree to which they 
interrupt and/or influence the behavior or 
responses they are attempting to record 
or measure. In the  social sciences, the  various 
methods  used in interacting with research 
subjects are usually classified as either 
intrusive or  nonlntrusive. Tests that require 
subjects to perform particular tasks and 
highly structured survey instruments are 
considered to  be Intrusive in that they frame 
the informants' behavior and limit the range 
of acceptable responses. Hidden cameras 
and unidentified  observation, where the 
subjects have no idea that they are being 
observed or in any way evaluated, fall under 
the  category of  nonintrusive measures. In 
assessing tools and techniques associated 
with community-based research, three 
categories, intrusive, semi-intrusive and 
nonintrusive, can be used to indicate the 
degree of researcher-Imposed focus and 
control (Table 2). Matrix ranking is  inter- 
esting in  that it  has both  intrusive and 
nonintrusive characteristics.  It  requires 
informants to  assign ranks or scores to  a 
series of items significant in their environ- 
ment, such as tree species and crop vari- 
eties. The selection of items to  be ranked 
and the criteria by which they are scored 
are provided by the Informant, not the re- 
searcher. The process had been used by 
Robert Chambers and others (Mascarenhas 
et al. 199 1 ) to  rank trees against different 
uses in  India.  Centro lnternacional  de 
Agricultura Tropical scientists have used 
farmer rankings of bush bean varieties to 
ensure that they pursue field trials on va- 
rieties acceptable to local producers and 
consumers (Ashby et al. 1989).  Thus, this 
technique is  intrusive because it frames 
behavior, but in terms established by and 
meaningful to the community residents. 
Whether a technique is  considered in- 
trusive or nonintrusive is not necessarily 
related to  the quality or validity of the in- 
formation it is  likely to generate. A per- 
son who uses nonintruslve observation 
techniques without proper training may 
end up with a biased dataset less reliable 
than information that a skilled Interviewer 
can generate  through informal interviews 
and good survey instruments. One  tool is 
not necessarily better than another. Each 
has its own strengths and limitations. Tools 
should be  selected according to  the  kinds 
of information needed; the condition in 
whlch they will be used; and the skllls and 
Table 2. Technlques for community-based research and data collection. 
lntruslve  Semi-Intrusive  Nonlntrusive 
Formal surveys  Informal Interviews  Undeclared observation 
journals/actlvity logs  Semistructured obsewatlon  Researcher sketch maps 
Farm record keeplng  Matrix ranklngs  Matrix rankings 
Researcher-managed  trlals  Farmer flow diagrams  Researctier diagrams 
Farmer/research walks  Indigenous experimentatlon 
Farmer-managed trlals  Transects interests of the researchers who will use 
them. Productive dialogue and informa- 
tion generation usually involve the use of 
several tools which allow the researchers 
to  compare and  verify data obtained From 
different  sources and processes. This kind 
of  cross-checking (Fig. 3) is called 'trian- 
gulation".  Such planned triangulation, a 
basic principle of  RRA  (Chambers 1987, 
1990;  Grandstaff et  al. 1987),  provides a 
strong internal reliability check to  a proc- 
ess that some  feel lacks the objectivity and 
rigor of quantitative research. Observations 
can be used to  generate topics and ques- 
tions for informal Interviews with villag- 
ers. The responses of  informants can be 
compared with each other and against 
ongoing observations of behavior and lo- 
cal practices. It is often very useful to  de- 
sign the interaction that makes it possi- 
ble to  check for consistency data collected 
from various sources by tools using dif- 
ferent levels of  intrusion. Such patterns of 
cross-checks are illustrated in Figs. 3 and 
4. 
Observation  can provide the base for 
initial hypotheses that can generate top- 
ics and issues for discussion in  informal 
interviews. The interview responses con- 
firm and/or correct the initial observations 
and both can provide input to  the design 
OF  formal surveys if a higher level of sta- 
tistical analysis is required. in a similar fash- 
ion, farmer diagrams, often drawn on the 
Relationship of different tools and techniques ground, can be used to  correct researcher 
sketch maps. Resource-flow diagrams pro- 
duced by villagers (Lightfoot et al. 1991) 
can reinforce and often expand informa- 
tion generated through informal Interviews. 
No single tool, no matter how power- 
ful, is  sufficient in and of itself to gener- 
ate  broad-spectrum dialogue and In-depth 
information required for research, devel- 
opment planning and community problem 
solving. Each tool or technique has its own 
strengths and limitations.  Based  on the 
objectives of the interaction and the de- 
sired relationship, the researcher will se- 
lect a particular set  of tools and techniques 
tailored to  his or her needs and those of 
the local participants. 
Rapld rural apprafsal 
Rapid rural appraisal is one of  the most 
widely used techniques for interacting with 
villagers and conducting community-level 
diagnostic surveys for rural research and 
development. The term RRA  is  generally 
used to refer to  an interdlscipllnary team 
exercise that results In timely and cost- 
effective information for the design of ru- 
ral research and development intervention 
Flg. 4. Trlangulatlon among dlfftrent data sources. efforts. It Is  both a process of learning about 
communities and a way of organizing people 
and resources for collecting and analyzing 
information. Ideally, it starts a process of 
continuous  learning by the researcher that 
results in a tentatlve list of problems, op- 
portunities and potential strategies. 
Under the RRA rubric, a number of tools 
and techniques have been used (e.g.. single 
informant interviews, group interviews,. 
mapping of village resources and flows, 
transect analysis, fieldwalks, structured 
observation, seasonal calendars) to  Facilitate 
the interaction with and collection of in- 
formation from rural villagers. The RRA 
process is  based on a paradigm that views 
the world as  consisting of multiple sets 
of interactive variables subject to rapid 
change and a high degree of uncertainty 
(jamieson 1987). In  such environments, 
communication and cooperation with rural 
villagers are considered essential for 
understanding rural problems and Issues, 
monitoring trends and proposing viable 
solution strategies (Grandstaff et  al. 1987). 
As a process, RRA  attempts to bring to- 
gether essential information gathered from 
secondary sources and from primary in- 
teraction with rural  residents to design 
and plan for research and/or development 
action. 
One  of the  core principles of RRA is the 
use of interdisciplinary teams. This approach 
provides strength and depth that come 
from focusing the minds and hands of sldlled 
researchers from different backgrounds on 
a single problem. Ironically, this strength 
has emerged as  one  of the approach's main 
limitations. For  the most part, RRA exer- 
cises have been carried out by teams of 
national and expatriate scientists with 
external donor support. The process has 
been more a part of external donor-driven 
and nongovernmental organization (NG0)- 
sponsored projects than an integral corn- 
ponent of national research and extension 
programs which tend to  be organized along 
commodity and disciplinary lines. 
Even when implemented by well-trained 
teams, RRA  is generally a researcher-con- 
trolled process that focuses on identify- 
Ing development constraints and oppor- 
tunities for change, and understanding the 
flow of resources, energy and  information 
through a  given system during present 
conditions. The process, in and of itself, 
does not necessarily generate a continu- 
ing relationship  of  mutual learning and 
problem solving between the researcher 
and community residents. It is also tem- 
poral in nature, usually providlng only a 
single snapshot of what is happening in a 
community. 
Rapid historhi  appraisal 
A process which may be referred to  as 
rapid historical appraisal (RHA) can be used 
to  assess the degree of change that a com- 
munity or subsystem (i.e., rice production) 
has undergone over a designated period 
of  time. This process assumes that all so- 
cial and environmental systems are under- 
going  change. The primary purpose of RHA 
Is  to document indicators of  the nature, 
causes and speed of past change in a given 
community. Often, change in  a commu- 
nity system is  related to technological, 
economic, social and political transitions 
that have taken place on a regional, na- 
tional and global level. Utillzlng ethnohistory, 
informal  interviews, village and district 
records and secondary sources. WA  at- 
tempts to reconstruct a comparative his- 
torical summary of key changes that have 
taken place in the  village and the country 
during specific time periods, usually within 
two to  three generations, depending on 
the availability OF elderly informants. 
Rather than a substitute for traditional 
historical  methods, RHA  is  a  brief  look 
backwards that is  highly dependent on 
informant recall of key events and situations 
related to  particular village practices. The 
farther back one  goes in the reconstruction, the greater possibility of  selective reall 
and inaccuracy of  quantitative data. The 
only  control  of  these weaknesses  is 
triangulation with information from multiple 
informants and historical documents (census 
production  records, old  maps, accounts 
written by  professional historians, etc.) 
The  following sample (Table 3), taken 
From  the RHA portion of  a follow-up RRA 
study conducted in a Vletnamese village 
(McArthur et al.  1993), illustrates how 
increases in rice yields are directly related 
to a series of  physical, technological, so- 
cial and political changes over a 50-year 
period. The historical summary allows one 
to identiFy particular sets of events that 
have contributed to significant growths In 
production and deterrnlne the likelihood 
that  similar circumstances will  occur 
again. 
Participatory rural appraisal 
Participatory rural appraisal (PRA) Is  a 
process that has emerged in response to 
the shortcomings of  RRA with respect to 
involvement of  villagers in the diagnostic 
and priority-setting process. It is based on 
the assumption that for lasting change to 
occur, community residents must partici- 
pate in an active colearning process with 
researchers. For this to happen, a reversal 
in  roles must take place. 
For  poor  farmers to be  served well, 
Chambers (I  989) argued that a series of 
reversals must occur so that the farmer's, 
rather than the researcher's analysis, be- 
comes the focus of  research priorities. He 
called for a process in  which researchers 
work with and learn from farmers. This theme 
of  reversals is at the core of  several PRA 
techniques, including the farmer first and 
last (FFL) process (Chambers  and Ghildyal 
1985)  and the farmer back to farmer (FBTF) 
approach (Rhoades and Booth  1982). By 
placing the farmer and  his or  her  inter- 
ests as the primary focus of  attention,  these 
methods attempt to increase researcher 
awareness and appreciation of  indigenous 
knowledge and experience. Farmer map- 
ping, concentrating on socloeconomic  dis- 
tinctions and location of and access to re- 
sources, and matrix ranking, are examples 
of  PRA techniques which provide oppor- 
tunities for villagers to share their knowl- 
edge and preferences with  researchers. 
These techniques are more apt to result 
in  collaborative and collegial relationships 
than the more researcher-dominated RRA 
methods. 
Although an increase in mutual under- 
standing between researchers and farm- 
ers is desirable, the concept of  reversals 
has certain lirnitatlons. Baker (1  99 1  ) sug- 
gested that farmer demands could result 
in an  underinvestment by  researchers in 
issues pertaining to sustainability. Given 
intra- and interhousehold variations in pri- 
orities, often related to differences in  gender, 
wealth and residence location (Feldstein 
and Poates 1990). Baker claimed that in 
the end, researchers would ultimately have 
to decide whose concerns are most com- 
pclllng and how to incorporate these into 
research priorities. 
Given  the potential conflict  between 
researcher and villager agenda, it would 
appear that some kind of  balance, rather 
than a complete reversal, in  farmer and 
researcher roles is desirable. To  this end, 
certain techniques have been developed 
which give the farmer, or flsher in the case 
of coastal areas, greater control over learn- 
ing, research and evaluation without di- 
minishing the scientific contribution of the 
researcher. Kenmore ( 1 Wl  ) suggested that 
the plateau of  yield  increases related to 
improvements in water management, fer- 
tilizer technology and genetic engineer- 
ing had  been reached. He felt that farm- 
ers, rather than technology, would be at 
the center of the next wave of  production 
increases. To this end, he argued for an 
additional investment in  the training of 
farnier trainers. This  'expert  farmer" ap- 134 
Table  3. Chronology of events and agricultural changes In  Nguycn  Xa vlllage, Vletnam (McArthur et al. 
1993). 
Perlod/date  Vletnam  Nguyen Xa vlllagc 
French colonial rule 
Arrlval of Japanese troops In lndontsla 
Formulation of Vletmlnh 
End of French rule1 Vletnam under Japanese 
Influence 
Surrender of Japan: Vletmlnh selzes power 
Ho Chl Mlnh's declaration of Independence 
Outbreak of Franco-Vietnamese war 
France creates "State of Vletnam" under 
former Emperor Bao Dal 
Major defeat of French by Vletmlnh along 
VletnamIChlna border: dlrect US mllltary ald 
to French In Vletnam 
Double cropplng of tradltlonal rlce varletles wlth no 
use of fertlllzer, second crop often lost to flooding: 
ylelds from 60-70 kgasao-' 
Hlgh degree of tenancy: most land owned by 51 
famllles 
Strong vlllagc support of Vletmlnh reslstance flghtcrs: 
French troops stationed In Dong Hung Dlstrlct 
Rcsldents fortlfy vlllage and repel three attempts by 
French forces to move through Nguyen Xa on offensive 
agalnst Vletmlnh; 92  villagers kllled defcndlng vlllage 
from French soldlers 
French defeat at Dlen-Blcn-Phu: 
lnltlatlon of Land Reform 
Geneva Agreements; dlvlslon of Vletnam 
Rectlflcatlon of land reform errors In the north 
987 mau of land redlstrlbuted to former tenant 
farmers: two crops of tradltlonal rlce varletles 
grown wlth use of manure and compost. ylelds 
range from 70 to 80 kgesao.' 
Formatlon  of Rrst hamlet level cooperatlve 
Formatlon of Natlonal Llberatlon Front of 
South Vletnarn 
Maln canal constructed: ylelds avcragc 100-1  30 
kg'sao.'  wlth Improved water management 
Number of cooperatives varlts from 1 to 16 
Flrst electrlc pumps Installed 
lntroductlon qf US ground troops In South 
Vletnam 
Beglnnlng of sustalned US  bomblng In North 
Vletnam 
Local forces shoot down a US  plane near Cau 
Nguyen Brldgc 
End of sustalned US  bornblng of the North 
Collapse of Salgon Chvernment 
Unlflcatlon of Vletnam 
Chlncsc lnvaslon of Vletnam 
Llmlted lntroductlon of household contract 
681 men conscripted lhto mllltary sewlce; 265 
famllles lose a son In the war 
Model lrrlgatlon and water management system 
completed wlth 3 gates and 7 pumping statlons; 
year-round water control to 90% of tleld areas 
Yleld Increases from 6.000 to 10.000 plus kg.hi-' wlth 
lntroductlon of hlgh-yleldlng varletles (1966- 1984) 
system In agriculture proach is at the core of an innovative In- 
tegrated Pest Management Program in 
Indonesia that uses farmer field schools 
to  train villagers in AEA and experimen- 
tal techniques.  Farmer groups conduct 
collaborative research  with university-trained 
personnel who live in villages and oper- 
ate "village laboratories".  Drawing on 
nonformal education as a theoretical base. 
this process involves  the generation of  local 
ecological knowledge through culturally 
appropriate group exercises. In  this process, 
researchers contribute a framework and 
methods for scientific investigatlon,  but 
the problems and practices to  be studied 
are farmer-selected.  Farmers adopt meth- 
odology to become better research pat- 
ners and crop/fleld managers. Kenmore's 
hypothesis was supported by a series of 
recent studies in the Philippines (Pingali 
et  al.  1990a, b) that suggested that farm- 
ers who have used their own knowledge 
and innovation In  fine-tuning the manage- 
ment  OF existing  technology have produced 
rice yields in Laguna province that sur- 
pass those of the International Rice Re- 
search Institute (IRRI). 
Gmphlc tools and techniques 
A  number of graphic techniques for 
gathering and analyzing field data have 
been developed to be used in conjunc- 
tion  with  the informal intervlew and other 
key RRA  and PRA  tools. The most com- 
mon  forms of  graphic representations in- 
clude researcher- and farmer-drawn maps, 
resource-flow diagrams. transects and matrix 
ranking. When researcher sketch maps are 
compared with  those drawn by  local resi- 
dents, it  is often possible to  compare fea- 
tures significant to  the researcher with  those 
important to  the  1-1  residents. When used 
as a base for further open-ended questions, 
graphic tools such as  crude maps  can  provide 
rich  sources of  information concerning im- 
portant soclal and environmental system 
interactions. When transformed into  a series 
of  overlays (Fig.  5).  one participatory map- 
ping exercise can produce an amazing 
amount of information and suggest key 
relationships between the physical envi- 
ronment, or the resource base and the social 
system. 
Some anthropologists have questioned 
whether the ability to produce graphic 
representations varies among different 
cultures and societies, particularly those 
that do  not have a rich graphic arts tradi- 
tion. Although the universality of  this ap- 
proach remains to be fully established. 
mounting evidence  (LightFoot  1990; 
Rhoades et  al. 1890; Lightfoot  and Minnick 
1991  ;  Chambers 1992; Mascarenhas 1992) 
suggest that villagers respond  well to  these 
techniques which can offer important 
insights to indigenous knowledge and 
resource management systems. 
To achleve maximum effectiveness, it 
is necessary to  do  more  than simply request 
that a villager draw a map. The researcher 
should facilitate a process of sequentlal 
discovery with such probes as :  Can you 
point  or  show me  where the best farmland 
is located? Why is this so? Who owns or 
uses this area? Was it always like this? Can 
you show or mark where the rich people 
live? etc.  In thls way,  the mapping or 
diagramming exercise provides not only 
a product, but also an important  contribution 
to  the dialogue process. 
Transects can be a useful tool for creat- 
ing  dialogue with  villagers and analyzing 
field data. They can range from a very simple 
illustration of the relationship among to- 
pography, agricultural production and resi- 
dential patterns  to  more  complex dlsplays 
of  resource flows and human activity and 
residential patterns as indicated in  Figs. 6 
and 7. When used to its fullest extent. 
creating transects is an Intensive process 
that both displays information and gen- 
erates hypotheses for further exploration. 
Matrix scoring is a method commonly 
associated with PAR that provides the Enterprise map 
I 
Map  area  taken up 
by each enterprise 
Social map 
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Flg. 5. Agroecorysttm maps (Lightfoot et al.  1989). vlllager a  high  degree of  controlled 
participation in the  dialogue process. While 
the  researcher indicates  the  key issues he 
or  she is interested in learning about, such 
as tree species or  bean varieties, the  villager 
decides  what items  will be ranked and the 
criteria that they will be measured against. 
As such, this process puts the  vlllager In 
a  true dlalogue. rather than in a simple 
response mode in  interacting with the 
Flg. 6. Factors Influ- 
cnclng land use In the 
mldlands  of Vletnam 
(Cur  et al. 1990). 
researcher. The  end  production of a session 
in which village women in  India ranked 
sources of supplementary income is 
illustrated in Fig. 8. 
Like all the  other field tools associated 
with RRA  and PRA,  graphic techniques have 
their own  strengths  and Ilmitatlons. Used 
In  association with other tools, they are 
an important component in the growlng 
array of  methods  for enhancing productive 
I  Influential technology  I 
V@ 
processing 
\  Economic policy-management and organization  / Dunglmanure 
Homestead 
upland 
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Flg. 7. Typlcal bloresource flows between enterprises and land types in  an Aslan Integrated agriculture-aquacukure farmlng system (Llghtfoot 1990). communication  among  researchers, 
practitloners and village  partners  in 
development. 
Applications to Communlty- 
based Resources Management 
The notion of  "resource" is a social struc- 
ture (Rambo 199 1  ). A particular object or 
material From the natural or social envi- 
ronment is only a resource if it is consid- 
ered to have value and meaning by  a par- 
ticular society. When researchers  move  from 
their own  culture and that of the univer- 
sity and the experiment station to rural 
villages, it is possible that they can bring 
with them. as part of their world view, a 
perception of  resources  that does not  match 
with that of the local residents. Farrnlng 
systems research, for example, explicitly 
focuses on  those resources under the farm- 
er's direct control (Shaner et dl. 1982). but 
does not address the possibility that the 
researcher and the farmer may not  recog- 
nize the same set of resources. 
The  first step in looking for ways to 
improve the efficiency and/or productivity 
of Indigenous resource systems is to 
determine what elements in the system 
are considered resources by both the 
researcher  and the village residents. Informal 
interviews and mapping  exercises can assist 
in identifying a list of locally defined 
resources. In addition, a researcher also 
needs to recognlze that people can see 
the same element as a resource, but  relate 
to and manage it very differently. Some 
people  consider trees as a resource because 
of  their value as a source of  building material. 
fuel and profit. Other people see trees as 
an important element of the ecosystem 
Sample rapid historical appraisal timeline 
-  -- 
Matrix ranking can be used for ranking items such as: cro?s; varieties, types and breeds of 
livestock; trees; fodders; supplementary income generating activities; etc. This example of 
nonagricultural livelihoods in Godavellagudda village was done by the village women after 
selecting their own criteria. 
Staff: Elias  Participants:  P.  Lakshinarayana 
Suresh  Krishnappa 
Padmovath  Gangulamana 
Gangojamana 
Flg. 8. Sample rapld hlstorlcal appraisal tlmellne (Mascarenhas 1992). that needs  to  be  maintained because they 
protect the  watershed, control erosion and 
provide a natural habltat for many species 
of  fauna. Some people assign a  special 
spiritual role and meaning to  trees. 
In many parts of Asia, certain trees are 
considered the home of  spirits and cer- 
tain groves of trees are viewed as  sacred 
grounds. In the northern Phillppines, vil- 
lagers can show  you the  trees where various 
spirits and nonhuman  residents  live 
(McArthur 1977). In the highlands of Central 
Vietnam, many of  the Montagnard tribal 
groups recognize water spirits and avold 
building dams or wells that would cap- 
ture these spirits (McArthur 1970).  In Laos, 
the Lao Theung (midland Lao) groups 
manage  and conserve certain trees in "sa- 
cred" groves (McArthur et al.  1992).  To 
gather information on this level of mean- 
ing and its subsequent implication for re- 
source management, it may be necessary 
to  tap some  of  the  deeper, nonvisible and 
nontechnical aspects of the indigenous 
knowledge system. In-depth ethnographic 
interviews and case studies are often helpful 
in collecting this level of  information. 
In  a similar fashion, participant obser- 
vation of different agricultural practices can 
also provide important clues to  how peo- 
ple relate to their resource base. While 
working on a soil management research 
project In  an Indonesian transmigration 
ccmmunity, Coikr  ( 1991  ) discovered that 
one ethnic group refused to hoe, while 
another group were avid hoers. This ob- 
servation led her and the other research- 
ers to look deeper at the soil and at in- 
digenous knowledge systems for an ex- 
planation. Thls was not a frivolous task, 
even for the agronomists and sol1 scien- 
tists, because they needed to be sure  that 
the methods they were using to incorpo- 
rate fertilizer into the soil in their field tri- 
als would not be rejected on some cul- 
tural grounds. 
In addition to  how  a resource is defined, 
the issue of whether It is privately or  com- 
munally owned and who has use and ac- 
cess to it can vary. Lamug (1 989) noted 
that in  the highland areas of the Philip- 
pines, tribal groups who have tradition- 
ally practised kaingh, or  swidden agriculture 
believe that custom and historical  use 
patterns determine land-use  rights and 
boundaries. No individual owns a single 
piece of  land. In  contrast, lowland farm- 
ers who have migrated  into the upland 
areas feel that any forest land they have 
cleared and farmed is  thelrs. What peo- 
ple are willlng to  do  with a resource, be it 
a forest, lake or coral reef, can depend greatly 
on such factors as  the relationship between 
legal ownership, on one hand, and tradi- 
tional use and historical rights, on the other. 
The  RRA, which combines primary data from 
interviews and observation with second- 
ary source material on the area, can be  an 
important tool For  understanding the  critical 
factors that affect people's access to  and 
use of particular resources. 
Impllcatlons for Use  In the 
Coastal Zone 
Pressures from population growth, 
urbanization and industrialization in many 
aaas  have resulted in increasing competition 
among  different Interest groups for access 
to and  control  over  a  decreasing 
environmental  resource  base.  Such 
competition is perhaps greatest in coastal 
areas, which traditlonally have had the 
greatest  concentration  of  human 
settlements. They  also are  generally closer 
and within easier access to  major urban 
centers  than the upland areas. They often 
involve the use and management of multiple 
and interdependent common-property 
resources-mangroves.  beaches, coastal 
waters and coral reek. Such human and 
physical environments provlde an Ideal 
living laboratory in which to  utilize. refine 
and expand the exlsting dlagnostic tool 
kit. For thls adaptation to  occur, research- 
ers must first ascertain their level of in- 
terest and commitment to  community-level 
work and define their principal objectives 
and the kind of relationship and ultimate 
outcome they hope to  achieve. These de- 
cisions will facilitate a logical selection of 
tools and techniques appropriate to the 
researchers' major objective and the an- 
ticipated relationships with the host com- 
munity. This decision process will also 
expedite learning the use of  different tools 
and techniques as the researchers will al- 
ready know what they want to  achieve and 
which techniques  wlll probably be the most 
useful. Once this level of  preparation has 
been attained, It will be possible to look 
for ways in which the specific techniques 
may need to be modified for use in  coastal 
areas. 
Individual and group interview tech- 
niques, walking tours and mapping exer- 
cises work well in defined, semi-isolated 
village communities  where there is a relative 
homogeneity of resource management 
interests and practices.  In coastal areas 
where inshore waters are being increas- 
ingly polluted by urban and industrial waste; 
where local Ashers may be competing  with 
urban-funded commercial operations; and 
where the same reefs that provide a habi- 
tat for fish and attraction for tourists are 
being destroyed at alarmillg rates, some 
new techniques may need to be devel- 
oped. Collaboratlve and collegial relation- 
ships may be harder to  forge. We may have 
to look to other fields such as decision 
sciences for conflict resolutlon and for ideas 
on  how  representatives of competing, and 
perhaps hostile, interests can be brought 
Into effective dialogue with each other as 
well as with researchers  and development 
workers. One research orientation that may 
be  useful  in  dealing  wlth  multiple 
stakeholders is analytical hierarchy proc- 
ess (AHP) (Saaty and Kearns 1985). This 
computer-based decision tree technique 
could assist both researchers and coastal 
resldents  In expressing and critically 
analyzing their preferences with respect 
to the management of a given resource. 
Working through this process wlth indi- 
vlduals or groups representing different 
stakeholders  could provide a basis for pro- 
ductive dialogue among groups and as- 
sist In  the clarification of different agenda 
and views of  resources and how they are 
manifested withln a historical  and sociolegat 
context. 
Feeny (thls vol.) suggested four key ele- 
ments that must be considered in  under- 
standing resource management on the 
commons: (1) the resources; (2) the pref- 
erences (desired outcomes, trade-offs) of 
the various users; (3) the technology used 
to  exploit the resources; and (4)  the insti- 
tutions and rules that govern behavior and 
interaction  among users. When looking  at 
such common-property resources as coastal 
mangroves, bays, seagrass meadows and 
coral reefs, it is critical to recognize that 
sustainable management systems will re- 
quire partnerships among a range of us- 
ers and stakeholders lncludlng local fisher 
groups, municipal governments and vari- 
ous national agencles. Dr. Angel Alwla. 
Secretary of  the Phllippine Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources,  in 
discussing the role of the national gov- 
ernment in  coastal resources management 
(thls vol.).  noted that 20 different agen- 
cies have a mandate that impinges one 
way  or another  on coastal resources. 
Pomeroy ( 1993) suggested that sustain- 
able management must involve a work- 
ing  partnership  between  these government 
agencies and local user groups. He referred 
to this partnership as  "co-management" 
where the national government and the 
local community share authority for fish- 
eries management. 
In developing an effective framework 
for such co-management, researchers and 
community development workers need to 
determine the appropriate roles and rela- 
tionships that each group should have with the various stakeholders and comanagers. 
For  example, it may  be easier and more 
suitable for NGOs  to establish long-term 
collegial relationships with Rsher groups 
and local government agencies. Researchers, 
on the other hand, may find it more use- 
ful and cost-effective to develop consultative 
links with national government agencies 
and collaborative relationships with NGOs 
and people's organizations (POs) actively 
involved in helping local groups work out 
effective co-management strategies. 
Of the three conceptual orientations 
discussed in this paper, TOT, agroecology 
and PAR, the last two seem the most rel- 
evant to coastal resources management. 
While it is critical to understand the bio- 
logical, physlcal and technological aspects 
of  the resources, it  is  equally important 
to comprehend the various market attributes 
and external social, political and institu- 
tional forces that influence the behavior 
of  the various stakeholders and comanagers 
(Oakerson 1992).  The objective is to de- 
velop a research and intervention stmt- 
egy  that  combines  the  aspects  of 
agroecology and PAR Into a single alter- 
native process capable of  generating the 
key resource system and institutional data 
necessary for documentlng and compar- 
ing different management strategies. 
While the challenge may seem forml- 
dable, the old adage-  "where there's a 
will, there's a way" is ever true. If researchers 
and practitioners are willing to learn from 
each other and from previous experience 
and to try something different, ways can 
be found to generate and build upon ef- 
fective dialogue wlth the multiple inter- 
est groups who all  have a stake In  sus- 
tained management of  the coastal zone. 
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date. some  writers, agencles and sec- 
tors, including the government and 
multilateral institutions, have asslgned a 
critical  role  to  nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) in natural resource 
regeneration, protection and management 
programs, in  general, and communlty- 
based coastal resources management 
(CBCRM) programs, In  particular. Here in 
the Phillppines. one  could cite the "critical 
role" attributed to the NGOs by the  Aslan 
Development Bank and the government 
in implementing the Fishery Sector Program. 
To  execute  the  coastal  resources 
management component of the program 
in  I2  bays,  the government contracted 
the services of  NGOs primarily  to do 
community organlzing and carry out 
alternative livelihood  projects. Other 
examples  are  the  United  Nations 
Development Programme-Global Environ- 
mental Facility (UNDP-GEF) Small Grants 
Program that commenced in  1992 and 
assigns the implementation of  community 
projects  to  NGOs  and  people's 
organizations; and the National Integrated 
Protected Area System (NIPAS) program 
of the  Department of  Environment and 
Natural  Resources to be funded by GEF through  the World  Bank  which  also 
highlights the role of  NGOs in the  protection 
and management of natural  resources. 
Notable also is  the legal mandate given 
to  NGOs by: the  Local Government Code 
to participate In  the local development 
council; the  NIPAS Act to  sit in the  local 
Protected Area Management Board; and 
the Presidential Executive Order that created 
the Philippine Council  for Sustainable 
Development to  participate in monitoring 
the  implementation of  Agenda 21 by the 
Philippine government. 
Such an assessment recognizes the in- 
creasing influence and expanding role NGOs 
play In  effecting changes in  Philippine 
society, in general, and in the grassroot 
comrnunitles, in particular. It is also a result 
of the relative effectivity and dynamism 
of NGOs in their conduct of development 
work. 
But such recognltlon and assignment 
of  role are not due to a unified  frame- 
work. In  fact, different writers, agencies 
and institutions define such a role from 
varying perspectives and motivations. Thus, 
though there is a general slmiiarity in the 
llnes of work, such as community organizlng 
and livelihood programs, in essence the 
roles assigned by different sectors are not 
the same. 
This paper attempts to define such a 
role from the polnt of view of a service 
NGO  working with Filipino  fishers, llke 
the  Tambuyog Development Center. 
Framework 
The framework of  the role of  a service 
NGO  like Tambuyog in a CBCRM program 
could only be formed from: (1) the rec- 
ognition of  the basic "property rights" 
problem of  an open-access resource llke 
fishery and its resolution in  the Philip- 
pine socioeconomic  and political context, 
and (2)  the  precarious state  of the  coastal 
resources. 
CBCRM essentially is a response to open- 
access regimes that surely and eventu- 
ally lead to  the depletion of fisheries re- 
sources. Such is  brought about by  the 
Institutional vacuum or the weak articu- 
lation of property and management ar- 
rangements that characterizes an open- 
access situation. This  in  turn  breeds 
overfishing, the use of destructive fish- 
ing gear, and the  wanton dumping of wastes 
and pollutants into the country's fishing 
grounds. Such a situation occurs since 
everybody has virtually complete autonomy 
to use the resource and no one has the 
effective ability to  keep any potential user 
out. The resource is  subject to the rule 
of  capture and belongs to  no  one until it 
is in one's possession or actual use; thus, 
no property rights exist under an open- 
access situation. 
Since the basic problem is the  unclear/ 
nonassignment and ineffective articula- 
tion of  property rights, coastal resources 
management must go  beyond the regu- 
lation of  fishing efforts; the curtailment 
of  illegal  fishing  methods;  and 
microlivelihood projects like backyard swine 
and poultry mislng. The beginning of a 
meaningful and effectual response is the 
reverse of the  problem, the clear assignment 
of  property rights to the state, private 
Individuals and communities. The choice 
of what property reglme to  adopt could 
not be made in a vacuum. One must take 
Into account the Philippine social, polltical 
and economic context: the current dis- 
mal state of our natural resources; and 
the factors behind it. 
Theoretically and legally, coastal resources 
In  the Philippines are state properties. 
But historically and in actuality, these are 
virtually  open-access resources due to 
Ineffective management and differential 
enforcement of regulations in their use. 
In  short, even with the new Local  Au- 
tonomy Act, we are not optimistic about 
state property regimes. At the  same  time. 
given a weak state, held captive by rent seekers, strengthening state property 
regimes will  be contrary to the general 
public clamor for a  robust and healthy 
civil society as expressed by the worn- 
out phrase "people empowerment." 
The most familiar property regime is 
private-property rights. Any  adherent of 
mainstream economics will  tell us that 
the best option to  remove the open-ac- 
cess externality and to  have an efficient 
resource allocation is privatization. Indeed, 
that may be true in the dream world of 
perfect competition, but not in  a Third 
World country like the  Philippines wherein 
concentration of  ownership has not only 
wrecked havoc on the resources but has 
also led to the misery and abject pov- 
erty among  the people. Such circumstances 
ultimately add to  the degradation of  open- 
access resource bases, the forests, riv- 
ers, lakes and seas. The current condi- 
tions of Laguna de  Bay attest to this. 
Community property is in essence "pri- 
vate" property for a particular group. This 
means that all others are excluded from 
the community and decisionmaking. In 
this setup, individual co-owners have rights 
and obligations. Generally, the only vi- 
able option for the rational resource use 
and management in our country is a CBCRM 
program with a community-property re- 
gime at  its core. As a system, CBCRM is 
broader than the set of possession and 
actual use of the fisheries resource. It includes 
use rights, exchange rights, distribution 
entitlements, a management scheme and 
an authority instrument as means of ef- 
fective management. It  has a built-in struc- 
ture of economic and noneconomic in- 
centives  that encourage compliance with 
existing conventions and institutions. Such 
a structure emanates from the assump- 
tlon that the behavior of al! members is 
subject to  accepted rules, which are trans- 
parent. Today, even with our "confused" 
culture, conformity with norms is still an 
effective ~nction  against antisocial behavior. 
Unfortunately, a lot of these norms, with 
thelr sanctions and incentives are inop- 
erative or being eroded. usually because 
of factors beyond the control of the  com- 
munity. Most of these are macro in na- 
ture which Include government policies, 
the  prevailing economic climate, among 
others. 
Because of the  very nature of CBCRM, 
advocates of privatization of open-access 
resources would argue that the  cumber- 
some  decisionmaklng process would imply 
higher transaction costs compared to a 
private-property regime. This process is 
exacerbated by the fact that our colonial 
and current history has been biased against 
community-property rights and has vir- 
tually erased traditional arrangements  and 
practices that produce and reproduce a 
community-property regime. But the notion 
of transaction cost here would be rela- 
tive and culturally specific-for  a  long- 
marginalized community, such a cumber- 
some process will  not be considered a 
cost but a benefit. 
Agenda 
With the foregoing discussion, we  could 
say that the real  agenda in  the coastal 
communities is building the necessary social 
infrastructure in setting up CBCRM. This 
would mean enhancing the capability of 
the coastal communities in managing their 
resources. Such would entail community 
organiutions. which refer to  autonomous 
and self-reliant bodies: and institutions, 
meaning social arrangements that pro- 
duce, reproduce and strengthen the com- 
munity-property regime. 
A  community organization must be 
empowered to manage the coastal re- 
sources in such a way that will arrest the 
continuing resource degradation and in- 
crease the existing stock. This could only 
happen if a  real  management buildup 
program is put in place. At the same time, 
these organiutions  must be strengthened so that the  people in the countryside would 
be able to  redlscover and exercise their 
inherent capacltles to decide thelr own 
fate and that of thelr Immediate envlron- 
ment. 
Our Role 
Given the framework and agenda, the 
role a service NCO  must take could only 
be facilitative, in the sense  that the real 
actors in  CBCRM are the people in  the 
coastal communities. Resource manage- 
ment, to stress the point, is not only building 
the capacity of the resource to renew It- 
self but more so, enhancing  the  capabilities 
of  the people in  the coastal communi- 
ties to manage their own lives and re- 
sources. Thus, the role of an NGO could 
only be at best a "partner" agent if the 
real end goal is  people empowerment. 
In that sense.  the objects of the program 
become the subjects as well. 
In doing its facilitative role in helping 
set  up  the  necessary social infrastructure 
of  CBCRM, the  Tambuyog Development 
Center assists the coastal communities 
In  the following components: (1) com- 
munity organizing; (2) research (social, 
technical, policy): (3)  training and edu- 
cation: (4)  socioeconomic work/livelihood: 
(5)  networking and advocacy; and (6)  fi- 
nance and resource mobillzatlon. Problems Encountered in the Implementation of a 
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e destruction of the Philippines' coastal 
ecosystem has reached crisis propor- 
tions (Lacanilao 1989b).  Coral reek, which 
account for 9-25% of  total flsh produc- 
tion (Carpenter 1977;  Murdy and Ferraris 
1980)  have been so  damaged that only 
6%  are in excellent condition. based on 
the llvlng coral cover (Gomez  and Alcala 
1984). Siltation; fishing methods like mum- 
ami, kayakas and blasting; and the use 
of cyanide (Carpenter and Alcala 1977) 
are largely responsible for the destruc- 
tion of the country's coral reefs.  Man- 
groves, a  multi-use/multl-user  coastal 
resource, have been transformed Into a 
privately owned and single-purpose re- 
source  when they were cleared for shrimp 
mariculture (Bailey  1988). Mangroves 
provlde a slgnlficant support for fish and 
shrimp communities (Sasekumar et al. 1992). 
Of 448.3 10  ha of  mangroves existing in 
1968,  only 25 1,574  ha remained In  1976. 
Despite the existence of a "thicket of 
laws and regulations" (World Bank 1989), 
the destruction of the country's coastal 
resources has continued unabated over 
the years. The World Bank (1989)  iden- 
tified the  following organizational prob- 
lems concerning the management of  the 
country's natural resources: inappropri- 
ate  mandates; iesource Ilmitations: confusion 
arising from bureaucratic reorganirations; 
potential for corruption in line agencies 
charged with managing natural resources; 
ineffectiveness of  local governments: and 
lack of empowerment of  user groups. Lacanilao (I  9894 proposed the bllowlng 
strategies to  arrest further destruction of 
Philippine coastal resources: (1)  integration 
of economics and ecology into lawmak- 
ing and decisionmaking systems; (2) 
population control that goes beyond family 
planning programs; and (3)  coastal en- 
hancement programs that will replenish 
depleted resources. This set of strategies 
provided the context within which the 
Southeast Aslan Fisheries Development 
Center's (SEAFDEC) integrated seafarming 
and searanching project was formulated. 
The project addresses the issues of de- 
graded coastal habitats, dwindling fish 
stocks, failure in  law enforcement, and 
the need for alternatlve livelihood op- 
portunities. 
The Philippine government through the 
Department of Agriculture launched the 
Fishery Sector Program (FSP) to  address, 
among  others, the  alleviation of poverty 
of flshers through the development of al- 
ternative livellhood activities and reha- 
bilitation  of  coastal resources. The FSP 
has adopted the community-based  ap- 
proach of coastal resources management 
through greater community participation. 
The Local Government Code of 199  1 pro- 
vided the policy structure of decentral- 
izing the management of coastal resources 
to  the local government units (LGUs). In- 
tegrated management of coastal resources 
will need the collaborative involvement 
of social scientists, biologists, develop- 
ment workers and flshery managers. 
Community Flshery Resource 
Management Project of 
SEAFDEC/AQD 
In  199  1. SEAFDEC's Aquaculture De- 
partment (AQD) started implementing its 
Community Fishery Resource Management 
Project after a year of site selection. The 
development- oriented research on the 
community-based coastal resources man- 
agement (CBCRM) offers a significant op- 
portunity to  improve the livelihood and 
quality of Ilk of millions of poverty-stricken 
flshers. The dual objectives of enhanc- 
ilng the coastal envlronment through ac- 
alve involvement of the community and 
of  Improving the socioeconornlc condi- 
tlons through alternative livelihood need 
the support of community organizations, 
social scientists and development work- 
ers in  applying CBCRM  techniques in 
selected fishing communities. The objectives 
of the project are to: 
1. develop model marine hatchery-nurs- 
ery systems of selected species for 
culture and release of juveniles; 
2. provide additional livelihood through 
cultivation of appropriate finfishes, 
seaweeds, molluscs and crustaceans: 
3. regenerate fish habitats such as  coral 
reek, seagrass beds and mangrove 
swamps; 
4. increase Rsh stock by  releasing ju- 
veniles of suitable species; 
5. develop the community into a strong 
and organized association and grant 
it territorial use rights to  manage the 
project site; and 
6. extend the seafarming and searanching 
activities to  other fishing communities. 
The community-based strategy entails 
four major interventions: ( 1 ) deployment 
of concrete artificial reefs (ARs) for en- 
hancement of fish  habitat; (2) granting 
of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFS) 
to  solve the problems brought about by 
ineffective law enforcement; (3)  community 
organizing and institution buildlng; and 
(4)  alternative livellhood activities. These 
four interventions are integrated and com- 
plementary and should not be taken in 
isolation. 
This  is  SEAFDEC's  first  attempt at 
participatory research involving biologists, 
social scientists and community workers. 
The lack of an effective system of integrating 
the multidisciplinary research studies  and 
relating their objectives to community organizing has resulted In  problems in 
the implementation of  the project. 
This paper presents the two-year ex- 
perience of SEAFDEC in  project imple- 
mentation, wlth emphasls on problems 
encountered in  the process, as well as 
community-organlzlng activities. 
Pllot Slte 
A slte  selection process using blophysid 
and socloeconomic criteria was under- 
taken. The biophysical criteria considered 
the  conditions of the coastal habltats, i.e., 
coral reefs, seagrass beds and mangrove 
areas and site suitability for deploying 
Ak.  The  socioeconomic  criterla used were: 
( 1  ) fishing as  major occupation; (2)  fish- 
ing income below poverty level: (3)  control 
of fishing practices; (4) use of fishing credlt; 
(5)  potential for alternative livelihood; (6) 
Flg. 1. Malallson Island: 
the pllot rlte of the Corn- 
munlly Flshcry Resource 
Management Project. 
membershlp In  fishing association; and 
(7)  presence  or  awareness  of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
Out of flve candidate areas in the islands 
of Panay and Guimaras, Malallson Island 
was chosen as  the pilot site. 
A small island of 55  ha and 74 house- 
holds, and lying at 1 125' north latitude 
and 122 east longitude. Malalison is lo- 
cated on Panay Island, central Philippines, 
and belongs to  the municipallty ofculasi, 
province of  Antlque (Fig. 1  ). Only 12 ha 
of the total land area comprise the vil- 
lage, while 33 ha are classified as refor- 
estation area. Only 3 ha are riceland; the 
rest of the land is covered with coconut, 
black myrtle and @/I-/p//  (Leocaena  sp.). 
There is also about a hectare of fishpond 
which is  seldom used. One  side of the 
island is exposed to  amihan or northeast 
monsoon, while the other side is  open 
to habagat  or southwest monsoon. &4  59  10-14  15-19  20-24  25-29  30-34  35-39  40-44  45-49  50-54  55-59  60-64  65 and onr 
Age 
Flg. 2. Age structure of Malallson Island populatlon (30 Aprll 1991). 
Malalison  has a young population of 
431 (Fig. 2). More than half are  younger 
than 20, 29%  are 9  years old and  younger. 
There are more females than males. 
Subsistence fishing Is  the primary means 
of livelihood of  the islanders (Fig. 3).  This 
occupation refers to a widespread pat- 
tern of economic activity which involves 
heavy dependence upon small-scale pro- 
duction of marine resources, largely for 
home consumptlon, and for sale or ex- 
change in nearby households or markets, 
again for immediate home consumption 
(Szanton 197  1 ). The heads of 55 house- 
holds are  fishers; some  members ofvarious 
households are also engaged In  fishing. 
Prlmary level (Grades 1-4) Is  the high- 
est educational attainment for majority 
of the population (Fig. 4).  The  island has 
only a primary school with two teach- 
ers. Chlldren have to attend the elementary 
school at  Culasi. across the channel. 
Majority of the vlllagers are poor. In 
1990, half of the household populatlon 
earned an annual income of  less than 
P1 5.000 (Fig. S).'  Based on  a 1988  pov- 
erty threshold of P2,654  per month, 75.3% 
of households lived below the poverty 
level in 1990. 
Occupation 
Flg. 3. Prlmary occupatlon of household heads 
In Malallson Island. coastal assessment and seafarming tech- 
nlques while the socioeconomic studies 
are on traditional fishing boundaries and 
TUWs, and economic utilization of resources. 
Community organizing  and  institution  buiid- 
ing are facilitated by an NGO.  the Par- 
ticipatory Research. Organization of  Com- 
munities and Education ~owards  Strug- 
gle for Self-Reliance (PROCESS)  Founda- 
tion Inc. Seaweeds farming is the initial 
cooperative livelihood  activity implemented 
by the association with technical and fi- 
J  nancial support from SEAFDEC. 
Flg. 4. Educational attainment of population aged 
8 years old and over, In Malallson Island. 
(In thousands,+) 
Flg. 5. Household Income dlstrlbutlon, 1990. In Malallson Island. 
Actlvltles  Research 
Complementary activities on research.  The research team is composed of 
community organizing  and alternative live-  biologists, an aquaculture economist, a 
lihood are simultaneously being under-  rural sociologist, a seaweed expert and 
taken. The biological research focuses on  technical assistants with background in fisheries. A technical assistant and an aide 
are assigned full-time on the island. 
The following research activities are being 
conducted: 
1.  Resource assessment -  a detailed 
survey on organisms and a description 
of physiw-chemical properties of the waters 
in the site. Organisms being surveyed in- 
clude seagrasses, seaweeds, corals, fish 
and other invertebrates. The percentage 
of cover of hard and soft corals, algae, 
seagrasses: species composltion, dlver- 
sity and abundance of fish  populations 
and other Invertebrates associated with 
. the reef are being assessed through un- 
derwater Ilk-form transect techniques using 
SCUBA. Water quality parameters such 
as  pH, temperature, salinity and turbid- 
ity are monitored on a quarterly basis. 
Samples  are analyzed for dissolved oxy- 
gen, suspended sollds and nutrient con- 
tent. This study is on its second year and 
will be  continued for another three  years. 
2.  Economic utilization  of resources 
-  identifies and evaluates present and 
potential utilization of resources to for- 
mulate policies and projects that would 
lead to optimal resource use for the benefit 
of the communitjr. Rapid  rural appraisal 
techniques like semi-structured and key 
informant interviews, direct observation, 
mapping and village transect preparation 
are employed in  preliminary data gath- 
ering. Fig. 6 shows  the agrofishery transect 
of Malalison identifying water- and land- 
based resources, problems encountered 
by  flshers and opportunities for utlliza- 
tion of other resources. Respondents for 
group Interviews are usually composed 
of six married couples. The second phase 
of the study employs a structured ques- 
tionnaire regarding income derived from 
the use of fish resources and invertebrates 
like sea urchin and sea cucumber. 
3.  Investigation of traditional marine 
boundaries and TURFS -  documents the 
existence of sea  tenure practices; explores 
the social consequences of  deployment 
of ARs: and determines the legal and social 
Implications of granting exclusive use rights 
to the Fishermen's Association of  Malallson 
Island (FAMI). 
4.  Seaweed cultivation -  is composed 
of two substudies, namely, "Bottom-line 
and floating raft methods of seaweed cul- 
tivation" and "Cage culture of  grouper 
and seaweeds". The objectives of the  study 
are to: ( 1) develop a seedbank and dem- 
onstration farm for seaweed farming; (2) 
monitor the growth rate and condition 
of the test plants and production of the 
seaweed using three variants of the long- 
line technique, as well as the envlron- 
mental factors  which may influence these 
variables; (3)  demonstrate the mechan- 
ics of seaweed and finfish cage culture; 
and (4)  undertake economic  assessment 
of  seaweed farming singly or in polyculture 
with finfish in cages. 
Community orginlzlng and 
institution bulldlng 
The long-term goal of conserving and 
regenerating coastal resources through 
a sustainable, community-based approach 
requires a  strong, self-reliant  people's 
organization. The success or failure of AR 
deployment and the granting of TURFS 
to the fishers' association depend, to a 
large extent, on the knowledge, capa- 
bilities and attitudes of community members 
regarding sustainable coastal resource use. 
When Malalison was chosen as  the project 
site, no formal people's organization existed 
on the island. An informal group of  fishers 
called MICA  (Malalison Island, Culasi, 
Antique) was engaged in a fishing activity 
called duldog,  the  island's version of  muro- 
ami, a fishing method declared illegal by 
the Bureau  of Fisheries  and Aquatic 
Resources since 1986. In November 1990, 
FAMl was organized through the initiative 
of the municipal government of Culasi, 
and registered with the Securities and Midland  S  Wine 
ihwsrll  - 
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The members of MICA joined FAMI. 
Being a research institution with  no 
experience in  community organizing, 
SEAFDEC consulted with NGOs in Antique 
and chose PROCESS Foundation, Inc. as 
its partner NGO. 
The foundation has a wide experience 
in organizing and mobilizing fry gather- 
ers and fisher communities not only in 
Antique but in other provinces in  Panay 
as well. A Memorandum of Agreement 
was entered into by SEAFDEC/AQD and 
PROCESS for the latter to undertake a training 
program and assign a full-time commu- 
nity facilitator in the island. 
The long-term  objectives of  commu- 
nity-organizing activities are to: 
I.  empower the people in  Malalison 
through effective and efficient par- 
ticipation in socioeconomic and po- 
litical activities: 
2.  facilitate people's organization and 
community access  to  and control over 
resources and provide opportunities 
and means of production; 
3. develop skills and capability for self- 
reliant, self-managed sustainable 
organization, projects and community: 
4. inculcate values and promote aware- 
ness of and a proper attitude towards 
environmental conservation; and 
5. identify, explore and  implement ap- 
propriate, indigenous and innovative 
technologies as well as sustainable 
alternative livelihood projects. 
The community referred to is composed 
of FAMl members, who  are primarily house- 
hold heads. 
Training programs are conducted through 
lectures. The outputs  of each training session 
are group reports from the participants 
done  through workshops. Ten training pro- 
grams, including a mid-year assessment 
workshop, were held in  1992. Of these, 
two  were on membership orientation and 
one  was on gender sensitivity. The  other 
training programs were exclusively  for 
officers and potential young leaders. Topics 
discussed included basic leadership skills. 
organization development and manage- 
ment, project development  and rnanage- 
ment, cooperative development,  basic 
financial  management, basic paralegal 
knowledge, and ecology and environment 
protection and conservation. The offic- 
ers' training programs were usually 3- 
to 4-day live-in  seminars held outside 
Malalison. Since participants are usually 
breadwinners, a replacement income of 
PSO/participant/day  was provided. The 
foundation facilitated FAMl's membership 
in a regionwide federation of subsistence 
farmers' and fishers' organizations. Moreo- 
ver, representatives of FAMl also attended 
other capability-building workshops and 
meetings organized by PROCESS. 
In  199  1, experiments in  a low-tech- 
nology, low-financing,  labor-intensive 
seaweed farming using Kappaphycus 
alvarezli were undertaken to showcase 
a livelihood activity on the island. Sea- 
weed farming is  not new to the island- 
ers, however. It was started by a family 
of a young fisher in  1989, and by 1990, 
three families were already engaged in 
the activity. Seaweed farming on the Is- 
land Is  beset by two problems: (1) planting 
could only be done  during the northeast 
monsoon as  the area suitable for seaweed 
production is exposed to  the southwest 
monsoon, and (2)  nonavailability of seedlings 
in nearby communities. In  199 1, nobody 
engaged in seaweed farming because of 
the latter problem. 
The favorable results of the SEAFDEC 
experlments encouraged several mem- 
bers of FAMl to try seaweed farming in 
January 1992. Although production per 
farmer was high, the aggregate volume 
was less than a ton whlch did not attract 
buyers. The harvest was sold at a breakeven price. This experience, however, did  not 
discourage the fishers. In  December 1992, 
FAMl decided to venture into seaweed 
farming. SEAFDEC provided an interest- 
free seed money of  P 10,000 which FAMl 
lent to 50 participating members. The loan 
covered the cost of seedlings and some 
materials. As agreed upon during gen- 
eral assembly meetings, FAMI gets 5%2 
of sales of each participating member. 
SEAFDEC continuously provided technl- 
cal assistance before and during the farming 
period. At present, most of the partici- 
pants have two croppings and the last 
harvest will be in June before the onset 
of  the southwest monsoon. The targeted 
total production is about 3 t. 
Other livelihood activities have been 
identified by FAMI. Hog raising is high 
on the list because of the availability of 
indigenous feeds like coconut meat and 
ipil-ipil leaves. Cage culture (nursery and 
growout) of selected finfish species like 
milkfish, grouper and siganids is being 
considered.  Experimental runs on these 
commodities would be undertal<en  to  de- 
termine their viability. 
In June 1992, a consumer store was 
established to supply  rice to members 
especially during  the typhoon season. This 
venture, however, failed because of poor 
collection of receivables. 
Problems Encountered 
Several problems have been encoun- 
tered during the course of project im- 
plementation. 
1.  High  expectatons of immediate 
project benefits. During  the last quarter 
of 1990, the municipal  government of  Culasi 
was formally  informed of the selection 
of Malalison as pilot site. Meetings  with 
municipal and barangay (village) omciais, 
NGO representatlves. fishers' representatives 
and  Malalison residents were held during 
that period  to explain the objectives and 
strategy of project implementation. The 
short- and long-term socioeconomic benefits 
to the community were emphasized to 
get  the cooperation of  potential beneficiaries. 
The  high expectations of community 
members are an offshoot of this presentation. 
A case in  point is the community members' 
desire for the immediate  construction and 
deployment of Ah.  This could provide 
employment and business opportunities 
for the community through the demand 
for gravel and sand, and services. However, 
the decision to  construct ARs will be based 
on  data regarding biological and physical 
properties  of the coastal waters, engineering 
designs and socioeconomlc considerations 
on potential use conflict. This information 
will come from ongoing  research studies. 
The readiness of  the association to manage 
the site for AR deployment is another 
consideration. The area for ARdeployment 
is the same site where TURFS would be 
declared. The impatience of beneficiaries 
over the long  time to  construct and deploy 
ARs has caused irritation between FAMl 
members and SEAFDEC staff: has reduced 
attendance in FAMI general assemblies; 
and has reached a  point where some 
influential community members have 
threatened to pass a petition to  stop the 
project. Some members of the Board of 
Directors have even lost interest in  FAMI 
activities. 
2.  Lack  of integration  between 
SEAFDEC's  research  activities  and 
PROCESS' commun&-~~WngactivIdles, 
Community organizing is the primary 
responsibility of  the community facilitator 
assigned by PROCESS.  Her frequent absence 
in the site and lack of supervision have 
created a gap in community-organizing 
activities. There is some confusion within 
the community because some members 
of the SEAFDEC  team are also deeply 
involved in  community-organizing  activities. 
Irregular coordination and communication 
withln and between the two institutions 
put the project in jeopardy. 3. Unstable leadership wlthin FAMI. 
The flrst president elected in November 
1990 resigned without finishing his term 
to look for employment in Manila. The 
vice president who took over as  presi- 
dent is  young and energetic but has yet 
to gain the respect of  older members of 
FAMI. He prefers that a reelection of of- 
ficers be held to "legltimize" their posi- 
tions. The  leadership problem is com- 
pounded by a long-standing feud between 
two big  families on the island. The FAMl 
president, who is  associated with  one of 
the feuding farnllles, must be able to  balance 
his actions to satisfy both sides. 
4. Practice of  muro-am/ by some as- 
sociation members afflllaled w/th the 
present polit/cal leader. The presence 
of SEAFDEC in  the island has substantlally 
reduced the practice of illegal fishing 
practices. The continuous education cam- 
paign of  SEAFDEC and PROCESS has gen- 
erated concern for the fishing grounds 
among  community members. Because of 
low income and lack of  other sources of 
livellhood, some members continue with 
muro-ami operations due to high catch. 
However, social pressure has built up  within 
the community against those who per- 
sist in illegal fishing practices. 
5. Lack of  understandhg  and appre- 
ciation of reswrcb activities by some 
commun/ly members. This situation has 
led to  resistance on  the part of  some fishers 
to  provide informatlon like catch data to 
researchers. Moreover,  community  members 
have also reached a saturatlon point be- 
cause of interviews and surveys going 
on almost at the same time. 
6. Need for a full-time project leader. 
The present project leader devotes only 
50% of his tlme to the project and this Is 
not enough to  effectively attend to  project 
needs like coordination with PROCESS. 
integration  of research actlvltles, admin- 
istrative matters and report preparation. 
Problems arising from lack of  communl- 
cation and coordination could have been 
avoided If project leadership was given 
Full-time attention. 
Responses to Problems 
The problems which beset the project 
are an offshoot of  the inexperience of  the 
research  team  In  community-based 
development projects. The team members 
are basically researchers whose orientations 
are laboratory- and problem-specific type 
of studies. This lack of  experlence, however. 
is compensated for by the rnultidisclpiinary 
composition of the research team which 
provides a forum for discussions  and 
exchange of  ideas. Gradually, team members 
have been able to integrate themselves 
into the community and understand the 
attitudes, values and visions of the fishers. 
It  Is imperative that continuous dialogue. 
both formal and informal, be undertaken 
among  researchers, the community facilitator 
and members. Several forms of commu- 
nication implemented by the project have 
been found effective in eliciting partici- 
pation: 
1. Regular community dlalogue and 
general assembller.  These meetings are 
Initiated by FAMI, SEAFDEC or PROCESS 
to discuss  major concerns confronting 
members of  the association and the staff. 
Such concerns included delay In  AR con- 
struction, lack of income-generating ac- 
tivities, illegal  fishing practices  and problems 
associated with FAMl activitles.  Durlng 
these meetings. project objectives.  im- 
plementing strategies and timetable of 
activltles are always discussed for the 
communlty to  understand the long-term 
nature of  the project. 
2. Personal vfs/ts to some members 
of  FAMI. This has created an atmosphere 
of  familiarity and confidence in  the project 
staff. During  these visits, inevitably, even 
personal or family problems  are discussed 
such as husband-and-wife quarrels, un- 
paid  debts, Illness in  the family. The show of concern about their problems erases 
doubts regarding  the slncerity ofthe  project 
staff. 
3. Regular meetings of FA Mi  Board 
of Directors. This is a good venue for 
discussing details concerning project irn- 
plementation. The community facilitator 
and SEAFDEC staff are usually invited to 
shed light on some issues arising From 
project implementation. 
4. Presentation of research resuits 
to  the community. This has been found 
effective in  sustaining the interest of  com- 
munity members. Role playing by the re- 
searcher-presentor works well in projecting 
desirable attitudes of  the fishers, such as 
sharing information vital to  the different 
studies. Community members are encour- 
aged to  ask questions, react to research 
findlngs and confirm the veracity of re- 
search data. This forum has substantially 
reduced resistance and noncooperation 
on the part of community members. 
Appropriate visual aids are used for easier 
understanding  of  research results. Moreover, 
the importance  of  the roles of  biologists, 
economist, sociologist, seaweed expert 
and technical assistants gets to be ap- 
preciated by the community. 
5.  Cross-visits  to other people's 
organizations. At the end of the one- 
year  tralning program facilitated  by 
PROCESS,  members of the FAMI Board 
of Directors and potential leaders went 
on  cross-visits to other provinces in Panay 
Island. They were able to  interact and share 
experiences,  problems and frustrations 
with officers and members of similar 
associations as well as observe successhl 
alternative  livelihood projects. These 
interactions made FAMl officers realize 
not  only the importance of  organized efforts 
to improve thelr economic well-being, 
but  also the problems and disappointments 
held in  common  with  other associations. 
6. Planning workshop participated in 
by community members, SEAFDEC staff 
and PROCESS representatives.  The two- 
day workshop was an opportunity for com- 
munlty members to  discuss their achieve- 
ments,  frustrations, expectations and 
problems related to  the project. SEAFDEC 
and PROCESS discussed their respective 
roles in  project Implementation.  The fol- 
lowing needs and gaps were identified 
during  the workshop: ( 1  ) the community 
members' deslre for income-generating 
projects and capability-building in  man- 
asing  small-scale enterprises; (2)  strength- 
ening of committees In terms of policy 
formulatlon and implementation,  role 
clarification, and leadership training; (3) 
need for community facilitator to  stay in 
the island: and (4)  delineation of  the re- 
spective roles of  SEAFDEC and PROCESS 
to  avoid confusion among  community mem- 
bers. The workshop's  outcome became 
the basis for project proposal prepara- 
tion for the second year of community- 
organizing activities. 
lessons Learned 
Project implementation of this nature 
needs well-integrated, closely coordinated 
and effectively managed activities. A full- 
time project leader is a must to ensure 
smooth implementation: at least 50% of 
hislher time must be spent in the pilot 
site. Moreover. he/she should have a good 
grasp of  all project components, Integrate 
them and relate effectively with all in- 
stitutions involved. 
Good project management starts with 
well thought-out  short- and long-term 
plans, clear goals and objectives, a real- 
istic budget, as  well as  qualified and 
dedicated researchers, community workers 
and support staff. Each team member should 
not only know hislher area of  responsi- 
bility but  also be  aware of  the other mem- 
bers' work to  arrive at a harmonious re- 
lationship. Regular meetings  and consul- 
tations among  team members are nec- 
essary and periodlc monitoring  of  activities will  provide up-to-date  information re- 
garding the  project's status and problems 
encountered. 
Close coordination between the research 
Institution and the NGO  through regular 
consultations will minimize confusion among 
community members. Each  must know 
what the other is  doing, with the lead 
institution integrating the  community-or- 
ganlzing aspect with research activities. 
The success of  a community-based coastal 
resources management project will de- 
pend on  the degree  of  attalnment of  so- 
cial, economic and environmental indi- 
cators, e.g., diversified sources of  liveli- 
hood: active participation of  the people 
in community activities; and enhancement 
of  the coastal resources through  regu- 
lated fishing practices. The experiences 
In  the project will  help improve policy 
formulations on coastal resources man- 
agement. 
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lntroductlon 
T 
e  Central Visayas Regional Project (CVRP) 
in  the Philippines was a  pilot  project 
intended to address resources manage- 
ment issues, among  others, In the four prov- 
inces of Central Visayas, or Region VII, and 
to strengthen the government's program 
of decentralllmtion. Prepared in  1982, It 
was implemented for 8.5 years from July 
1984 to  December 1992.  The total project 
cost was  estimated at US$44 million with 
financial assistance from the World Bank. 
Using the  watershed as  the planning unit. 
three primary project components -  up- 
land  agriculture,  soclal  forestry  and 
nearshore fisheries -  were supported by 
activities in  infrastructure,  Institutional 
strengthening of  regional government 
agencies, applied wmrnunications, research, 
training and technical  assistance. The 
nearshore fisheries component, the  topic 
of this paper, utilized  about 10% of the 
overall project budget. 
The  history of CVRP extends back to 1975 
when Filipino planners and World Bank staff 
recognized a causal relationship between 
the continuing degradation of renewable 
natural resources and increasing poverty 
in  rural  communltles. Forest  cover was 
shrinking; topsoil eroded rapidly from upland 
slopes belng farmed with lowland rowcrop 
methods; coastal waters were overfished; 
and highly productive fisheries habitats like 
coral reek and mangrove brests  were being 
destroyed. 
Decllnlng harvests from degraded re- 
sources combined with rapid population 
growth resulted in Increasing poverty among 
forest occupants, upland farmers and 
artisanal fishers. Most of these resources 
users were aware of the problem as  they 
watched their harvests and income dwln- 
dle year by year. It was also recognized that to  effectively 
address  the numerous resources manage- 
ment issues involved, the devolutlon of 
many decisionmaking powers from the 
central offices to  the regional level would 
be required. 
The prlmary objectives of the nearshore 
fisheries component were: 
to  assist coastal communities to im- 
prove and sustain the productivity of 
thelr coastal waters; 
to  increase the income of small-sale 
fishers and profitability of their oc- 
cupation; and 
to  strengthen the government's pro- 
gram of decentralization. 
The CVRP was implemented at 5 coastal 
sites in 4 provinces which included  16 
municipalities and 182  villages (barangay) 
along 223 km of coastline. Organized fisher 
communities were greatly involved in the 
development project planning process, 
implementation and perlodic monitoring. 
Project staff that stayed permanently in 
the coastal project sites  served as facilitators. 
community organizers and trainors to  the 
fishers. 
Responsible  for much of  the resources 
degradation. they were also the only ones 
who could  undertake  rehabilitation  and 
sustainable management over the long  term. 
3.  The ability to  provide and secure long- 
term tenure over portions of the resource 
was seen as an important means of  re- 
shlctlng access and of encouraging sus- 
tainable management practices. 
4.  Nearly all the interviewed small-scale 
fishers related problems that were symp- 
tomatic of serious overfishing. However. 
scientific data were not available to con- 
firm or deny that conclusion. In addition, 
the responsible national government agency 
was still assisting fishers to acquire bet- 
ter hear to reach the great untapped re- 
sources in the sea. The regulatory frame- 
wrk  did not provide adequate mechanisms 
fa  management by local governments. Thus. 
project design focused on rehabilitating 
degraded coastal habitats and prohibiting 
access of those who used illegal and habitat- 
destructive methods, although the need 
for harvest management as  well, was evi- 
dent to project planners. 
Assumptlons 
During project preparation, several re- 
source assumptions were made by project 
planners that shaped project design, like 
the following: 
1.  While Philippine law provided for a 
state property management reglme, the 
government lacked the capability to ef- 
fectively enforce its fesource management 
regulations. The resulting situation in the 
government-owned  forests, upland and 
coastal waters Is best described as  de  hcto 
open access. This lack of effective control 
on resources access was determined to 
be a root cause common to all forms of 
Project objectives were to be attained 
wing  a community-based approach which 
included the following basic aspects: 
1.  The community would be the lead 
agency, not a government agency which 
WIS  the usual practice. Sustainable resources 
management could only be implemented 
and institutlonalized  wlthln the commu- 
nity if  the members were properly organ- 
i-d  and trained to develop the needed 
capability. 
2.  Resources management interventions 
were kept simple and appropriate to  the 
needs identified  by the community. Im- 
plementation was by coastal residents and 
-  ~  ~  --  ~-  ~- the control of illegal fishing and 
other habitat-destructive activities; 
mangrove reforestation and rnan- 
agement; 
the construction, placement and 
management of  artificial reefs; 
the protection of  all coral reek  and 
the establishment of  marine sanc- 
tuaries including 10-1  5% ofthe  total 
reef area within a municipality; 
limited  small-sale mariculture; and 
later in the project, the use of 
deepwater fish-attracting devices 
harvested only by handlines. 
3.  Development activities focused on 
the barangay or village,  the lowest level 
of  government organization in  the Philip- 
pines. The Barangay Development Coun- 
cil (BDC) was activated as the primary plan- 
ning  and  implementing body. The  BDC could 
be expanded and made representative of 
the  village and would provide  a direct link 
to  the government system. Groups of  vil- 
lage residents were also organized to  im- 
plement resources management activities 
of  mutual interest to members. 
4.  As more villages were organized, 
their activities, particularly the control of 
illegal fishing, were federated at the mu- 
nicipal and then the site level. 
5.  Community organizers involved  the 
community in situation analysis,  includ- 
ing the identification and prioritization of 
Issues. Key Issues identified by  the  village 
were addressed in as a  constructive, 
nonconfrontational manner as possible. 
While coastal resources management Is- 
sues were always among those with the 
hlghest priority, the community was as- 
sisted to  deal with priority nonresources 
management issues as well. 
6.  Communlty development and tech- 
nical workers lived in their respective tar- 
get villages where they served to  stimu- 
late and support community  action rather 
than as community leaders. 
7.  Livelihood of  fishers would be im- 
proved  with better resources management 
in  an overfished environment, not  through 
the provision of  additional flshing gear or 
boats. 
8.  lmplementation would be done in 
two  stages: (1) determine if  the approach 
would work and if so, (2) institutionalize 
the successful approach in  the community, 
local governments and government sup- 
port agencies. 
9.  To  facilitate  devolution  of 
decisionmaking power  and to  provide secure 
resources  access, the following  points  were 
settled with national government agen- 
cies in a formal Memorandum of  Agree- 
ment signed in  June 1984: 
The then Bureau of Forest Devel- 
opment would issue Stewardship 
Agreements, a 25-year renewable 
lease in  mangrove and other for- 
est land areas. This was the first 
long-term tenure instrument offered 
by the government to forest oc- 
cupants who  had previously been 
considered "squatters". 
The Bureau of  Fisheries  and Aquatic 
Resources agreed to (a) allow 
municipal  fishery  ordinances, 
including  those  establishing 
municipal marine sanctuaries, to 
be approved at the regional rather 
than at the national level; (b) permit 
the licensing of artificial reef use 
so that access could be controlled: 
and (c) stop the use in  Region VII 
of muro-am/ and kayakas,  two 
fishing practlces destructive to coral 
reefs. 
10.Project funds were released dlrectly 
from the Department of  Budget and Man- 
agement in Manila to the Project Ofice 
based in Cebu Clty without passing  through 
another national government office. Project 
Site Managers based at the five Site Man- 
agement  Units  also  had  their  own 
checkbooks and were authorized to dis- 
burse up to USB3.000  per transaction, 
provlded the item was in  their approved 
workplan and budget. The direct fund flow and fiscal autonomy by Slte Managers rea- 
sonably facilitated implementation and was 
unique at that time. 
Results 
For 8.5 years, the coastal fishers' asso- 
ciations developed the knowledge and skills 
in the rehabilitation and management of 
the  nearshore fisheries. Some reglonal re- 
source management regulations were 
imposed by the national government like 
the ban for the operations of muro-ami 
and kayakas in coastal waters. However, 
several equally Important resources man- 
agement issues were not formally addressed, 
such as the user rights to artificial  reefs 
and the official recognltion of coral reefs 
with sanctuary that were identified, estab- 
lished and managed by the fishers' asso- 
ciations and the community. This situa- 
tion prompted most municipal government 
authorities  to  pass ordinances supporting 
the  fishers and the  community's resources 
management activltles. 
Since CVRP was a pilot project, it was 
recognized at  the  outset that the motives 
and means to  act collectively would open 
up better policy alternatives to the com- 
mon-property problems in the coastal ar- 
eas  which resulted in dwindling fish catch. 
(Berkes et al.  119891  defined common- 
property resources as "a class of resources 
for which exclusion is  difflcuit and joint 
use involves subtractability".) 
The CVRP's  position then was to try 
developing a mechanism where the coastal 
fishery shall be jointly  managed by the 
organized marginal fishing communities 
and the government so  that users' rights 
would be equally recognized in the man- 
agement  of resources classified under com- 
munal and state  property. Although it was 
anticipated that operationally, joint resources 
management may create some overlap- 
ping functions, the practice of co-manage- 
ment can be put into place, thus initiat- 
Ing a better scheme of community-based 
management. 
In summary,  the Intent of CVRP  was to 
work with fishing comrnunlties to try to 
d~evelop  what is now termed co-manage- 
ment of coastal resources. Although CVRP 
was Implemented by a specially created 
government entity, the methods used were 
those of nongovernmental organizations. 
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is paper hopes to share the experi- 
ences learned by the Palawan Integrated  T" 
Area Development Project (PIADP) rela- 
tive to community-based resources man- 
agement (CBRM). 
The project components of  PIADP which 
may in  one way or the other have the 
nature of  a CBRM, as  defined in this pa- 
per, are presented. When  PIADP was 
launched more than a decade  ago, CBRM 
as a development strategy was not yet 
in full use. 
During the later stage of PIADP imple- 
mentation, however, CBRM was recog- 
nized as  a potent strategy towards sus- 
tainable development. For the Province 
of  Palawan (Fig. 1 ), this came about when 
the strategic environmental plan (SEP) was 
formulated In the late 19805. Consequently, 
pilot-testing activities were undertaken 
by  PIADP  in  the different areas of  the 
province. 
Speciflcally, this paper highlights one 
of  the relevant pilot-test projects: the Honda 
Bay  Resource  Management  Program 
(HBRMP),  implemented from June 1989 
to December 1990. 
Here are some basic assumptions and/ 
or understanding of  community-based 
coastal resources management (CBCRM) 
and its related terms: 
1. "Resources management" is the uti- 
lization of natural resources with due 
respect to and recognition of  sound 
ecological processes. 
2. A "community" in relation to  CBRM 
is a social organization not necessarily 
synonymous to  a village (barangay) or  municipal  government.  its 
geographical boundaries could be 
defined in  relation to its adjacent and/ 
or surrounding  land or water resources. 
Thus, a community could be a group 
of  households in  an upland area, an 
association of fishers, an irrigators' 
associatlon,  lowland residents,  an 
organization  of coffee  growers, 
etc. 
3. 'Community-based"  denotes the 
participation  of  the organized members 
of a given community in activities 
benefitting and/or affecting the com- 
munity. 
4. CBRM is a strategy undertaken  through 
the active participation of  an organized 
community. 
5. CBCRM specifidly refers to  the coastal 
resources and adjacent cornmunitles. PIADP: a Brlef Background 
Officially launched in 1982,  PIADP Phase 
I was a multisectoral seven-year project 
funded through a US$47-million loan from 
the  AsIan Development Bank (ADB), a 7- 
million grant from the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and a counterpart from 
the Philippine Government. It has 14  com- 
ponents which focused on agricultural 
development as  the key sector comple- 
mented by essential infrastructure and social 
and institutional services. The integrated 
area development strategy in Palawan was 
designed to: ( 1 ) develop the agriculture 
sector in areas with the greatest potentials; 
(2) improve external transport services 
and access to  population centers and ag- 
ricultural areas; (3) strengthen support 
services and develop farming systems  and 
production technology appropriate to  local 
conditions; (4)  expedite the issuance of 
land tltles: and (5)  build  up absorption 
and implementation capacities. 
The project area covered the whole main 
island of the province (about 1.2 million 
ha) but concentrated on its central and 
southern parts where 60%  of the 400,000 
inhabitants live and where the potential 
areas for agriculture are situated. After 
1988,  the project was allowed to  be ex- 
tended for another two  years within which 
99% of its total  targets were attained. 
As a multl-agency project, it was imple- 
mented by the Departments of Agricul- 
ture (DA), Environment and Natural Re- 
sources (DENR), Public Works and High- 
ways (DPWH), and Health: Central Bank 
of  the Philippines; National  Irrigation 
Administration (NIA): and PIADP Office, 
which was then under the National Council 
on Integrated Area Development. 
On 27 September 1990, the US858- 
million  loan for Phase  II or the Second 
Palawan IAD Project (SPIADP)  was signed 
between AD0 and the Philippine Govern- 
ment. Formally  launched in  1991. It  is 
scheduled to  end by  f 996. 
The SPIADP expanded its coverage by 
targetting the northern mainland, the island 
municipalities, as  well as continuing the 
development efforts in the  southern and 
central mainland covered during the  first 
phase, or  effectively, the  whole Provlnce 
of  Palawan. Aside from projects in Phase 
I. SPIADP now includes fisheries  support 
services, an integrated health program 
and women-in-development as  additional 
components. This paper shall focus on 
PIADP 1's CBRM experiences. 
CBRM and PIADP I 
Of  the 14 project components under 
PIADP  I,  only four en be  classified as  di- 
rectly in consonance with the concept of 
CBRM-communal irrigation, rural drink- 
ing  water  supply  (RDWS),  upland 
stabilization and integrated environmen- 
tal program (IEP). 
Under communal irrigation, the man- 
agement of  water for rice production was 
handled  by  an Irrigators Service Asso- 
ciation (ISA). The facilities of the RDWS 
component were managed through the 
Rural Waterworks and Sanitation ASSO- 
ciation (RWSA). Upland stabilization aimed 
to offer alternatives to  the environmen- 
tally destructive shifting cultivation (lo- 
cally called kaingin) practices by upland 
farmers in  three specific pilot sites. Fi- 
nally, IEP  hoped to provide the rational 
framework towards sustainable develop- 
ment in  the province by formulating a 
SEP that recognized the importance and 
relevance of CBRM. 
Communal irrigation 
implemented by NIA, this project com- 
ponent covered 4,500 ha broken down 
into several communal schemes  averag- 
ing 250 ha each, scattered throughout 
the central and southern mainland Palawan. For each communal irrigation system. 
an ISA was organized by a cornmunlty 
organlzer deployed by NIA who stayed 
in the area for about one-two years. The 
organization of lSAs was required by NIA 
prior to the actual design of the irriga- 
tion dam and its  canals as these ISAs had 
to participate as early as the design stage. 
During construction,  the ISA members 
provided a certain amount of equity (in 
cash or in  kind), and the association moni- 
tored the progress (including financial) 
of  the project. Upon completion, the ISA 
had to formally accept the irrigation  system 
and manage the scheme. From the or- 
ganizing up to the turnover stage, NIA 
conducted several trainings aimed at en- 
hancing ISAs' organlzatlonal and tech- 
nlcal capabllities on water management. 
The  performance of these  irrlgatlon 
systems after turnover, however, varied 
(i.e.,  on cropping intensity, production, 
organlzatlonal cohesiveness, self-reliance 
or dependence on NIA). Several lSAs 
became  Inactive;  complaints  from 
downstream  farmers  in  terms  of 
nonavailability of water were noted; as 
well as reports of nonincrease in cropping 
intensities and/or productivity; and lack 
of credit and inadequate postharvest 
facilities. However, some irrigation  systems 
are still performing well now and have 
achleved their desired expectations. 
In summary, the following were ob- 
servations on the project in relation with 
the concept of CBRM: 
1. The organization of lSAs was a pre- 
requisite to the actual design and 
construction  of the irrigation facilities. 
2. It  was assumed that the ISAs' organized 
members  actively participated through- 
out the process. 
3. As the irrigation facilities were turned 
over to ISAs, the latter took the re- 
sponsibility in management, thus pro- 
moting self-reliance. 
4. Problems encountered by lSAs were 
sometimes beyond their capability, 
e.3..  lack of credit and postharvest 
facilities, deforested watershed. 
Rural drinklng water supply 
The DPWH Implemented this compo- 
nent, completing 456 Level 1 and 2 Level 
I1 water supply systems throughout the 
central and southern mainland  of  Palawan. 
A Level I  system is either a shallow or 
deep well constructed near a group of 
10-1  5 households. On the other hand, a 
Level II system stores water in a reser- 
voir and delivers it through several com- 
munal faucets located in  strategic polnts 
withln the community. As in the irriga- 
tion component, the establishment of  RWSA 
was a prerequisite  to  the actual construction 
'of  the system. The RWSAs were trained 
on the actual maintenance of the wells. 
In  contrast to the irrigation component, 
however,  no cornmunlty organizer was 
assigned to each RWSA. Obviously. em- 
ploying  one organizer for each of the 400 
or more RWSAs was unimaginable. Rather, 
the group of  households merely presented 
a list of officers and members to DPWH 
as proof that they were already organ- 
lzed as  an RWSA.  Consequently, cases 
of Ill-maintained  wells were noticed (about 
50% of the total number of wells did not 
produce any potable water). Moreover, 
despite the insistence of DPWH that RWSAs 
malntain the wells, several instances oc- 
curred wherein RWSAs demanded that 
DPWH replace the spare parts (even a 
slmple bolt) for the well. 
Throughout PlADP I, the following were 
observed on the drinking water supply 
component: 
1. The organization of RWSA was a pre- 
requlslte to constructlon. 
2. There were several reports of con- 
tractors constructing (and sometimes 
abandoning) the wells without no- 
tifying the village officials and/or 
RWSA. 3. Training on  maintenance was inad- 
equate. 
4. The RWSAs' sense of  ownership and 
responsibility for the wells was not 
noticeable. 
5. However, some RWSAs actively main- 
tained their wells. 
Upland stab//fzation 
Realizing the threat posed by shifting 
cultivation in  the uplands perpetuated by 
tribal communities (at the time of PlADP 
feasibility studies, in  contrast to  the present 
where majority of  kalnglneros are Chris- 
tian migrants), this project was imple- 
mented  through DENR to  pilot-test farming 
systems in  three sltes which would sta- 
bilize upland areas.  In this regard, the 
Tagbanuas and the Palawans (tribal groups) 
were the main project beneficiaries. It was 
envisioned that through demonstration 
and persuasion, these tribal communities 
would no longer practise kaingin, stay 
in the same area and apply more eco- 
logically sound farming  systems, with better 
economic returns. Throughout the project, 
the staff, consisting of  a forester-team leader 
and several community organizers-tech- 
nologists, stayed on site with the farm- 
ers. 
Stewardship contracts (in consonance 
with the Integrated Social Forestry Pro- 
gram) were distributed. The beneficiar- 
ies were also employed as laborers at the 
demonstration area, while taught on  various 
farming systems (e.g.,  contour farming, 
hedgerows, vegetative terracing) with  the 
objective that these farmers shall apply 
this knowledge on their own farms.  Ba- 
sic amenities and services were provided, 
such as drinking water, elementary edu- 
cation,  housing materials and health 
services. 
During the last two years of project 
implementation (1  989-1  990), the farmer 
beneficiaries were trained on coopera- 
tives and later organized as such. Upon 
project phaseout, these cooperatives were 
envisioned to manage their own  affairs, 
such as marketing  their products, acquiring 
inputs, continuing  the practice of  improved 
upland farming system, etc. 
Among the three pilot sites, Salogon 
at Brooke's Point remained the most properly 
maintained and operating even after project 
phaseout. A significant observation in  re- 
lation to this is that,  of the three sites, 
the farmers in  Salogon opted to have a 
communal stewardship contract while the 
other two  chose the individualized con- 
tract. 
The following were also observed: 
1. Organizing  the beneficiaries was not 
a prerequisite to  receive the benefits 
from government. 
2. Majority of  the beneficiaries (about 
120 households For each site) remained 
in their areas and were no  longer seen 
practising shifting cultivation. 
3. Ofthe  two  tribal groups, the Palawans 
had a more  closely knit social organi- 
zation than the Tagbanuas who in- 
cidentally were regularly in  contact 
with Christian lowlanders. 
Integrated environmental program 
Due to  the sensitivity of  Palawan's en- 
vironment, with its rich natural resources 
vulnerable to threats of  human activities, 
an environmental program  was included 
in the PlADP I package. Through scien- 
tific studies, several consultations with 
various sectors and after attempts to  draft 
a plan from 1983 to 1987, the "Strate- 
gic Environmental Plan for Palawan Bo- 
wards Sustainable Development" was finally 
formulated in December 1987 by PRADP 
Office and its consultants. 
A set of  strategies, SEP  was designed 
to be the framework for the sustainable 
development of  the province, balancing 
the much needed development efforts and the malntenance of its ecological Integ- 
rity. One of  SEP's strategies  was the pro- 
motion of CBRM, as  stated in  one of Its 
objectives. 'to  foster proper use and care 
of common resources by local commu- 
nities". 
The main goal of SEP was "to improve 
the living conditions of all Palawenos by 
developing its land and water resources 
in ways that are  economically viable, socially 
equitable and environmentally sustain- 
able". In attalnlng its goal, the following 
were adopted as philosophies: 
1.  Ecological viability -  The physical 
and biological processes that maintaln the 
productivity of natural ecosystems must 
always be kept intact. 
2.  Social acceptability -  The people 
themselves should be fully committed to 
support sustainable development activi- 
ties: this could be realized by fostering equity 
In  access to resources and the benefits 
derived kom them and through participative 
processes. 
3.  Integrated approach -  This gives 
way to a holistic view of  problems and 
issues prevailing in the environment as well 
as opportunities for cooperation and sharing 
that will eventually provide the resources, 
coordination and political will to  actually 
implement and sustain SEP activities. To 
implement the mandate of  the plan, the 
two  congressmen of Palawan filed the SEP 
Bill in the House of Representatives in 1988. 
After being approved as  House Bill  19576 
and later concurred in  by  the Senate, it 
was finally signed into law (Republic Act 
761 I) by then President Corazon Aquino 
on 19  June 1992. While awaiting its le- 
gitimization  from  1988 to 1990, PlADP 
OMce embarked on an environmental in- 
formation and education campaign, research 
and pilot-testing activities pursuant to  SEP. 
Along this Ilne, the Tamlang Catchment 
Rehabilitation and Protection Project, the 
lrawan Catchment Development Project and 
the Honda Bay  Resource Management 
Program, which could be considered as 
CBRM projects, were Implemented.  For 
purposes of this paper, the Honda Bay ex- 
perience shall be elucidated. 
Honda Bay: an Experlence In 
Community-Based Coastal 
Resources  Management 
Located on the eastern side of  main- 
land Palawan wlthin Puerto Prlncesa City, 
Honda Bay is large, approximately 28,000 
ha with  12  charted islands (Fig. 2). The 
islands are  generally small, ranging from 
1.25 to 45 ha, and most are surrounded 
by extensive shallow coral reef platforms, 
sand cays and mangroves. Coconuts are 
grown in flve of these Islands, namely, 
Fondeado, Fraser.  Makesi.  Meara and 
Ramesamey. Assessment of  the bay  in 
the  early 1980s showed a relatively good 
quality of  coral reef, seagrass bed and 
mangrove ecosystems. This is Indicative 
of good feeding, breeding and spawn- 
ing grounds of fish and other marine Ilfe. 
Thus, Honda Bay is  considered a major 
fishing ground in the province, especially 
In  Puerto Prlncesa City. 
Along the coast of  Honda Bay,  15 of 
the 19  villages are  directly dependent on 
it for livelihood. In  1890,  of the estlmated 
2,500 households in these villages, 85% 
were engaged In  Fishing, either as  a pri- 
mry  or alternative source of income. Tour- 
ism establishments and facilities have started 
to flourish along the beaches and in some 
dthe  small islands, namely, Pulding. Meara 
and Ramesamey. The islands of Arreclfe. 
Makesi, Bugins and Tadyo have become 
inhabited by permanent settlers. 
With the increasing population pressure, 
Fisheries resources are being depleted. 
Fish catch per unit effort had declined from 
36.5 kg in  1985  to 8.4 kg In  1989. Thls 
was  attributed  to the following:  (1) 
destructive fishing  methods such as 
dynamite or blast fishlng; (2)  encroachment 
by transients using "more efficient" fishlng 12  Irm  OWQY 
f ram PPC propar 
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methods (1.e..  trawl, minipurse seine and 
ring  nets) within the municipal or coastal 
waters;  and (3) destructive  land-based 
activities such as  logging and shifting 
cultivation causing erosion and siltation. 
slowly smothering the very foundation 
of  fisheries productivity -the  mangroves, 
seagrass beds and coral reefs. 
Although there are existing laws against 
illegal flshlng practices, enforcement Is 
another story. There may have been  a good 
turn-in of  apprehensions, but  culprlts are 
never really wnvlcted and punlshed. except 
for payment of fees In amounts mlnlmal 
compared to the value of  thelr haul. The 
situation Is true not only In Honda Bay. 
The same problems are prevalent In  other 
coastal and marine areas of  the province. 
But being a major Fishing ground near- 
est to Puerto Princesa Clty,  Honda Bay 
has become the focus of interest of as- 
sessment studies. 
In 1988, when PlADP Office negotiated 
wlth EEC for funding support, the latter 
suggested that the office should start 
Implementlng  action-orlented and hlgh- 
Imw  projects, rather than research studies. 
Consequently. HBRMP was conceptualized. 
The problem then was that the funds 
available (the unused portion of  the EEC grant during Phase I) could suffice for 
only one  and a half years of implementation. 
The  community-based  approach was 
believed to  require a minimum of three 
years within which target communities 
should be closely supervised by the project 
management. Nevertheless,  it was an 
opportunity to pilot-test  the CBCRM 
program within  SEP.  Meanwhile, the 
Planning Department of  PlADP  Office 
together with some  technical staff of its 
other departments tasked to  conceptualize 
the  project, recognized the presence of 
regular programs by other agencies and 
the  City Government that could be tapped 
in sustaining the operations of the project. 
A Special Projects Unit under the Project 
Management Department of  PlADP Of- 
fice was set  up to  undertake HBRMP, the 
Tamlang Catchment Rehabilitation  and 
Protection Project and the Irawan Catchment 
Development Project. Within this unit, a 
three-member technical staff was formed 
to  work on the finer points of the HBRMP 
operational plan and to  supervise its day- 
to-day activities. The team was  composed 
of a Team Leader -  a fisheries graduate 
(major  in business management) with ex- 
tensive experience in project planning and 
implementation coordination in both gov- 
ernment and nongovernmental organi- 
zations (NGOs); a Project Development 
Officer -  an agriculture graduate expe- 
rienced in project planning; and a Com- 
munity Organizer -  a fresh graduate In 
political science. 
The team finalized its operational plan 
after an ocular inspection of the area and 
some  interaction with the target commu- 
nities. These should have allowed sub- 
stantial community participation in planning. 
But as experienced, time limitation cut 
short the  process. The  team opted to  focus 
on communities where organizing activities 
had been started by other agencies. As 
wlll  be discussed later, this resulted in 
both positive and negative impacts relative 
to the success of the project. Neverthe- 
less, the project focused on two com- 
munities, Manalo and Sta. Cruz. 
Barangay Manalo, with 279 households. 
of  which majority are engaged in  both 
farming and Fishing, was selected because 
It was a recipient of an earlier project by 
the Regional Fisheries Training Center (RFTC) 
of  DA. Consequently, the beneficiaries of 
the said project who were organized by 
RFK became the participants of HBRMP. 
Barangay Sta. Cruz, a smaller community 
with 90  households, 12 km away from 
Barangay Manalo is  likewise composed 
of farmer-fishers.  It  was chosen due to 
Its potential for oyster and mussel cul- 
ture, considered an alternative to  the ex- 
tractive fishing methods. 
The HBRMP involved four major activities: 
project preparation, project impiemen- 
tation, training and preparation of an area 
management plan. 
Project preparation 
Project preparation included review 
of materials regarding the situation in 
the project area: evaluation of the project 
design against actual field  conditions 
(in consultation with prospective ben- 
eficlaries); establishment of linkages with 
Institutions; and the selection of  spe- 
cific project sites and beneficiaries. These 
provided the basis in the finallzation of 
the operational plan whlch outlined the 
objectives, approach and strategies, 
targets, schedule of activities and budg- 
etary requirement. 
The objectives of HBRMP were as  fol- 
lows: 
1. provide livelihood alternatives; 
2. relieve the fishing grounds from 
extractlve methods of fishing: 
3. enrich the natural breeding and feeding 
grounds of  marine life: and 
4. strengthen the community values 
on  environmental  protection, 
cooperativism and self-reliance. The objectives did not Include direct 
intervention on law enforcement as the 
team opted to  employ "positive strokes" 
which focused on the needs of  people 
and the  ecological habitat. The proposed 
project cost amounted to  P494,OOO (Ta- 
ble 1). 
The program on CBCRM, as outlined 
by  SEP and as pilot-tested  by HBRMP, 
intended to harness the communities in 
the proper use and protection of the coastal 
resources within  their locale. Basically, 
this allowed the communities the prior- 
ity right to use the resources while as- 
suming  the primary responsibility to protect 
these resources. Consequently, the fol- 
lowing were  adopted as  operational strat- 
egies: 
1. Beneficiaries/cooperators shall  be 
considered co-implementors and not 
mere recipients of inputs, and if possible 
must Le organized into working groups 
or associations. 
2. Technologies to  be introduced must 
be complementary in nature and use 
simple methodologies. 
3. Technical assistance must include the 
beneficiaries' secondary occupation 
such as  farming, usually upland. 
4. Aslde from structured semlnars/work- 
shops, on-the-job trainings shall be 
facilitated by the staff by working and 
maximizing the beneficiaries' partici- 
pation. 
5. Inputs of  other developmental in- 
stitutions (i.e., DA, DENR. City Gov- 
ernment)  shall be harnessed and re- 
inforced by starting where these  agen- 
cies have left off or coordinating/align- 
ing activities with their ongoing pro- 
grams. 
Project implementation was done in three 
phases:  (1) resource identification and 
mobilization, wherein the levelling of ex- 
pectations between and among  the pro- 
spective coop era to^ s, the project staff and 
the institutions was undertaken  to de- 
termine the responsibility centers  and the 
Table  I. The cost of the Honda Bay  Resource Management Project. 
Activity  Cost (P) 
A.  Project preparation  10,000 
B.  Project Implementation  17 1.600 
-  oyster and mussel nursery  20.000 
-  artificial reefs and fish shelter  15.000 
-  statlonary lift net  42,500 
-  seaweeds culture  12,500 
-  fish paste/fish sauce  12.000 
-  salt production 
-  mangrove rehabilitation 
-  village (barangay)  market 
-  hook and line fishing 
-  gill net flshing 
-  crab culture/aquasllviculture 
C.  Training 
D.  Preparation of area management plan 
E.  Proiect administration 
-  personnel  243,000 
-  office supplies  20.000 
-  travel  2  1.400 
Total  494.000 
------ counterpart each group was willing to share; 
(2) installation of structures; and (3) op- 
eration and maintenance as  part of the 
production phase. 
Throughout the process, suggestions 
and recommendations from project ben- 
eficiaries were encouraged relative to what 
type of projects they wanted to pursue. 
adopt or change. In  cooperation with various 
institutions  and with the assistance of PIADP 
Office, the project beneficiaries were able 
to start up and/or operationalize the fol- 
lowing undertakings: 
Barangay Sta. Cruz (with 10 households): 
I.  oyster and mussel nursery, and 
2. artificial reefs and fish shelters 
Barangay Manalo (with 57 households): 
1. stationary lift nets; 
2. seaweeds culture: 
3. fish paste/fish sauce; 
4. salt production; 
5. mangrove rehabilitation (1  2 ha); 
6. village market: 
7. hook-and-line fishing: 
8. gill-net fishing; and 
9. crab culture/aquasilvicuiture 
During project implementation  and after 
training on cooperativism, the beneflci- 
aries/participants  in Barangay Manalo 
organized the Manalo Coastal Mangrove 
Development Association Inc. (MCMDAI) 
and registered it  with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). 
-It might be surprising that wlthin a 
span of  one and a half years, the above 
activities within Barangay Manalo could 
be undertaken  by a group of fishers whose 
association grew from 10 to 57 mem- 
bers. However, to attain thelr targets, 
the members divided themselves Into 
working groups,  depending on their 
Interests, except For the hook-and-line 
and glll-net fishing and the crab cul- 
ture/aquasilviculture which were under- 
taken by all members. These actlvlties 
were considered a fallback in case their 
primary venture would fail. 
It  would also be interesting to consider 
the evolution of projects as  conceived 
by the beneficiaries: 
1.  When they decided to venture into 
seaweeds  farming  (which  was  then 
encouraged by the city goverment), they 
requested training  from  an  existing 
cooperatlve within the bay. 
2.  The crab culture activity was an idea 
raised by one of the participants, for which 
PIADP  Office requested the Mangrove 
Committee of the Ecosystems Research and 
Development Bureau (ERDB) of DENR  to 
train them. In  this regard, the beneficiaries 
readily accepted the ERDB  staffs suggestion 
to undertake aquasilviculture which would 
combine crab culture with mangrove and 
nipa enrichment/rehabilitation. 
3.  Gill-net fishing was initiated by the 
beneficiaries  to maximize their time at sea 
while  attending  to  the  seaweeds. 
maintaining the mangrove plantation or 
drying the anchovies caught by stationary 
lift nets. 
4.  The Fish paste and fish sauce projects 
were identified by the wives of fishers 
operating the stationary lift nets. 
5.  An offshoot of the stationary lift net 
project was snlt production to ensure supply 
of  salt for the fish paste/sauce production. 
The salt in the area was originally bought 
from Mindoro Province through the city 
market. The boiling method was adopted 
since the critical period was  during the 
rainy season,  instead of the usual solar 
method applicable only during summer 
months. 
6.  The village market was put up  through 
the initiative  of  the association in  cooperation 
with the village officials. 
Inklally, the project staff proposed a set 
of relevant projects expressed in relatively 
general  terms  to  the  prospectlve 
beneficlaries:  marlculture development. 
multiple fishing  gear, processing  of marine- 
based products, mangrove rehabilitation. training and extension services,  and 
community organization. Notably, the 
specific  projects that  later  evolved, 
conceptualized and implemented by the 
cooperators,  fell under these project 
categories. The broad project intentions 
basically provided' guidance and leeway 
for the beneficiaries to  contribute their ideas 
in  the detailed planning  and operation of 
the specific projects. Lessons learned on 
project development became experiential 
rather than theoretical. Although not all 
of  the projects at one time or another proved 
to be successful.  the working groups 
Involved had the chance to realize "what 
went wrong". This minimized "passing the 
buck"  in cases of failures  which usually 
resulted in disinterest and breakdown in 
other project undertakings. 
Grouping  of  beneficiaries prior  to  project 
implementation likewise cushioned the 
adverse effect of  disinterest in  some of  the 
members. There was always one or two 
members left to carry on the project and 
in  some cases encourage new  ones to  join. 
Consequently, in the promotion of 
projects, selection of  the appropriate project 
mix was based on the varying interests, 
values and motivations of  the beneficiaries. 
It was apparent that full-time fishers were 
more fickle-minded compared to fishers 
who  were also part-time farmers. This was 
associated  with the  nature  of their 
occupation. Farmers tend to  exercise more 
patience in  tilling their lands and waiting 
for the harvest season.  Fishers can earn 
income  overnight.  Mariculture  and 
mangrove plantation, actually farming at 
sea, were therefore.closely  tied up with 
multiple fishing gear which are simple and 
traditionally used In  the area. 
Another  motivational  mechanism 
employed was financial management. Each 
working  group within MCMDAI  was allowed 
to handle its sharing arrangements on 
income, recording and safekeeping. There 
were, however, a treasurer and an auditor 
to  check-and-balance the statement. Each 
group was required to set aside 20-40% 
of  their net Income  as contribution to  the 
general Fund of  the association which served 
as their emergency fund in  cases of  calamity 
and as a reserve for project expansion. 
Because every member felt a rightful  claim 
to a portion of  the fund, it  also served as 
a pull mechanism keeping the members 
intact. 
As a forerunner to the above financial 
management scheme, a 60-20-20 sharing 
arrangement was made of the proceeds 
or income derived from the stationary lift 
nets reinstalled for and by the beneficiaries. 
Sixty percent went to  the fisher-cooperators; 
2096 to the Regional Fisheries  Training Center 
(WC)  within two  years as repayment for 
the nets provided  (retrieved from a stationary 
lift  net  project undertaken by RJTC and the 
original 10  members, prior  to  HBRMP); and 
20% to  PlADP OHice to  be availed of  later 
by the fisher-cooperators as capital buildup 
or for calamities. Moreover, as agreed upon. 
the 20% share of PlADP OHice was turned 
over to the association upon evaluation 
of  its  cohesiveness, proper operations and 
maintenance of the lift nets and sound 
financial management. This money  was later 
used by the MCMDAl  members in  installing 
their village market and as  seed capital 
for  members engaged in buy-and-sell 
operations of rice and fish. 
Meanwhile, in setting up  the projects, 
specifically the structures, the beneficiaries 
were asked to  provide labor counterpart. 
They were also infdrmed of the risks and 
of  course the possible benefits. This way, 
thC beneficiaries became true partners of 
the  project  with  a  higher  level  of 
commitment and not mere recipients of 
inputs. 
Reaching out to the beneficiaries also 
meant  collaborating  with  the  other 
government  or  nongovernmental 
instltutions operating in  the  area. The HBRMP 
actually became an experience of four 
agencies:  RFTC-DA, Environmental 
Management Bureau-DENR,  the local governments (city and village) and PlADP 
Office. Working arrangements between and 
among  these  entities were both formal and 
informal, through a  Memorandum of 
Agreement or verbal  understanding. In 
either case, synchronized movements at 
the top enhanced the acceptance of  the 
project by the  community. This also  allowed 
sharing of experiences, both success and 
failure, that enabled improvement in style 
of operation. 
The multi-institutional  arrangement 
exposed the beneficiaries to linl<ages 
necessary for them to  sustain operations. 
The  regular programs  OF  the involved 
agencies were avenues that had been 
opened, so that as  HBRMP closed, the 
association still had several projects that 
could be pursued. During project phaseout, 
the association was negotiating with the 
Land Bank for financing of their proposed 
boat building  and coconut by-product 
processing project; a  100-ha mangrove 
plantation was  being discussed with DENR; 
and the development of the  village market 
into a consumer store  was  also underway. 
During the inception of HBRMP, the  city 
government also launched a community 
organization scheme  to  hasten delivery of 
government services, develop  self-reliant 
communities and provide a two-way access 
between the city government and other 
agencies on one hand and the local 
communities on the  other. Of the 60 villages 
within the city, they clustered a number 
of  contiguous  villages  into  Area 
Development and Management Units 
(ADMUs). A  Sangguniang Bayan  (City 
Council) member was assigned together 
with a respected private indivldual in the 
community to  organize each  ADMU, provide 
guidance and catalyze developmental 
activities identified by the  ADMU members. 
It was  envisioned that these ADMUs would 
become  private foundations or converted 
into NGOs to become self-reliant and a 
potent force to be harnessed towards 
community development. Consequently, 
the  two  ADMUs organized within the Honda 
Bay  area, SAMANMARLUC (Salvation, 
Manalo, Maruyogon and Lucbuan) and 
BACRUZ (Bacungan and Sta. Cruz), became 
partners of  the  HBRMP staff and beneficiaries 
themselves. The beneficiaries at  Barangay 
Manalo, who were organized into the 
MCMDAI,  affiliated  with  the 
SAMANMARLUC ADMU  while those at 
Barangay Sta. Cruz became members of 
the BACRUZ ADMU, and evolved later into 
a cooperative called BACRUZ Coop. 
The 18-month term of  HBRMP could not 
provide conclusive results on its impact 
on coastal  resources.  But  indications of 
Improvement have been observed. Trawls 
and ring nets which used to  Frequent the 
coastal waters are operating farther out 
to  sea,  while cyanide and blast fishers have 
been warned and therefore have become 
more careful and less potent. 
Along this line, the city government's 
organization of ADMUs was  a significant 
move  towards  greater effectivity in coastal 
resources protection in Honda Bay. The 
'open-access"  nature of coastal resources 
renders it almost impossible for protection 
efforts to  succeed if they are done  only 
in  isolated portions and without direct 
involvement by the community. In  the 
case of Honda Bay, the  SAMANMARLUC 
ADMU  is  intensifying Its campaign on 
fishing  ground  protection  through 
surveillance and actual apprehensions. 
It paralyzed the illegal fishers' operations. 
Unlike  if  only one vlllage took the 
campaign, it would have been so  easy 
for the illegal fishers to  move  to  the next 
village and render the effort futile. 
Training supports  the  productive elements 
of  the project by ensuring technical as 
well  as administrative competence of 
beneflclaries.  Training  coupled  with 
extension services provided  incentives to the beneficiaries  by enhancing their 
capability to  operationalize the projects 
with  minimum  supervision,  thus 
encouraging self-reliance. Extension services 
became almost personalized with PlADP 
staff attending to  the expressed needs 
of the beneficiaries in their other sources 
of  income aside From those utilizing coastal 
resources. Examples are  contour farming 
system in the uplands; sourcing of good 
varieties of planting materials:  and the 
establishment of a village market. These 
extension services were  done  with negligible 
cost to the project. 
On  institutional development, the  ben- 
eficiaries  were  assisted through trainings 
on cooperative principles and positive value 
system aside from imparting technolo- 
gies on income-generating projects and 
environmental protection measures. The 
decision. however, to  organize into a full- 
blown cooperative was left for the ben- 
eficiaries to decide whenever they,were 
ready For it. Meanwhile, they functioned 
as  an association. Registration with SEC 
provided legal personality to the asso- 
ciation in  Barangay Manalo, enabling it 
to  negotiate with other organizations. The 
cooperators in Barangay Sta. Cruz affili- 
ated with an existing cooperative in the 
area, the BACRUZ  Coop. Working with 
an existing organiution allowed more effort 
to  be devoted on capability strengthen- 
ing rather than on  the dragging process 
of registration. 
Preparation of an area 
management plan 
For the long-term prospect of Honda 
Bay's development and protection, a Rapid 
Rural  Systems Appraisal  (RRSA) was 
undertaken. This included the  assessment 
of Honda Bay and its associated catchments 
and an outline of recommended strategies 
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- Table 2. Loglcal framework matrlx. 
Problem  Development potentlal  Strategy 
Soclopolltlcal  Soclopolltlcal  1.  Strengthen local management 
~eptlve  attltude towards  1.  Generally young ancl llterate 
work  populatlon 
Poor health condltlon  2.  Presence of organited groups 
Land tenure  worklng towards communlty 
Inadequate drlnklng water  development 
SUPP~Y  3.  Area development management 
unlts dellneated by the city 
government 
Econornlcs 
1.  Lack of capltal 
2.  Lack of technology 
3.  Lack of draR anlmals 
4.  Pests and dlseases 
5.  Low sol1 fertlllty 
6. Low flsh catch 
7.  Low prlces of products 
Envlronmental 
1.  Forest denudatlon. 
lncludlng mangroves 
2.  lneffectlve enforcement of 
envlronrnental laws 
Econornlcs 
I.  Proxlrnlty to the clty proper 
where flnanclng Instltutlons. 
lrnplementlng agencles and 
educatlonal servlces are based 
2.  Available technology on 
approprlate Farming systems 
and flshlng rnethodologles 
3.  Accesslblllty to market outlets 
Envlronmental 
1.  Awareness of the people on 
envlronrnental primlples is 
relatlvely hlgh 
2.  Envlronmental damages have not 
yet reached crlsis level/ 
lrreverslble stage 
unlts towards sustainable 
development and self-reliance 
2.  Educate the people on posl- 
tive values and attltudes 
3.  Establish llnkages wlth govern- 
rnent/nongovernment support 
services 
4.  Develop and promote Ilvell- 
hood alternatives that are 
economlcally and envlronmen- 
tally sound 
5.  Counterbalance utlllzatlon 
pressure on resources wlth 
protection and habitat enrich- 
ment measures, as  follows: 
a.  promotlon of posltlve 
changes In land use (e.g.. 
tree parks In steephllls 
and stable upland farmlng 
system In lowhlllsl; 
b. enforcement of envlronmen- 
tally crltical areas network 
(ECAN) wlth priority to 
restrlcted use zone whlch 
buffers the core zone: 
c. establishment of communal 
mangrove forest reserves; 
and 
d. establishment of a marine 
reserve coverlng the whole 
of Honda Bay 
for  development to guide the local 
management  Units  in  their  future 
undertakings (Table 2 and Fig. 3).  The results 
of  RRSA and its consequent network analysis 
coupled with the  vast experience learned 
during the HBRMP Implementation make 
up a  potential reservoir of  knowledge, 
as outlined in the  area management plan, 
that  could  guide  future  sustainable 
development efforts and its actors not 
only in Honda Bay but also in the other 
fishing grounds In the province. 
The aftermath 
After the implementation of  HBRMP, 
a 1  00-ha three-year mangrove reforestatlon 
contract worth PI.  16 million was awarded 
to MCMDAI by DENR Although the  contract 
was approved by DENR In  1990, the 
mobllization Fund amounting to P108,OOO 
was released only In May 1992. Between 
the  signing of  the  contract and the  release 
of  the mobllization fund. PIADP Office. 
through its original HBRMP team, provided 
technical as  well as  administrative support 
to.  MCMDAI.  This  was  an  informal 
arrangement without any funding from 
PIADP, speclfic to the  activity. A one-year 
community-based  project may not be 
adequate  to successfully put In place what 
has been started. But  DENR's regular 
program on  communlty-based mangrove 
reforestation  proved to sustain certain 
activities of  HBRMP. At  this time. MCMDAI has fully planted 
the targetted 100 ha of tldal flat to  mangrove 
species,  inclusive of the  12 ha planted 
to  mangroves  in 1990- 1  99  1 that have grown 
to  an average height of 1 m. Survival rate 
for the total plantation  is 75-80%. Replanting 
in  place of  dead seedlings and maintenance 
of those that survive are being carried 
on by the officers and members of MCMDAI. 
Further, the members report a considerable 
improvement on their catch of marine 
products within the mangrove. 
Some earnings from the reforestation 
contract are being utilized by members 
of  MCMDAI for income-generating  projects 
such as piggery, fishpond, gill-net Fishing. 
mango spraying and handicrafts. 
Other  projects  did  not  achieve 
sustainability. The BACRUZ Coop and the 
SAMANMARLUC  ADMU  were  by 
themselves at the infantile stage at the 
time the projects were turned over. 
Meanwhile, with the change of leadership 
in the city government after the local 
elections in 1982, the ADMU Program 
was dissolved  by the present administration. 
Nevertheless, the protection of  Honda Bay 
is currently pursued by the clty government 
through its revived Bantay Dagat Program 
(Operation Baywatch). 
Unfortunately, the other group-oriented 
activities (e.g..  village market, saltmaking, 
aquasilviculture) suffered setbacks due to 
their premature Independence from the 
managlng association. 
This paper would llke to put forward 
two prlmary elements in  defining CBRM 
or specifically CBCRM as  a resources 
management strategy: (1  ) The community 
that utilizes a given resource is organized. 
either formally or informally. (2)  The sald 
organized community actively participates 
in  the proper management of the natural 
resources. Consequently, the capability 
for resource management (i.e., technical 
skills and organizational cohesiveness) of 
the organized  community has to be 
examined so that its activities and the 
inputs or assistance provided by 'outsider 
catalysts" (meaning government agencies 
or NGOs) will be sustained by the said 
community. 
Community organlzhg 
As experienced by PlADP or at least 
by two of its components, the establish- 
ment of an organization is a requirement 
prior to the actual delivery of services. 
However, it is observed that the more 
successful projects are those where or- 
ganizing is  not  a prerequisite; rather, the 
organizntlon of  communities just evolves 
after the people themselves recognize the 
need For it. However, there is yet no  es- 
tablished operating procedure as to when 
and in  what form the cornmunitles should 
be organized.  On the other hand, it is 
noted that to attain active participation 
and sustainability, there is no room for a 
"paper organlzntion". At  stake are the dwin- 
dling natural resources. It will be court- 
ing  disaster, if  a group of individuals are 
merely organized on paper just to have 
the authority to exploit the fragile eco- 
system. 
Meanwhile, in  community organizing, 
It is a must to consider the leadership 
pattern in  the community, Including  the 
kinship structure.  In Honda Bay for ex- 
ample, if a prospective leader does not 
associate well with his kin,  even the 
nonrelatives tend to look down on Rim. 
In a small community, where almost all 
are somehow related, thls is very significant. 
Moreover, among  tribal groups, the Salogon 
USP exemplifies the utility of the socio- 
cultural structure, i.e..  the dominance of 
the panglima (tribal leader) in  achieving 
positive acceptance and effectiveness of 
the program even after phaseout. A ctive participation 
Aside from a very cohesive organiza- 
tlon as an assurance towards meaning- 
ful and active participation of the com- 
munity in an activity, the requirement for 
equity and counterpart from the community 
is also an ektive  strategy. Further, flexibility 
in project design to provide leeway for 
the beneficiaries to  input their ideas, needs, 
perceptions and ingenuity during plan- 
ning and project execution is likewise an 
important element to get their partici- 
pation. Even financial management can 
be an incentive or disincentive for the 
beneficiaries to  be involved and committed 
to  the project. 
Other factors to  consider are the cred- 
ibility, attitude and capability of the com- 
munity organizers or the project staff. 
Specifically, the project staff must have 
the proper perspective on the role of par- 
ticipants in the total effort. A case in point 
is when these  workers consider the farmers 
a hindrance to  the  speedy completion of 
the project. In  addition, the organizers 
themselves should be properly or  adequately 
trained. Quality time with  farmers and 
fishers is also important, and should not 
be wasted as they also have their own 
priorities -  to feed their families. 
Actlve involvement is directly related 
to  the participants' need to  have a sense 
of ownership of  and commitment to  the 
project. If they themselves do  not iden- 
tify with the project, as experienced by 
the rural drinking water supply compo- 
nent of PIADP, then sustainability is not 
expected, thus making the exercise a waste 
in terms of time, money and effort. 
Capability enhancement 
Relevant to the actlve particlpation of 
the community is  the level of its capa- 
bility to  cope with the new responslbiii- 
ties of managing the resource, thus, the 
need to  enhance their capabiiity through 
training and information education campaign 
in whatever form. 
Again, this is  dependent on the capa- 
bility of the project staff to  train and support 
the related institutions to  provide train- 
ing. In  Honda Bay, one of the strategies 
adopted was tapping the assistance of 
the city government, RFTC and ERDB  to 
train the beneficiaries. The contacts with 
other institutions enhanced the capabil- 
ity of the  community. Later on they also 
provided the necessary linkages to  sus- 
tain their existing and proposed projects. 
However, the type of training and the 
messages to be delivered through an in- 
formation education campaign should be 
properly designed to address the needs 
of the community. Otherwise, if these are 
not relevant to  their interest, the participation 
of  the beneficiaries cannot be readily 
expected. 
Sustainability 
Inherent to CBRM  is  the issue of 
sustainability. Organized communities, 
with the active participation and enhanced 
capabilities of  people, logically point 
to the assumption that the communi- 
ties sustain their resources management 
activities. 
Pollcy-related issues 
Community arganizing has become al- 
most like a fad, similar to  the phenom- 
enal sprouting of  NGOs.  Every  project 
proponent in  an area is  organizing ac- 
tivities. A farmer or a fisher becomes a 
member of two or more associations to 
the detriment of his productive performance 
and ultimately that of the  group as a whole. 
Most of  his time is spent on organiza- 
tional meetings rather than on more sub- 
stantive concerns -  his livelihood. Meanwhile, a community can be con- 
sidered the sociopolitical unit beyond the 
family in a society. In  a situation where 
development decisions come from the 
central government, the community be- 
comes only the recipient with no  oppor- 
tunity at all to  be heard in  policymaking. 
It is therefore ironical to  promote  CBRM 
when decisions to utilize the resources 
are always made at the top (i.e.. concessions 
are issued in Manila). 
Moreover, in  a country where politics 
is almost accepted as a way of life, it is 
expected that CBRM will also be affected 
by political patronage and Interventions. 
Although politicians' involvement in  com- 
munity organizing is a welcome slgn, vested 
political interests in resource use and 
management are inevitable. On  the other 
hand,  although an NGO may have the 
advantages to  achieve an effective CBRM, 
it is not always the safe formula. There 
are also NGOs with  questionable origins 
and intentions. 
Finally,  while the government Is vig- 
orously pursuing  environmental rehabili- 
tation, little is done to protect the still 
relatively intact ecosystems. In Honda  Bay 
for example, mangroves are being  reha- 
bilitated simultaneous with  conversion of 
other existing ones into fishponds,  in 
addition to  the indiscriminate and unchecked 
cutting of the trees for housing materi- 
als and charcoal making. 
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